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In this thesis three distinct trading scenarios are considered and stochastic opti-
mal control models are proposed to derive the optimal strategy the agent/firm
should follow. First, we consider an agent who needs to liquidate a large amount
of an asset and can trade in both a ‘lit’ exchange and a dark pool. We find the
optimal selling schedule by solving numerically the resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation. Next, we consider a customised liquidity pool (CLP)
that offers a market-making service, by showing bid and ask prices to its clients.
The CLP earns the spread from each transaction and it is subject to an inven-
tory risk deriving from potential unfavourable price movements. The CLP can
hedge its position in the ‘lit’ pool by means of limit and/or market orders so
to rebalance its position on the asset. Finally, we consider a firm that offers
mixed principal-versus-agency trading to its clients, and which earns the spread
from the principal portion and a fixed fee for the brokerage service. We find
the optimal proportion of principal/agency liquidity that should be displayed
to clients and the optimal hedging strategy. We make specific reference to the
foreign exchange market and consider the cases of one currency pair and three
currency pairs. We provide the pseudo-codes, which have been written for solv-
ing numerically the models presented in this thesis, as well as a concise review
of the dynamic programming principle (DPP) and the viscosity solution theory,
specifically applied to the models discussed herein.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of the thesis
This thesis can be collocated within the extensive literature of algorithmic and
high-frequency trading. The increasing power of the machine, together with
new market needs, has determined a substantial increase in trading speed. Such
trading activity, which may take place at a millisecond level, is now mostly per-
formed by computers. At the basis of such execution rules there are complex
algorithms, which originate from mathematical models. Industry practitioners
typically have extensive market knowledge and convey such information into a
modest number of mathematical equations that output instructions, which form
the trading strategies followed by the firm. Depending on the firm’s activity,
whether it be betting on future price-movements direction or offering two-way
quotes to clients, financial analysis endeavours to maximise the firm’s net earn-
ings, while managing the risk taken. An analysis of the impact of high-frequency
trading has been studied in, e.g., Cartea et al. [25], who find that traders belong-
ing to such a class increase price impact as well as market noise, traded volume
and market liquidity.
In this context, we propose two classes of mathematical models which can be
utilised depending on the trading situations the agent (or firm) may face. For
each class of models we treat, we proceed as follows: We define the stochastic
differential equations, which model the evolution of the surrounding environment,
17
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and we describe the set of actions the agent may take to intervene on the financial
system. We make use of the optimisation techniques provided by stochastic
optimal control theory to single out the best admissible strategy and we plot
the results. We analyse how the results vary when different values of the model
parameters are employed, and we discuss the financial validity of the derived
results. In Section 7.1 we collect the main mathematical tools applied throughout
the thesis.
One of the important contributions of this thesis is to provide market practi-
tioners with new understanding and novel tools. As such, the thesis also aims
at capturing real market dynamics, which take place in modern trading floors.
Therefore, mathematical assumptions are made, while keeping practical consid-
erations in mind at all times.
1.2 Main contributions
The original work presented in this thesis revolves around two main research
streams: (i) optimal execution and (ii) optimal pricing and inventory manage-
ment. In this section we contextualise this work within the current literature
and we make specific references to the proposed innovations and the new contri-
butions we made.
1.2.1 Optimal execution
Agents who need to perform an ‘optimal execution’ typically trade for underlying
economic reasons. They trade in one direction only at any given time and are
subject to (unfavourable) price slippage. Since the rise of algorithmic and high
frequency trading, the need for clear and predetermined trading schedules has
become essential to guarantee minimal market impact and effective execution
by the due-date the agent may have. The general agreement is that slicing a
“parent order” (i.e. the whole amount which needs to be executed) into “child
orders” is optimal when it comes to large executions. This is so to minimise
the turmoil in the market, which may encourage other agents to trade in the
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same direction, further impacting the market price. Additionally, it gives the
chance for the order book to be refilled, in order for market participants to trade
at better prices. The main question is how such parent orders should be sliced.
With no information available and a set terminal date, trading at a constant rate
looks like a reasonable approximation of an optimal strategy. On the other hand,
depending on market conditions and the benchmark of the agent, the trading
speed may take visibly different shapes, making the constant-rate liquidation
strategy largely sub-optimal. Pioneers of this research field are Almgren and
Chriss [2] and Bertsimas and Lo [10]. A great deal of research has developed
since then and we refer in particular to the book by Cartea et al. [23] and
Gue´ant et al. [43] and the references therein. In particular, the benchmark of
the agent substantially changes the shape of the optimal policy. We find, e.g.,
(i) the work by Lorenz and Almgren [61] where agents target a mean-variance
criterion, (ii) the papers by Cartea and Jaimungal [21], Frei and Westray [39]
and Guea`nt and Royer [46] on targeting VWAP1, (iii) the work by Løkka [62] in
which a maximisation of a CARA2 utility function is considered, et cetera.
A related research stream, i.e. optimal execution in situations where multiple
venues are available to market participants, has also been the object of recent
studies. In particular Kratz and Scho¨neborn [57, 58] introduced dark pools as a
liquidating venue in a setting applicable to order-driven markets. Horst and Nau-
jokat [52] studied a similar problem, in that liquidation was performed through
passive orders (which share similarities with the dark-pool order-matching struc-
ture) and aggressive orders.
Main Contributions: Our work on optimal execution falls in the latter cate-
gory and we consider a situation where both ‘lit’ and dark pools are available to
market participants. Although the topic is not original in itself, we propose sev-
eral modifications and extensions to the state-of-the-art literature by analysing
the effects of, e.g., permanent price impact3 in a continuous-time model, which
1Volume Weighted Average Price.
2Constant Absolute Risk Aversion.
3Permanent price impact may occur more often in less liquid markets, in which it takes
more time for the liquidity taken by a market order to be refilled via submission of fresh limit
orders. Furthermore, it may happen due to trades originated by a new flow of price-sensitive
information. Finally, large orders are more likely to cause permanent market impact compared
to small-sized orders.
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has not been discussed elsewhere in the aforementioned works. Next we propose
a model for the whole top of the book, by giving a structure to both the lit-pool
best bid price and the spread. Additionally, we consider partial order execution
in the dark pool. Finally, we work with more structured price dynamics and
do not require for the latter to be martingales. With this last assumption, we
consider the possibility for the agent to have a market view and schedule his
trading accordingly. These results are presented in Chapter 3.
1.2.2 Optimal pricing and inventory management
As noted by Carmona and Webster [17], research on optimal market making
can be associated to two different schools of thought. On the one hand, we
find inventory-risk models in which market makers construct their posting strat-
egy in accordance with their risk aversion and the current distance from their
preferred inventory position. Such market makers rarely, if ever, bet on future
price movements. They offer bid and ask quotes and trade in either direction
with their clients. As a result of such trades, and assuming the price remains
constant, market makers earn the spread from each transaction. Price updates
today are at a millisecond level and thus it can happen that the market maker
trades (out of a long position) at a lower price than the one they entered at. Such
a trade results in a loss if the charged spread was not wide enough to cover such
a movement. Therefore, by offering liquidity, the market maker is subject to an
inventory risk, which can be mitigated by adjusting his quotes and/or crossing
the spread to actively hedge out his position. Pioneers of this line of research
are Garman [40] and Amihud and Mendelson [3, 4].
On the other hand, a second line of research has its focus on adverse selection,
asymmetric information, client alpha and price direction. Such optimal quoting
problems have been extensively studied since the late ’80s (cfr. Kyle [59]). The
goal was to find the optimal bid and ask quotes to trade a security, given partial
information about its future value.
In the context of an order driven market, such a problem has recently been stud-
ied by Guilbaud and Pham [47]. They assume that a market maker posts limit
Chapter 1. Introduction 21
orders on both sides of the book and submits market orders when its inventory
becomes critically small or large.
Main Contributions: The research presented in this thesis can be positioned
in the framework of inventory-risk. We consider a firm which offers quotes to
its clients. It also intersects the more recent research on order-driven markets in
that such a firm can hedge out its position by means of limit and market orders.
At the time of this writing we are not aware of other similar works. We find the
optimal pricing and hedging strategies the firm should follow, and we present
our results in Chapter 4. In the same context, we provide an application of the
above framework to the foreign exchange market in which one and three currency
pairs are traded. We propose a mixed principal and agency execution offered by
a firm to its clients. The foreign exchange literature is very limited in itself and
currency-pair trading in an order-driven market is rather unexplored territory
as of now. We find the optimal principal versus agency proportion of liquidity
that should be offered to clients as well as the hedging strategy the firm should
follow. In this last application, we further (implicitly) consider an element of
price discovery and adverse selection when, e.g., we allow for features such as
permanent impact and mean reversion of the price process. These additional
features position the work presented in Chapter 5 in the intersection of the two
research lines discussed above.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of six main chapters. The original work is presented in
Chapter 2, in particular Section 2.3.2, and in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. The
remainder of Chapter 2 gives the reader an overview of the problems at hand,
and in Chapter 7 we collect the main mathematical tools utilised throughout the
thesis. While we provide proofs specific to the original models presented here,
such results are not original in the sense that standard techniques are applied,
and thus we do not wish to refer to them as being ‘original’ work. This thesis is
structured as follows:
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In Chapter 2 we provide four reference models for both optimal execution and
optimal market making, with and without the presence of a dark pool as an
alternative trading venue. We start the chapter by refreshing some order-driven
market terminology and, in Section 2.2, we introduce the optimal-execution and
market-making problems when only a lit pool is available to market participants.
In the optimal-execution case, the goal is to find the optimal trading schedule of
an agent who wishes to execute a sizeable amount of shares over a finite period
of time. We provide a reference model and we show the optimal strategy, which
we obtain numerically. Next, we introduce the market-making problem faced by
an agent who submits limit orders on both sides of the book and is subject to an
inventory risk (associated with future price movements) throughout the activity.
The agent can hedge his position by crossing the spread via the submission
of market orders. The optimal strategy is shown and its features are discussed.
Next we move to Section 2.3 where we assume the presence of a dark pool, and we
revisit the optimal-liquidation and optimal market-making problems within this
new setting. In the optimal execution case, the agent can post simultaneously
in both venues. With regard to the market-making problem, we switch our
vantage point and assume that a firm (which shares similarities with modern
dark pools) offers tailored prices which are only visible to its clients. Such a
firm, which is also subject to an inventory risk, can hedge its position in a
standard exchange by submitting both limit and/or market orders. This latter
problem (cfr. Section 2.3.2) is a novelty in the literature and as-such is part of
the original work presented in this thesis. The models analysed in this chapter
do not aim at capturing realistic market features, for they are only meant to
provide the reader with the basic tools and concepts that will be largely utilised
later in the thesis. In light of such a goal, the mathematical complexity has been
reduced to a minimum.
In Chapter 3 we take the perspective of an agent who wishes to liquidate or
acquire a substantial number of shares. We consider structured price dynamics
and, in Section 3.2, we start by analysing the situation where the agent is only
allowed to trade in a ‘lit’ pool. When mentioning a ‘lit’ market, we refer to an
accessible venue with full transparency and a limit order book publicly available
for trading. In such a venue the execution is certain, since we assume the agent
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trades by means of market orders only. We find the optimal trading schedule of
the agent and compare it with the one shown in Chapter 2. In Section 3.3, we
consider an optimal simultaneous execution in ‘lit’ and dark pools. In the latter
venue the liquidity is hidden and trades take place at the ‘lit’-pool mid-price.
Here anonymity is preserved, and price impact is avoided. As a shortcoming,
execution is not guaranteed, for it is subject to the existence of a trading coun-
terparty. We take as a reference model the work by Kratz and Scho¨neborn [57]
and we consider the following modifications: (i) more realistic price dynamics
which incorporate empirically observed market features, (ii) presence of perma-
nent price impact when trading in the ‘lit’ pool, and (iii) optionality of partially
filled orders submitted to the dark pool. We show, and provide a financial inter-
pretation to, the optimal trading schedule in each venues. This chapter is based
on Crisafi and Macrina [30].
In Chapter 4 we consider a firm which provides two-way liquidity to its clients
and optimally chooses the spread it charges for offering such a service. Such a
spread is also a function of the order size, since we assume that larger orders
should be executed at a wider spread. We consider a jump process for the ‘lit’
pool mid-price and a continuous-time Markov chain with a discrete state space
for the spread process. The firm is subject to an inventory risk, which can be
mitigated by skewing the quotes offered. In addition, the firm can resort to the
‘lit’ exchange to actively exit its position. In particular, the firm can post limit
orders in the standard exchange, of which execution is uncertain, but from which
the firm benefits due to advantageous prices. The firm may also cross the spread
and post expensive market orders. Limit orders posted for hedging purposes need
not to be placed on top of the book. We numerically solve the derived system
of quasi-variational inequalities and we graphically show the optimal strategy
of the firm. Finally, we comment on the empirical terminal-cash distribution,
which we obtain by Monte Carlo simulations. This chapter is based on Crisafi
and Macrina [31].
In Chapter 5 we further extend the framework presented in Chapter 4 by in-
cluding the possibility for the firm to execute only a portion of the client’s order
principally, i.e. as a market maker, while trading the remaining part in the
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standard exchange on behalf of the client. Analogous to Chapter 4 the firm is
subject to an inventory risk, which can be mitigated by (i) skewing its prices,
(ii) offering asymmetric percentages of principal liquidity and (iii) crossing the
spread in the standard exchange via market orders. We consider the foreign
exchange market and present models for trading one and three currency pairs.
We show the optimal principal strategy, that is, the optimal portion of order to
be executed principally, and the hedging strategy of the firm.
In Chapter 6 we summarise the results obtained in this work and suggest further
directions this research may take. Finally, in Chapter 7, we provide a brief
description of the viscosity solution theory and we give the pseudocodes we use
to numerically solve the HJB equations stated in the thesis.
Chapter 2
Reference models
2.1 Overview of the chapter
In this chapter we provide an introduction to the optimal execution and the
optimal market making problems. We start by describing the functioning of ‘lit’
pools, namely (i) the different types of order that can be sent to such pools, and
(ii) the different types of agent that trade regularly within those venues. We
then provide reference models for the aforementioned trading situations, which
are the object of study of this thesis. We finally introduce the concept of dark
pools, their main features and the associated reference models for both trade
execution and market making.
In what follows we consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a fil-
tration {Fu}0≤u≤T satisfying the usual conditions, such that all the processes
specified below are taken to be {Fu}-adapted.
2.2 ‘Lit’ pool and its terminology
Market participants can send passive or aggressive orders to the ‘lit’ pool. Passive
orders (or limit orders) specify the quantity and the price at which the posting
agent wants to buy or sell. Such orders are recorded in the limit order book
(LOB) until they are executed or cancelled. The highest price at which an
25
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investor is willing to buy (or, equivalently, a limit buy order is posted) is called
the best bid price, and the lowest price at which an investor is willing to sell (or,
equivalently, a limit sell order is posted) is called the best ask price. The difference
between the best ask and the best bid prices is called spread and their arithmetic
average is called mid-price. The latter is a theoretical quantity and is not a
tradable price in most standard exchanges (exceptions include mid-matching
orders for foreign exchange trading in electronic crossing networks). Limit orders
are filled by aggressive orders (or market orders), which only specify quantities
that wish to be traded, and are to be executed at the best available LOB prices.
In particular, market buy (sell) orders are matched with limit sell (buy) orders.
Most exchanges follow the price-priority rule. That is, limit orders at a more
favourable price are executed first. When multiple limit orders are posted at
the same price, the first-in-first-out rule applies (time priority). Investors who
post limit orders are called liquidity providers, while investors who submit market
orders are called liquidity takers. A market order is expensive and the agent pays
the spread, while the latter can be earned through limit orders. On the other
hand, a market order benefits from sure execution (provided that there is enough
liquidity in the LOB), while a limit order may not be executed. Crossing the
spread is an alternative definition of submitting market orders and walking the
book is the action of moving the best price available via aggressive trading. Such
a movement is called price impact (or slippage), which can be temporary and/or
permanent. We distinguish between two main classes of market participants that
operate in ‘lit’ pools. Buy-side agents, who trade only in one direction at any
given time, and sell-side agents or market makers, who post limit orders on both
sides of the LOB to earn the spread. The former agents need to solve an optimal
execution problem to find their optimal trading schedule, while the latter need a
model for optimal market making. In what follows, we provide reference models
for both types of agent.
2.2.1 An introduction to optimal execution
The current literature on optimal execution in an order-driven market is vast
and interesting. Research in the field has its roots in the papers by Almgren
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and Chriss [2], and Bertsimas and Lo [10]. More recent contributions include,
e.g., Pemy and Zhang [72], Pemy et al. [73], Gatheral and Schied [41], Brigo
and Di Graziano [12], Moazeni et al. [67], and Cartea et al. [22]. Cartea and
Jaimungal [20] consider a continuous-time, jump-diffusion mid-price model and
explicitly take into account the impact of the market activity on the mid-price.
In the same context, we also mention the works by Gue´ant et al. [44], and
Bayraktart and Ludkovsky [7], who treat optimal liquidation via limit orders.
Microstructural features of optimal trading in LOBs are, for example, treated in
(i) Cartea and Jaimungal [19], who model the spot price via a hidden Markov
chain to capture the switches between price regimes, (ii) Cartea et al. [24], who
model the deviation of mid-price from its long-term mean via a jump-diffusion
process, and (iii) Obizhaeva and Wang [69] and Alfonsi et al. [1], who propose
trading strategies by modelling the LOB’s depth.
Here we describe a simple model based on Cartea et al. [23], which serves as
a building block for the next chapters. We consider an agent who wants to
execute a sizeable trade by means of aggressive orders in a ‘lit’ pool. We assume
that there is enough liquidity in the LOB to match their market orders at any
point in time. They execute existing limit orders and impacts the best price,
making their subsequent trades less profitable. The agent’s trades are subject
to both permanent and temporary price impacts. For explanation purposes, we
restrict our attention to optimal liquidation, while keeping in mind that optimal
acquisition is analogous. The goal is to find the optimal selling schedule that
maximises their performance criterion.
2.2.1.1 A reference model
In this section we provide a base model that is useful for comparison with the
ones proposed in the following chapters. We assume that the agent trades on a
continuous-time basis between a starting time t ≥ 0 and a terminal date T , and
we denote by ν := {νu} their selling rate. The LOB best bid price is subject to
both a permanent and a temporary price impact derived by the agent’s trades.
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In particular, the permanently impacted best bid price satisfies
dSbu = −µνudu+ σdWu, (2.1)
where {Wu}, for u ≥ t, is a standard Brownian motion, the initial price level is
Sbt = s
b and µ ≥ 0. An assumption that is usually made, see e.g. Almgren and
Chriss [10], is that the investor will get the trade orders executed at a price that
includes an instantaneous impact commensurate to the liquidation rate ν. This
feedback effect is commonly referred to as temporary impact. The temporarily
impacted best bid price Sˆbu is given by
Sˆbu = S
b
u − βνu, (2.2)
where β ≥ 0. The temporary price impact happens when the quantity posted
at the best-price level is not sufficient to fill the the incoming aggressive or-
der. Hence, by (potentially) exhausting multiple book levels, the resulting price
received by the agent may be less than the current best bid price.
Finally, the agent’s inventory evolves according to
dXu = −νudu, (2.3)
and starts at an initial size Xt = x ≥ 0. The agent has a performance criterion
that they wish to maximise by optimally choosing their trading schedule (i.e. the
process νu, ∀ u ∈ [t, T ]). Such a criterion can include a variety of components in
order to reflect the preferences specific to that particular agent. In this context
we assume that the agent wants to maximise their total revenues subject to: (i)
a running penalty for holding the inventory throughout the whole liquidation
period, and (ii) a penalty for failing to liquidate their entire inventory by T . The
former penalty models the urgency of the agent for liquidating the inventory,
while the latter penalty can be interpreted as the reluctancy of the agent to
terminate the trading period with a non-zero inventory. Further details are
given below. We write for the value function
V (t,x) = sup
ν
Et,x
[∫ τ
t
(
Sˆbuνu − φX2u
)
du+
(
Sbτ − αXτ
)
Xτ
]
, (2.4)
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where α and φ are non negative constants, and x := (x, sb) is a vector of state
variables1. The stopping time τ , defined by
τ := inf{u ≥ t |Xu ≤ 0} ∧ T, (2.5)
indicates the first time the inventory is depleted or the terminal date, whichever
comes first. That is, the agent stops trading as soon as their inventory reaches
zero, if that happens before T . Equation (2.4) will be used throughout the thesis,
hence it is worth commenting on the meaning of each of its components. The
quantity Sˆbuνu models the instantaneous revenues due to the sale of the shares.
Indeed, the rate of trading νu is multiplied by the temporary impacted bid price.
This reflects the fact that there may not be enough liquidity posted on the first
level of the book to satisfy the order of size νu and thus the agent’s aggressive
order may exhaust multiple levels. The higher the rate of trading, the higher
the number of levels taken from the book. This is incorporated in the functional
form of Sˆbu in (2.2). The quantity φX
2
u models the running penalty for holding
the inventory. In other words, φ is a measure of the urgency of the agent. The
higher φ, the sooner the agent wants to liquidate their inventory. The quantity
SbτXτ represents the terminal theoretical value of the shares at time τ . Such
quantity is different from zero only if τ = T and XT > 0. In fact, if τ < T , then
Xτ = 0—by definition of the stopping time τ—and the liquidation task is over.
The analogous holds for the quantity −αX2τ , which is non-zero only if τ = T and
XT > 0. Such a quantity models the terminal penalty for holding the inventory.
We interpret it as the ‘disappointment’ of the agent who failed to liquidate their
whole inventory. We would like to remark that the expression
(
Sbτ − αXτ
)
is
not necessarily to be intended as the price at which the remaining shares are
evaluated, since that could easily be negative for Xτ and α sufficiently large.
Standard techniques from dynamic programming principle2 (DPP) suggest that
the value function V (t,x) should satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
1Throughout the thesis we refer to the vector of state variables by the notation x, which may
take different meanings within different models, depending on the state variables considered for
the particular model. We always state explicitly the components of the vector x.
2See, e.g., Pham [75].
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(HJB) partial differential equation:
sup
v
{(
sb − βv)v − φx2 + ∂V
∂t
(t,x)− µv ∂V
∂sb
(t,x) +
1
2
σ2
∂2V
(∂sb)2
(t,x)
−v∂V
∂x
(t,x)
}
= 0,
(2.6)
with terminal condition V (τ,x) = (sb−αx)x and boundary condition V (u, 0, sb) =
0.
Remark 2.1. The HJB equation (2.6) is a special case of the more general model
discussed in the appendix, Section 7.1. The steps for its derivation are provided
in details therein. The above applies to all the HJB equations presented in this
thesis.
The functional form of the terminal condition (used to formulate an appropriate
ansatz), together with the linearity of the impact functions (i.e. βνu and µνu)
and the continuous price process dynamics result in the possibility of finding a
closed-form solution for Equation (2.6). An explicit expression for the optimal
strategy {νu} and the remaining inventory {Xu} deriving from (2.6) are given
by3:
νu = γ
ζeγ(T−u) + e−γ(T−u)
ζeγT − ζe−γT x, Xu = γ
ζeγ(T−u) − e−γ(T−u)
ζeγT − ζe−γT x, (2.7)
where
γ =
√
φ
β
, ζ =
α− µ2 +
√
βφ
α− µ2 −
√
βφ
, (2.8)
and x is the initial inventory level. Equation (2.7) is a deterministic function
of time and of the model parameters. In what follows, for consistency with the
remainder of the thesis, we graphically show the optimal strategy for various
parameters’ values and comment on their roles.
2.2.1.2 Numerical results and parameters’ analysis
In this section we show how the trading schedule changes when the model pa-
rameters vary.
3We refer to Cartea et al. [23], pages 144-146, for the details of the steps sufficient to achieve
a closed-form solution of (2.6).
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Remark 2.2. We numerically solve Equation (2.6)—which describes the local
behaviour of the value function—and plot the optimal strategy of the agent. We
then double-check the validity of our algorithm with Equation (2.7).
First, we find the optimal rate of trading v by applying first order conditions to
Equation (2.6). Then we substitute the resulting expression for v in the HJB
equation, in order to eliminate the sup operator (the method is standard and
widely used in, e.g. Cartea et al [23]). Finally, we employ a standard finite
difference method to solve the resulting, highly non-linear, PDE. We define time
and space grids, and apply the terminal and boundary conditions to the relevant
grid points. We then proceed backwards in time to determine further points
in the grid via a discretisation of the HJB equation (2.6). We thus are able
to approximate the value function and the optimal strategy of the agent. This
method is used throughout this chapter and we refer to the above high-level view
of the methodology for all the numerical results shown herein. Boundary and
terminal conditions are stated below each HJB equation, and parameters values
are reported below each plot.
Throughout this section, we consider an equally-spaced time grid [0,10] with
intervals of 0.01, an equally-spaced price grid [0,10] with intervals of 0.1 and an
equally-spaced inventory grid [0, 30], with intervals of 1.
We start by analysing the role of α and φ.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (2.6). We set σ = 0.1, β = 0.1,
µ = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 8, T = 10. In the left panel we set φ = 0.005. In the right
panel we set α = 0.1
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In Figure 2.1 we plot the evolution of the inventory for different values of α (left
panel) and φ (right panel). As α increases, the agent is motivated to liquidate a
bigger portion of their inventory by T . Higher values of φ incentivise the investor
to liquidate faster at the beginning, as a consequence of the higher reductions of
the value function when holding a large inventory throughout the whole period.
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
R
e
m
a
in
in
g
in
v
e
n
to
ry
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Selling schedule - β
β = 0.5
β = 0.1
β = 0.05
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
R
e
m
a
in
in
g
in
v
e
n
to
ry
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Selling schedule - µ
µ = 0.1
µ = 0.05
µ = 0.01
Figure 2.2: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (2.6). We set σ = 0.1, x = 30, sb = 8,
α = 0.1, φ = 0.001, T = 10. In the left panel we set µ = 0.01. In the right panel we
set β = 0.1
In Figures 2.2 we show how the optimal selling schedule changes, when different
values of the temporary (left panel) and permanent (right panel) impacts are
considered. When the impacts decrease, the agent liquidates a bigger portion
of their inventory by the terminal date T . This confirms the intuition that the
agent refrains from placing large orders (when the market impact is high) as to
avoid slippage: a feature that makes their trades progressively less profitable.
Our conclusion on the above reference model on optimal liquidation can be sum-
marised as follows. The agent wishes to liquidate their inventory by T , though
there is no obligation to do so. This feature is modelled by the parameters α and
φ, which penalise the agent for holding inventory (at maturity and throughout
the whole period, respectively). The agent’s liquidation urgency is modelled by
the parameters α and φ. In particular, we observe the following: (i) the higher
α, the smaller the remaining inventory at T , and (ii) the higher φ, the faster the
liquidation during the initial period. On the other hand, higher price impacts
reduce the selling rate of the agent by making the liquidation process more ex-
pensive. A variation of the above model consists in constraining the inventory to
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be zero by T , i.e. by setting x = − ∫ Tt νudu. This gives rise to a singular terminal
condition where limt→T V (t,x) = 01{x=0} −∞1{x 6=0}. Within this alternative
model, the coefficients µ and β have no impact on the amount of inventory liqui-
dated by T , while φ determines the selling impatience within the considered time
frame. A very similar feature is obtained, in the present framework, by setting
a sufficiently large α (see Figure 2.1—left panel—for α = 0.5). In fact, from
Equation (2.7), we have limα→+∞Xu = sinh(γ(T − u)x/ sinh(γT ). Hence, for
u = T , we have XT = 0, which means that no remaining inventory is held at time
T . This is not surprising, since by setting α = +∞, we have recovered the afore-
mentioned singular terminal condition, i.e. limt→T V (t,x) = 01{x=0}−∞1{x 6=0}.
2.2.2 An introduction to the market-making problem
As opposed to the agent whose goal is to find the optimal strategy to buy or sell
a large amount of an asset, a market maker does not trade in one direction only.
They post limit orders on both sides of the book, thus selling at the higher rate
and buying at the lower rate. Throughout their activity, the market maker may
hold an inventory (which may be negative in the case of short-selling), which
is associated to a risk coming from future price uncertainty as well as better
information that the market-maker’s counterparties may have. If the inventory
surpasses a (optimal) threshold, we assume that the market maker themselves
crosses the spread—by submitting aggressive orders—until the inventory is rebal-
anced and set within the acceptable level. At the end of the trading period, say
T , the market maker wishes to have a neutral position (equivalently, a zero inven-
tory) and is subject to a penalty proportional to the amount of asset held at T .
Previous work on market making includes Amihud and Mendelson [3] who, based
on Garman [42], relate the bid-ask prices to the share holding of a risk-neutral
agent. They find a relationship between the optimal quotes and the distance
from the “preferred” inventory position. Stoll [83] considers a two-period model
in which a risk-averse agent supplies liquidity and maximises their expected
utility. Ho and Stoll [51] utilise the DPP to obtain the optimal quotes which
maximise the terminal wealth in a single-dealer market. The recent evolution
in financial markets, arising with algorithmic and high-frequency trading, has
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shifted the optimal market-making problem to trading in an order-driven mar-
ket, where optimal quotes and trading strategies are computed and performed by
electronic machines. For example, Avellaneda and Stoikov [5] consider a market-
making problem in a limit order book. They consider the maximisation of the
agent’s utility function in both the finite and the infinite-time cases. They model
the arrival of buy and sell orders by Poisson processes and the dynamics of the
mid-price by an arithmetic Brownian motion. This type of problem has been
investigated elsewhere, too. The works by Cartea and Jaimungal [20] on risk
metrics and by Cartea et al. [18] consider ambiguity and Hawkes processes4, re-
spectively. Gue´ant et al. [45] deal with the inventory risk and reduce a complex
optimisation problem to a system of ODEs. Guilbaud and Pham [47] consider
a market maker who continuously submits limit orders at the best quoted (or
slightly better) prices and resorts to market orders when the inventory becomes
too large. They numerically solve a finite-time impulse-control problem and find
the optimal order sizes and quotes to be posted in the standard exchange.
As a reference model we here consider a mixture of (i) the market making problem
treated in Cartea et al. [23], and (ii) a simplified version of the Guilbaud and
Pham [47] framework. In particular, the following two modifications with respect
to Cartea et al. [23] are employed: (i) the market maker does not choose the
limit price and only posts on top of the book, and (ii) they can hedge their
inventory through market orders. Compared to Guilbaud and Pham [47], we
have: (i) unit-sized orders, (ii) continuous price process and constant market
spread, and (iii) the market maker can only post on top of the book. The model
described in Section 2.2.2.1 is for introduction purposes only and does not wish
to be realistic. The modifications with respect to Cartea et al. [23] and Pham
[47] are only made for simplicity of exposition. For example, the assumption
regarding a constant half spread is unrealistic (in normal market conditions) and
will, in fact, be removed in Chapter 4.
2.2.2.1 A reference model
We assume that the market maker trades within t and T , and continuously posts
unit-sized limit buy and sell orders on top of the book. Such orders are assumed
4Hawkes processes are self-exciting processes introduced by Hawkes [49].
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to be immediate-or-cancel (IOC) orders, that is either they are immediately
executed, or the market maker cancels them and posts new orders at the (possibly
updated) best bid and ask prices. We assume that the mid-price follows an
arithmetic Brownian motion
dSu = σdWu, (2.9)
with initial state level St = s. We assume that the market has a constant half
spread k, such that the best ask and bid prices are defined by
Sau = Su + k and S
b
u = Su − k, (2.10)
respectively. We assume that the market-maker’s inventory satisfies the following
stochastic differential equation
dXu = dN
−
u − dN+u , (2.11)
where Xt = x and {N±u } are independent Poisson processes with intensities λ±.
The process {N−u } models incoming market sell orders which fill the market
marker’s limit buy orders, while the process {N+u } models incoming market buy
orders which fill limit sell orders posted by the market maker.
Remark 2.3. The difference of two independent Poisson-distributed random
variables is well-known to be distributed according to the Skellam distribution
(Skellam [80]). As such, we could have written Equation (2.11) by a Skellam pro-
cess for the sake of compactness. We chose the current non-compact formulation
for ease of interpretation and for ease of comparison with the current relevant
literature (e.g. Cartea et al. [23]).
Finally, we define the cash process by
dYu = (Su + k)dN
+
u − (Su − k)dN−u , (2.12)
with initial state level Yt = y. The inventory and cash equations are to be
interpreted as follows. When the Poisson process {N+u } jumps, a limit sell order
is executed by an incoming aggressive buy order. The market-maker’s inventory
is reduced by one unit and their cash is increased by the amount Su + k. The
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analogous holds when {N−u } jumps. We emphasise that this is not an optimal
posting problem, i.e., the market maker does not choose the prices at which they
post their limit orders. We remove such an assumption in Chapter 4.
At any time the market maker can choose whether they want to cross the spread
in order to reduce their inventory. If, at time τ , a unit-sized market sell order
is placed, the inventory and the cash amounts are modified as follows: Xτ =
Xτ− − 1, and Yτ = Yτ− +Sτ − k. If a market buy order is optimal, the inventory
and the cash amounts become: Xτ = Xτ− + 1 and Yτ = Yτ− − Sτ − k. Such
expressions can be written concisely as
Xτ = Xτ− + ξτ and Yτ = Yτ− − ξτ (Sτ + kξτ ), (2.13)
where ξτ ∈ {−1, 1}.
Remark 2.4. Equations (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) can be compactly written by
dXu = dN
−
u − dN+u +
∑
i
δ(u− τi)ξτi ,
dYu = (Su + k)dN
+
u − (Su − k)dN−u −
∑
i
δ(u− τi)ξτi(Sτi + kξτi),
(2.14)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. More details can be found in Remark 7.1.
In the remainder of the thesis we will use the non-compact notation, although we
acknowledge that this remark applies to all the state-variables dynamics which
can be subject to discretionary impulses.
Every time the market maker sends (expensive) aggressive orders, they reveal
to other market participants the sign of their inventory. That is, a market sell
order is a sign of holding a positive inventory, which they want to liquidate, and
vice versa. The potential information leakage may push the price against the
market-maker’s inventory and therefore we find it suitable to add an additional
fixed penalty  > 0, to which the market maker is subject to when they cross
the spread. We choose a constant penalty for tractability of the model. Alter-
native specifications may include a penalty commensurate to the order size, as
well as a time-dependent penalty (as opposed to an instantaneous penalty), of
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which effect may decay with time. In the current setting, the former specifica-
tion does not make a difference since orders are assumed to be unit-sized. The
latter specification would be more appropriate if hedging was performed on a
continuous-time basis as it would have an interpretation analogous to the one
pertaining to permanent price impact.
Within the present model, the market maker aims to maximise their terminal
cash subject to both terminal and running penalties for holding a non-zero in-
ventory. their optimal strategy consists of a double sequence of stopping times τi
and random variables5 ξi, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , which maximises their performance
criterion:
V (t,x) = sup
(τi,ξi)i≥0
Et,x
[
YT +XT (ST − αXT )− φ
∫ T
t
X2udu−
∑
t≤τi<T

]
, (2.15)
where x := (x, y, s) is the vector of state variables, corresponding to the inven-
tory, the cash and the mid-price processes. This is an optimal impulse-control
problem and the value function solves the following HJB quasi variational in-
equality (QVI)
min
{
φx2 − ∂V
∂t
(t,x)− λ+[V (t, x− 1, y + s+ k, s)− V (t,x)]
−1
2
σ2
∂2V
∂s2
(t,x)− λ−[V (t, x+ 1, y − s+ k, s)− V (t,x)];
V (t,x)−MV (t,x)
}
= 0,
(2.16)
with terminal condition V (T,x) = y+(s−αx)x—see, e.g., Pham [75] for details.
The operator MV (t,x) in (2.16) is defined by
MV (t,x) = sup
e∈{−1,+1}
V
(
t, x+ e, y − e(s+ ke), s)− . (2.17)
Remark 2.5. The reason why Equation (2.16) is referred-to as an inequality is
explained in Section 7.1, Remark 7.2.
The result of the above optimisation thus only consists of the thresholds which
indicate—to the market maker—the inventory level at which it is optimal for
5We let ξi be the shorthand notation of ξτi .
Chapter 2. Reference models 38
them to cross the spread and post aggressive orders to rebalance their position
(also known as hedging).
2.2.2.2 Numerical results and parameters’ analysis
Next we study the behaviour of the optimal strategy for various values of param-
eters. The graphs of the present section show the optimal inventory thresholds
for the entire trading period. The region between the two lines (labelled “Limit
orders”) shows the range of inventory for which it is optimal for the market maker
to keep posting limit orders. As maturity is approached, the region shrinks due
to the penalty to which the market maker is subject to, if they reach T with
a non-zero inventory. If the inventory falls in the region above the upper line,
then it is optimal to post market sell orders until the inventory is back in the
limit-order region. If the inventory falls below the bottom line, the market maker
starts posting aggressive buy orders. The market-order regions widen when the
maturity is approached. This is due to the necessity to liquidate as much inven-
tory as possible before T .
We can use an ansatz to reduce the number of state variables of Equation (2.16)
and, in-particular, we set V (t, x, s, y) = y + xs + h(t, x) and substitute it into
Equation (2.16). We thus find, and numerically solve, the PDE satisfied by the
function h(t, x). (See (i) Cartea et al. [23], and (ii) Chapter 4, Section 4.3, of
the present work for details and examples of such substitution, respectively). We
use an explicit finite difference method to approximate the solution of Equation
(2.16) and the optimal strategy of the market maker. Throughout this section,
we consider an equally-spaced time grid [0,50] with intervals of 1 and an equally-
spaced inventory grid [-150, 150], with intervals of 0.1. The terminal condition is
stated below HJB equation (2.16) and parameters’ values are stated below each
plot.
The parameter φ models the running penalty for holding the inventory. The
higher the penalty, the sooner the market maker resorts to aggressive orders,
so to rebalance their position on the asset. The numerical results confirm the
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intuition, and Figure 2.3 shows that the limit-order region widens for a lower
value of φ.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.16). We set k = 3, α = 2, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50,  = 10. In the left panel we set
φ = 0.00001. In the right panel we set φ = 0.0001.
In Figure 2.4 we choose different values for the arrival-rates of buyers and sellers,
who fill the market-maker’s limit orders. We note that we lose the symmetry—
around the line Xu = 0—featured in Figure 2.3 and that the optimal boundaries
are now skewed. In the left panel, buyers come more frequently than sellers and
thus the optimal threshold at which the market maker starts posting aggressive
buy orders is closer to zero. The opposite holds when the arrival-rate of the
sellers is higher than the one of the buyers (right panel).
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Figure 2.4: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.16). We set k = 3, α = 2, φ = 0.0001, T = 50,  = 10. In the left panel we set
λ+ = 0.6, λ− = 0.4. In the right panel we set λ+ = 0.4, λ− = 0.6.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.16). We set α = 2, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50,  = 10, φ = 0.0001. In the left panel
we set k = 5. In the right panel we set k = 1.
The role of the parameter k is two-fold as it appears in both the earnings coming
from limit orders as well as the costs for submitting market orders. In fact, when
a passive order is posted (and executed), the submitting agent earns the spread,
which is paid by the counterparty, who sent an aggressive order to the same
market venue. We want to address the question of what a market maker should
do when the spread widens. According to the numerical results, a higher spread
incentivises the market maker to refrain from posting aggressive orders while
keeping posting passive orders. This behaviour has two interpretations. (i) The
earnings obtained through limit orders compensate both the running and the
terminal penalties for holding the inventory. (ii) The submission of aggressive
orders is very expensive in the scenario of a high spread k, and it offsets the
benefits coming from reducing the inventory. Such a feature is shown in Figure
2.5, where for high k (left panel) the limit-order region is wider compared to the
the case where k is low (right panel).
Figure 2.6 shows the role of the parameter α, which models the penalty for
holding a non-zero inventory at the end of the trading period. A higher α (left
panel) incentivises the market maker to resort to aggressive orders sooner—by
shrinking the limit-orders region—versus lower values of α (right panel).
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Figure 2.6: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.16). We set k = 3, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50,  = 10, φ = 0.0001. In the left panel
we set α = 5. In the right panel we set α = 1.
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Figure 2.7: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.16). We set k = 3, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, α = 2, T = 50, φ = 0.0001. In the left panel
we set  = 20. In the right panel we set  = 1.
Finally, we show that as  (that is, the penalty for crossing the spread) increases,
the market maker refrains from posting aggressive orders. Figure 2.7 shows this
feature, and we can see a shrunk limit-order region for low values of  (right
panel).
We conclude this section by summarising the insights provided by such a refer-
ence model. The market maker earns the spread by posting limit orders and is
subject to an inventory risk, derived by potential unfavourable price movements
(e.g. the price decreases when they have a positive inventory and vice versa).
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We note that the shape and the width of the optimal thresholds derive from such
a tradeoff. The optimal strategy of the market maker consists of posting limit
orders on both sides of the book, as long as the inventory does not surpass the
critical boundaries. In the event that the inventory crosses one of the thresholds,
the market maker posts aggressive buy or sell orders (when the inventory is neg-
ative or positive, respectively), until their holdings are back within an acceptable
level. While the main purpose of this model is to construct a common ground for
the discussion presented in the following chapters, we acknowledge that in the
literature, see e.g. Cartea et al. [23, 24], optimal market-making problems are
closely related to optimal-posting problems, where the market maker can choose
the price at which their limit orders are posted. Such feature is included later in
the thesis, in Chapter 4.
2.3 Dark pools
Dark pools are alternative trading venues where buy and sell orders are not dis-
played publicly. The introduction of dark pools was motivated by the existence
of big institutional investors who wanted to trade large amounts of an asset with
no impact on the market price, while also maintaining anonymity so to avoid
information leakage. There are different types of dark pools and one way of dis-
tinguishing among them is to consider the amount of principal liquidity offered
to the clients (see, e.g., Zhu [87]). There are dark pools which limit their ac-
tivity to just offering the platform for trading, subject to the payment of a fee.
Such pools match buyers and sellers at the ‘lit’-pool mid-price and are known
as crossing networks. There is no guarantee of execution of orders sent to such
types of dark pools, for each trade is subject to the availability of a counter-
party. On the other hand, there are dark pools which trade principally with
their clients and in-effect act as market makers. They guarantee anonymity to
their clients and, loosely speaking, offer a tighter spread than the one available
in ‘lit’ pools in order to be competitive and win more business. Analogously
to ‘lit’-pool market makers, they charge the spread for client’s transactions and
are subject to an inventory risk. In between these two categories, there are
dark pools which trade both principally and as agents, possibly within the same
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transaction. They earn the spread from the principal portion and a commission
fee from the brokerage service. The firms belonging to latter two categories are
commonly referred to as CLP or broker-dealer firms. The new European regula-
tion due to take effect in January 2018—known as MiFID ii—will substantially
reduce the anonymity granted to dark pool’s clients. In particular, monthly size
caps will be implemented so to limit the opaque activity of market participants.
Furthermore, reporting, clearing and transparency obligations will be in place
for instruments that are less regulated to date. Although the new regulation
will impact dark pools, the models presented in this thesis will still be relevant
for the following reasons: (i) agents will still be able to trade within multiple
venues, (ii) anonymity and opaqueness enter only marginally in the discussion
and in the model design, and (iii) we propose flexible setups that provide high
potentials for customisation.
To the best of our knowledge, at the time this thesis is being written, there are
no references available for trading in CLPs. On the contrary, optimal execution
within dark pools that limit their activity to third-parties orders’ match has been
extensively studied in, e.g., Kratz and Scho¨neborn [57, 58]. In the next section,
we outline a simplified model, inspired by Cartea et al. [23], as a reference for
the class of models presented in Chapter 3. Next, we provide a toy model for the
case in which the dark pool (CLP) operates as principal and provides liquidity
to its clients. The last reference model is part of the original work presented in
this thesis and we refer to Crisafi and Macrina [31]. A larger class of such models
is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4.
Research on dark-pool trading includes the early work by Hendershott and
Mendelson [50], who extend the Kyle [59] model to capture the dynamics of
the interplay between investors, dark pools and standard exchanges, followed by
Degryse et al. [34], Buti et al. [14] and Danie¨ls et al. [32]. The works by Ye [86]
and Zhu [87] examine the effects—on price discovery—of the migration of order
flows from exchanges to dark pools. Increase in overall trading volume is shown
in Buti et al. [15].
Kratz and Scho¨neborn [57] consider continuous-time trading in the dark pool
within the classical field of optimal liquidation. They model the LOB mid-price
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by an exogenous square-integrable martingale and regard the dark pool as a
complete-or-zero-execution venue where the arrival of trading counterparties is
modelled by a Poisson process. In this context, we also refer to work by Horst and
Naujokat [52], in which the authors find the optimal strategy when trading in an
illiquid market. The agent under consideration seeks to minimise the deviation
from a given target, while submitting market orders in the standard exchange
and “passive orders” in a dark pool.
2.3.1 Optimal trading in ‘lit’ and dark pools
We consider an agent who wants to liquidate a sizeable amount of an asset by
means of both, (i) aggressive orders in the ‘lit’ pool, and (ii) dark-pool orders.
The agent trades continuously in both venues and wishes to maximise their
revenues while (i) minimising the price impact, and (ii) reaching the terminal
date with as few shares as possible. The goal is to find the optimal selling schedule
in both venues, which maximises the performance criterion of the agent.
2.3.1.1 A reference model
We assume that the ‘lit’-pool mid-price follows an arithmetic Brownian motion
dSu = σdWu. (2.18)
Trades in the ‘lit’ pool take place at the instantaneously impacted price Sˆu =
Su − βνu, where ν := {νu} is the agent’s rate of trading in the ‘lit’ pool. The
agent simultaneously posts sell orders in the dark pool, which may or may not
be executed, depending on the availability of a trade counterparty. We assume
that the execution price in the dark pool is the ‘lit’-pool mid-price. We model
the arrival of dark-pool counterparties by a Poisson process {Nu} with constant
intensity λ. We define the agent’s inventory process by
dXu = −νudu− ηudNu, (2.19)
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where η := {ηu} is a predictable process, which models the size of the orders
placed in the dark pool at each time u ∈ [t, T ]. We further define the cash
process of the agent by
dYu = νuSˆudu+ ηuSudNu. (2.20)
The constant-intensity assumption is an unrealistic one. Market generally sees
activity bursts followed by periods of relative calmness. On the other hand, a
random intensity would reduce the tractability of the model. The agent aims
to maximise their expected terminal cash, subject to both terminal and running
penalties for holding a positive inventory. We define the value function by
V (t,x) = sup
ν,η
Et,x
[
Yτ +Xτ (Sτ − αXτ )− φ
∫ τ
t
X2udu
]
, (2.21)
where α and φ are non-negative constants and x := (x, y, s) is a vector of state
variables. The stopping time τ is defined by Equation (2.5), and it is needed
since the agent may terminate their liquidation task well before the terminal
date T (provided there is enough liquidity available in the dark pool). The value
function V (t,x) satisfies the HJB equation
sup
v,n
{
− φx2 + ∂V
∂t
(t,x) + λ
[
V (t, x− n, y + ns, s)− V (t,x)]
+
1
2
σ2
∂2V
∂s2
(t,x)− v∂V
∂x
(t,x) + v(s− βv)∂V
∂y
(t,x)
}
= 0,
(2.22)
with terminal and boundary conditions given by V (τ,x) = y + x(s − αx) and
V (u, 0, y, s) = y, respectively. A closed-form solution, together with the tech-
niques to obtain it, is provided in Cartea et al. [23], pages 178-181. In particular,
the optimal strategy ({νu}, {ηu}) is given by
νu = −
Xu
(
ζ− − ζ+ζ¯e−γ(T−u)
)
β
(
1− ζ¯e−γ(T−u)
) , ηu = Xu, (2.23)
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and the remaining inventory is given by
Xu = e
ζ−u/βx
1− ζ¯e−γ(T−u)
1− ζ¯e−γT , (2.24)
where
ζ± =
βλ
2
±
√
β2λ2
4
+ βφ and ζ¯ =
α+ ζ−
α+ ζ+
. (2.25)
Here, for consistency with the remainder of the thesis, we graphically show the
optimal trading schedule and comment on the roles played by the model’s pa-
rameters.
2.3.1.2 Numerical results and parameters’ analysis
In this section we provide a numerical analysis of the agent’s optimal liquidation
strategy, and how it changes when the model parameters vary. In the plots below
we show the inventory trajectories over time. In each plot, the dotted line shows
the inventory evolution if no dark-pool execution takes place throughout the
whole period. The solid line shows the effect of one dark-pool execution at time
τ = 5. We note that, within this model, the agent places a small portion of the
inventory in the ‘lit’ pool and all the remaining shares in the dark pool. That
is, the liquidation task ends as soon as the first dark-pool execution takes place.
We note that the optimal strategy ceases to be convex. In fact the agent hopes
to liquidate as much as possible in the dark pool, and thus starts by placing
small orders in the ‘lit’ pool. The speed of the ‘lit’-pool trading rate increases
towards the end of the trading period due to the terminal penalty for holding
the inventory.
Throughout this section, we consider an equally-spaced time grid [0,10] with
intervals of 0.01 and an equally-spaced inventory grid [0, 30], with intervals of
1. The terminal and boundary conditions are stated below HJB equation (2.22)
and parameters’ values are stated below each plot.
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Figure 2.8: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (2.22). We set σ = 0.1, s = 40,
λ = 0.5, α = 0.5, T = 10, φ = 0.001, τ = 5. In the left panel we set β = 0.2. In the
right panel we set β = 0.01.
In Figure 2.8 we see that β, i.e. the coefficient of the instantaneous price impact,
dramatically changes the shape of the selling schedule. A low β (right panel)
induces a faster liquidation in the ‘lit’ pool since the reduced impact makes
the dark pool less attractive to the investor. The trading speed reflects such
feature and increases in the case of low temporary price impact (left panel).
Furthermore, we note that the liquidation task is almost fully achieved even in
the case of no dark-pool executions (right panel, dotted line). This is not the
case for a high β. In fact, the agent fails to liquidate a relevant portion of their
inventory by T , if no liquidity is available in the dark pool (left panel, dotted
line).
Next, we analyse the role of the terminal penalty for holding a non-zero inventory
at T . The value function of the agent decreases proportionally to the square
of the terminal inventory, and therefore a higher penalty increases the trading
speed of the agent, so that the trading period can be concluded with a smaller
inventory. Our intuition is confirmed in Figure 2.9, where we note that a higher
α incentivises the agent to hold as few units of the asset as possible at T (left
panel). We further note that the selling speed increases more towards the end of
the trading period, rather than consistently between t and T . This is due to the
presence of the dark pool, since the agent wishes to liquidate as much as possible
in the alternative venue.
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Figure 2.9: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (2.22). We set σ = 0.1, s = 40,
λ = 0.5, T = 10, φ = 0.001, τ = 5, β = 0.1. In the left panel we set α = 3. In the
right panel we set α = 0.1.
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Figure 2.10: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (2.22). We set σ = 0.1, s = 40,
λ = 0.5, α = 0.5, T = 10, α = 0.5, τ = 5, β = 0.1. In the left panel we set φ = 0.01.
In the right panel we set φ = 0.0001.
In Figure 2.10 we show how the selling schedule changes when we vary the
parameter φ of the quadratic running penalty for the inventory holding. We
note that a high φ increases the trading speed of the agent in the ‘lit’ pool from
the beginning of the trading period.
The last parameter we focus on is λ, which models the arrival intensity of trading
counterparties in the dark pool. In the right panel of Figure 2.11 we note that
a low λ (that is, there is little to no liquidity in the dark pool) induces a faster
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liquidation in the ‘lit’ pool. In particular, as λ → 0, the trading trajectories
approach the ones obtained when trading in the ‘lit’ pool only.
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Figure 2.11: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (2.22). We set σ = 0.1, s = 40,
φ = 0.001, α = 0.5, T = 10, α = 0.5, τ = 5, β = 0.1. In the left panel we set λ = 1.
In the right panel we set λ = 0.1.
We can summarise our findings as follows. The trading trajectories in the ‘lit’
pool cease to be convex (i.e. the agent reduces their speed of trading in the ‘lit’
pool at the beginning of the period) since the agent is keen to liquidate as much
of their inventory as possible in the dark pool so as to avoid price impact. One
of the main features of the optimal selling strategy, which we derive by solving
the HJB Equation (2.22), is that the agent always places an optimal portion of
the asset in the ‘lit’ pool and all the remaining inventory in the dark pool at
all times. In Chapter 3, where we propose price dynamics with more structure,
we present cases where this feature ceases to be true. Finally, we note that
the permanent price impact is not treated in the present model. Its effects are
studied in Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Dark pools as market makers
In this section we explore the optimal trading strategies of a dark pool that
plays the role of a market maker. Here, we use the terms dark pool, CLP and
broker-dealer firm interchangeably. As opposed to the previous section, where
Chapter 2. Reference models 50
the dark-pool activity was limited to matching third-party orders, here the CLP
offers liquidity to buyers and sellers, and we refer to such activity by saying that
the CLP trades principally. Within this basic model, we assume that the CLP
trades 100% principally, thus transferring internally the whole inventory risk.
This assumption is removed in Chapter 5.
The CLP provides bid and ask quotes to its clients and earns the spread from
each transaction. We assume that the spread offered by the CLP is tighter than
the one shown in the ‘lit’ pool. Clients are incentivised to trade in the CLP,
since they are offered advantageous prices, while also preserving their anonymity.
Furthermore, such a feature increases the competitiveness of the venue compared
to similar liquidity providers. The assumption that the dark-pool spread lies
within the ‘lit’-pool one at any time is an unrealistic one. In fact, this does
not need to be the case, and it is not true when the CLP holds a non-zero
inventory. In the simplified model presented below, this is not an issue since
we consider both the dark-pool quotes and the ‘lit’-pool spread to be constants.
Such assumptions are removed in Chapter 4.
Throughout its activity, the CLP is subject to an inventory risk, which can be
reduced by submitting limit and/or market orders in the ‘lit’ pool. We sometimes
refer to such activity as hedging. We assume that the CLP is subject to a penalty
every time it resorts to the ‘lit’ venue, so to model the potential information
leakage the CLP would suffer. In particular, publicly displaying its orders on a
regular exchange may give insights to other market participants into the dark-
pool inventory and, thus, the market trend.
In the next section we provide a simplified version of the model presented in
Chapter 4 and we show the optimal inventory thresholds, which provide the
dark-pool trading strategy.
2.3.2.1 A reference model
We assume that the CLP trades within the time interval [t, T ], and executes
unit-sized buy and sell orders submitted by its clients6. We assume that the
6A unit-size order can be interpreted/changed to one lot or a fixed size with no added
complexity. We prefer to keep it to one, to reduce the numbers of parameters to a minimum.
Chapter 2. Reference models 51
‘lit’-pool mid-price follows an arithmetic Brownian motion
dSu = σdWu, (2.26)
starting at St = s. We further assume that the market has a constant half spread
k, such that the ‘lit’-pool best ask and bid prices are defined by
Sau = Su + k and S
b
u = Su − k, (2.27)
respectively. Equations (2.26) and (2.27) are far from capturing realistic market
dynamics. We choose them for tractability purposes, bearing in mind this model
is for reference purpose only. We let the CLP’s inventory start at the value x ∈ R
and satisfy the following stochastic differential equation
dXu = dN
−
u − dN+u , (2.28)
where {N±u } are independent Poisson processes with intensities λ±. The CLP
offers bid and ask quotes pegged to the ‘lit’-pool mid-price. That is, it executes
orders from buyers at a price Su + δ
+ and orders from sellers at a price Su− δ−,
where δ+ and δ− are positive constants, not greater than k. We define the cash
process of the CLP by
dYu = (Su + δ
+)dN+u − (Su − δ−)dN−u , (2.29)
with initial state level Yt = y.
At each time the CLP can choose whether it wishes to reduce its inventory by
means of market or limit orders. If at time τm a market order is placed, the
inventory and the cash processes are subject to the following impulses
Xτm = Xτm− + ξτ and Yτm = Yτm− − ξmτ (Sτm + kξτm), (2.30)
where ξτm ∈ {−1, 1}, for a sell and buy market order, respectively. On the
other hand, if at time τ ` a IOC limit order is placed, the inventory and the cash
processes are subject to the following impulse
Chapter 2. Reference models 52
Xτ` = Xτ`−
+ ητ`zτ` and Yτ` = Yτ`−
− η`τ (Sτ` − kητ`)zτ` , (2.31)
where ητ` ∈ {−1, 1}, for a sell and buy market order, respectively, and zτ`
is a collection of i.i.d. {0, 1}-valued random variables which model the limit-
order execution percentage. When z = 1 the limit order posted by the CLP gets
executed, otherwise it gets cancelled. In a more structured model the probability
mass function of the random variables zτ` should be related to the depth of the
book at which the CLP posts its limit orders. In the present framework we
assume that limit orders are always posted at the best prices available in the ‘lit’
market (which has a constant spread), and therefore we set P[z = 1] = p, where
p is a positive constant.
Similarly to Section 2.2.2.1, every time the CLP sends orders to the ‘lit’ pool,
it leaks information to other market participants. This feature is modelled by
fixed penalties m > ` > 0 for market and limit orders, respectively, to which
the CLP is subject to. We assume that the market-order penalty is larger than
the limit-order one since, by crossing the spread, the CLP reveals a higher degree
of execution urgency to other market participants. Furthermore, an aggressive
order produces a higher price impact (against the market-maker inventory) com-
pared to a limit-order.
The optimal strategy of the CLP is a pair of double sequences of stopping times
τmi and τ
`
j and random variables ξi and ηj , for i, j = 0, 1, 2 . . . , which maximise
its expected terminal cash YT while minimising the risk of holding the inven-
tory throughout the whole trading period. We thus plot the optimal inventory
thresholds which indicate—to the market maker—the inventory level at which
it is optimal for them to cross the spread and post ‘lit’ pool orders. We define
the value function by
V (t,x) = sup
Mi,Lj
Et,x
[
YT +XT (ST −αXT )−φ
∫ T
t
X2udu−
∑
t≤τmi <T
m−
∑
t≤τ`j<T
`
]
,
(2.32)
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where x := (x, y, s), Mi : (τ
m
i , ξi)i≥0 and Lj : (τ
`
j , ηj)j≥0. This is a double-
obstacle impulse-control problem and the value function solves the following
QVI:
min
{
φx2 − ∂V
∂t
(t,x)− λ+[V (t, x− 1, y + s+ δ+, s)− V (t,x)]
−1
2
σ2
∂2V
∂s2
(t,x)− λ−[V (t, x+ 1, y − s+ δ−, s)− V (t,x)];
V (t,x)−MV (t,x);V (t,x)− LV (t,x)
}
= 0,
(2.33)
with terminal condition V (T,x) = y + (s− αx)x. The operators MV (t,x) and
LV (t,x) in Equation (2.33) are defined by
MV (t,x) = sup
e∈{−1,+1}
V
(
t, x+ e, y − e(s+ ke), s)− m, (2.34)
and
LV (t,x) = sup
n∈{−1,+1}
E(z)
[
V
(
t, x+ nz, y − n(s− kn)z, s)]− `, (2.35)
where the expectation in Equation (2.35) is taken with respect to the random
variable z, which represents what percentage of a limit order is filled in the ‘lit’
pool. The result of the above optimisation consists of the thresholds for the
CLP’s inventory at which it is optimal to post (passive or aggressive) orders in
the ‘lit’ pool.
2.3.2.2 Numerical results and parameters’ analysis
In this section we show the optimal boundaries found by solving the quasi vari-
ational inequality in Equation (2.33). We find the critical thresholds that define
the strategy of the CLP. In the plots that follow, we show the optimal bound-
aries and we see that no ‘lit’-pool orders are submitted by the CLP as long as its
inventory lies within the central region, labelled “Market making”. If the inven-
tory falls outside the central region, the CLP starts submitting limit buy or sell
orders in the ‘lit’ pool when the inventory is negative or positive, respectively.
Market orders are the last resort means of trading and are submitted when the
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inventory surpasses the upper line for sell orders and the bottom line for buy
orders. We note that the boundaries shrink as we approach T as a result of
the terminal penalty for holding the inventory, which we model by α. In what
follows we look at the role played by the model’s parameter.
In Figure 2.12 we note that a high α (left panel) incentivises the CLP to resort
faster to hedging, compared to the case of low α (right panel). In particular,
the CLP resorts to market orders for lower inventory levels. Market orders
are expensive but benefit from sure execution and thus are preferred when the
penalty for holding the inventory is higher. When α is low, the aggressive-orders
boundaries widen in favour of passive orders.
We can use the ansatz V (t, x, s, y) = y + xs + h(t, x) in order to reduce the
number of state variables of Equation (2.33). We thus find, and numerically solve,
the PDE satisfied by the function h(t, x). We use an explicit finite difference
method to approximate the solution of Equation (2.33) and the optimal strategy
of the agent. Throughout this section, we consider an equally-spaced time grid
[0,50] with intervals of 1 and an equally-spaced inventory grid [-200, 200], with
intervals of 0.1. The terminal condition is stated below HJB equation (2.16) and
parameters’ values are stated below each plot.
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Figure 2.12: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.33). We set k = 4, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50, m = 30, ` = 15 φ = 0.0001,
δ+ = δ− = 2, p = 0.8. In the left panel we set α = 3. In the right panel we set α = 1.
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Figure 2.13: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.33). We set k = 4, T = 50, m = 30, ` = 15 φ = 0.0001, α = 1, δ
+ = δ− = 2,
p = 0.8. In the left panel we set λ+ = 0.7 and λ− = 0.3. In the right panel we set
λ+ = 0.3 and λ− = 0.7.
In Figure 2.13 the market-making boundaries are skewed upward (resp. down-
ward) when the arrival rate of buyers is higher (resp. lower) than the one of
sellers. In the right panel the inventory is expected to increase on average and
thus the CLP resorts to the ‘lit’ pool faster in the case of positive inventory,
compared to the case of negative inventory. In the left panel the opposite holds
since buyers are expected to arrive at a higher rate than sellers. The CLP in-
corporates its beliefs on the market trend, and it is thus incentivised to take its
hedging decisions consistently with the arrival rate of buyers and sellers.
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Figure 2.14: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.33). We set k = 4, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50, m = 30, ` = 15, α = 1, φ = 0.0001,
δ+ = δ− = 2, p = 0.8. In the left panel we set k = 6. In the right panel we set k = 2.
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The half spread k plays an important role since a higher k results in more expen-
sive aggressive ‘lit’-pool orders and more advantageous ‘lit’-pool passive orders.
These properties make limit orders preferred to market orders and thus the CLP
crosses the spread for higher levels of the inventory. Figure 2.14 shows that for
a high spread (left panel) the boundaries widen, while for a low spread (right
panel), the boundaries shrink.
In Figure 2.15 we show that low values of the penalties m and ` (right panel)
encourage the CLP to resort sooner to the ‘lit’ pool for its hedging activity. This
confirms the intuition that, being risk averse, the CLP resorts to the ‘lit’ pool
sooner, provided the hedging is less penalising.
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Figure 2.15: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.33). We set k = 4, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50, φ = 0.0001, α = 1, δ+ = δ− = 2,
p = 0.8. In the left panel we set m = 35 and ` = 20. In the left panel we set m = 6
and ` = 4.
The parameter φ models the running penalty for holding the inventory. In the
left panel of Figure 2.16 we note that the market-making region is consistently
shrunk compared to the right panel. This implies that the CLP reduces the
amount of inventory it is willing to hold at every point in time, in favour of
hedging, as the inventory causes higher reductions of the value function.
Chapter 2. Reference models 57
Time
0 10 20 30 40 50
In
v
e
n
to
ry
le
v
e
l
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Optimal boundaries - high φ
Market sell orders
Limit sell orders
Market making
Limit buy orders
Market buy orders
Time
0 10 20 30 40 50
In
v
e
n
to
ry
le
v
e
l
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Optimal boundaries - low φ
Market sell orders
Limit sell orders
Market making
Limit buy orders
Market buy orders
Figure 2.16: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.33). We set k = 4, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50, m = 30, ` = 15 , α = 1, δ+ = δ− = 2,
p = 0.8. In the left panel we set φ = 0.001. In the right panel we set φ = 0.00001.
The parameter pmodels the probability of execution of the limit orders submitted
to the ‘lit’ pool by the CLP. A higher p increases the likelihood of reducing the
inventory by means of limit orders, which are less expensive and, thus, preferred.
Figure 2.17 shows that in the case of a high probability of execution p (left
panel), the market-orders regions shrink as the CLP is confident it can rebalance
its inventory by means of limit orders. The opposite holds in case of a low p.
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Figure 2.17: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(2.33). We set k = 4, λ+ = λ− = 0.5, T = 50, m = 30, ` = 15 φ = 0.0001, α = 1,
δ+ = δ− = 2. In the left panel we set p = 0.95. In the right panel we set p = 0.65
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2.4 Conclusions
In the present chapter, we have considered both optimal execution and optimal
market making, with and without the presence of a dark pool (or CLP) as an
additional venue.
In the case of optimal execution, we note that the presence of a dark pool con-
siderably changes the optimal strategy of the agent. In fact, they place a small
portion of their inventory in the ‘lit’ pool and the remaining inventory in the
dark pool at every point in time. That is, the ‘lit’-pool trading speed is reduced
compared to scenarios where only a standard exchange is available to the agent.
This is in line with the feature that the dark pool offers more favourable trad-
ing prices (i.e. mid-price trading rather than buying at the best ask price and
sell at the best bid price). In the presented model, the liquidation task ends as
soon as the first dark-pool execution takes place. This behaviour of the optimal
strategy (i.e. placing all the remaining inventory in the dark pool) is due to the
dynamics of the mid-price, which we choose to be a martingale. In Chapter 3,
where this assumption is removed and more realistic dynamics for the mid-price
are chosen (e.g. a mean-reverting jump process), the aforementioned strategy
ceases to be optimal, since the agent takes advantage of the expected movements
of the market price.
When the dark pool (here, CLP) plays the role of a market maker by providing
principal liquidity to its clients, it sets bid and ask quotes and resorts to the
‘lit’ pool to reduce its risk of holding the inventory. It first posts limit orders,
which are less expensive but their execution is uncertain, and ultimately market
orders. We show that the optimal thresholds crucially depend on the model
parameters and, in particular, on the degree of risk that the CLP is willing to
take. In Chapter 4 we consider additional state and control variables. We allow
the CLP to choose both (i) the spread it charges to its client, and (ii) the depth
of the LOB at which it posts passive orders (i.e. the CLP need not to post on
top of the book). Furthermore, we drop the unrealistic assumption of a constant
‘lit’-pool spread.
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In Chapter 5 we provide an application of the above framework to the electronic
foreign exchange (eFX) market. We slightly modify some of the assumptions
made in Chapter 4, so to make the model consistent with the specific features of
the eFX market.

Chapter 3
Optimal execution in ‘lit’ and
dark pools
3.1 Overview of the chapter
In this chapter we study an optimal execution problem from the perspective of an
investor, when both dark and ‘lit’ pools are available to market participants. We
assume that an agent seeks to execute a sizeable amount of a liquidly-traded asset
over a finite period of time [t, T ], where the initial time t lies in the interval [0, T ).
The ultimate goal is to find the optimal trading schedule which maximises the
performance criterion of the agent. This chapter is based on Crisafi and Macrina
[30].
In Section 3.2 we propose a class of models and we numerically solve an optimal
execution problem when only the ‘lit’ pool is available to the agent. We show
that the optimal trading trajectories are closely related to the price dynamics
assumed.
In Section 3.3 we add the possibility for the agent to trade simultaneously in
both ‘lit’ and dark pools and we compare the results to the ones obtained in
the reference model presented in Section 2.3.1. We find, e.g., that the choice of
the optimal strategy depends on the price dynamics assumed (i.e. it depends on
the current and expected market conditions). In Section 2.3.1 the strategy was
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independent from the price since no information was available on future price
movements (i.e. the price was a martingale). We believe this is not realistic since
agents may have their own expectations on the market’s evolution and thus wish
to incorporate this feature in the model.
Throughout the present chapter we use standard finite difference methods to
solve—backward in time—the HJB equations stated herein. We thus obtain and
plot the numerical solution. The algorithm and techniques used are described
in detail in Section 7.5.1. Furthermore, the values of the parameters used are
reported under each plot, for reproducibility purposes.
3.2 Trading in the ‘lit’ pool
We assume that the agent trades in the ‘lit’ pool by means of aggressive orders
only. Such urgency may be motivated by a need for immediate liquidity as well
as some private information the agent may have. In order to precisely determine
the liquidation price received by the agent, a model of all LOB levels should
be considered. This would reduce the model’s tractability and thus we assume
that—as far as an optimal liquidation strategy is concerned—it suffices to model
the best bid price1. We remark that the effect of exhausting distinct book levels
can be achieved by a temporary price impact function, as seen in Chapter 2.
3.2.1 Price, inventory and cash dynamics
We fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration {Fu}0≤u≤T satisfy-
ing the usual conditions. In what follows, we assume that the task is to liquidate
an amount Xt = x of shares, where 0 ≤ x < ∞, and write for the inventory
dynamics
dXu = −νudu, (3.1)
where the rate of trading ν := {νu} takes value in a compact set V = [0, N ] ⊂
[0,∞) and is the control process of the stochastic optimal control problem pre-
sented in Section 3.2.2. In the short run, we assume that the best bid price at
1Or the best ask price in the case of an optimal acquisition.
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time u ∈ [t, T ] depends on its initial state and on the cumulated market activ-
ity up to time u. We introduce two compensated compound Poisson processes
defined by
J˜b,iu = J
b,i
u − λb,iuE
[
zb,i1
]
=
Nb,iu∑
j=1
zb,ij − λb,iuE
[
zb,i1
]
,
where i = 1, 2. In the above notation, {N b,iu } are independent Poisson processes
with intensity λb,i. The jump sizes are modelled by sequences of i.i.d. random
variables zb,ij , where j=1,2,. . . ,. We model the best bid price process by
dSbu = µ
b
(
u, Sbu− , νu
)
du+
2∑
i=1
hbi
(
u, Sbu−
)
dJ˜b,iu , (3.2)
with initial value Sbt = s
b. The functions µb and hbi can be chosen such that the
best bid price is always non-negative, or in ways that reproduce market features.
In Equation (3.2) we consider positive jumps which model the incoming limit buy
orders at a more favourable price, and negative jumps to account for cancellations
of limit buy orders and market sell orders which walk the LOB. The price model
in Equation (3.2) has been inspired by the financial considerations made in Cont
et al [28]. Explicit examples will be provided in Section 3.2.3. Although we view
the optimisation problem from the perspective of liquidating orders, the model
proposed in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) can be adapted to the case of optimal
acquisition. Last, we define the cash (wealth) process by
dYu = µ
y
(
u, Sbu, νu
)
du,
with initial value Yt = y. The function µ
y models the instantaneous gains made
by the investor through selling shares, possibly taking into account the temporary
price impact of trades. We consider a general function µy so to account for
different ways of calculating profits and losses (P&L).
3.2.2 The value function
We introduce a stopping time τ ,
τ := inf {u ≥ t |Xu ≤ 0} ∧ T, (3.3)
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that describes the first time the inventory is depleted, if such an event occurs
before the terminal date T . For notational simplicity, in this section we define
the space O = [0, x]× R2 and let the vector of the state variables be defined by
Xu =
(
Xu, S
b
u, Yu
) ∈ O, with initial values at time t given by x = (x, sb, y) ∈ O.
We propose a general objective function of the form
V (t,x)=sup
ν∈V
E t,x
[∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)f(u,Xu, νu) du+ e−r(τ−t)g(Xτ )
]
, (3.4)
where r ≥ 0 is a discount rate (also used in, e.g., Pemy and Zhang [72], and
Bian et al. [11]) and E t,x[·] is the expectation given the initial state of the
system (t,x) ∈ [0, T )×O. We consider a discount factor to model the potential
preference of the agent for an immediate execution. We emphasise that while
r may be the risk-free interest rate, it doesn’t have to be so. The function
f : [0, T ] × O × V → R may have several interpretations. For example it may
represent the gains made from the shares sale (e.g. Sbuνu), or correspond to a
penalty for holding the inventory (e.g. −φX2u, where φ > 0). The function
g : O → R may be the terminal reward obtained by a block trade liquidation of
the remaining inventory at time T (e.g. SbTXT ). However, g may also represent
a penalty resulting from failing to liquidate the whole inventory (e.g. −αX2T ,
where α > 0). Explicit examples are provided in Section 3.2.3.
We let p := (p1, p2, p3) ∈ R3, and we define the operator H by
H (t,x,p) = sup
v∈V
{
f (t,x, v)− vp1 + µb
(
t, sb, v
)
p2 + µ
y(t, sb, v)p3
}
. (3.5)
Also, for polynomially bounded (PB) functions ϕ ∈ C1,1([0, T ] × O), we let Bb
be defined by
Bb (t,x, ϕ)=
2∑
i=1
λb,iE(z
b,i)
[
ϕ
(
t, x, sb + hbi
(
t, sb
)
zb,i, y
)− ϕ(t,x)
−hbi
(
t, sb
)
zb,i
∂ϕ
∂sb
(
t,x
)]
,
(3.6)
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where E(zb,i) is the expectation taken with respect to the random variable zb,i.
Standard arguments from dynamic programming suggest that the value function
of the optimal control problem (3.4) satisfies the following HJB partial integro
differential equation (PIDE)2:
rV (t,x)− ∂V
∂t
(t,x)−H (t,x, DxV )− Bb (t,x, V ) = 0, (3.7)
on [0, T )×O, where DxV denotes the gradient vector of the function V and with
terminal condition V (τ,x) = g(x) and boundary condition V (u, 0, s, y) = y. The
meaning of the boundary condition is that if there are no shares to liquidate,
the agent does not take any action and they are left with their current cash
holdings. The same holds at time τ , if Xτ = 0. Since one cannot guarantee
the smoothness of V (t,x) on the whole domain, one cannot discuss the solution
of the HJB PIDE in the classical sense. We show the viscosity property of the
value function in Chapter 7.
3.2.3 Explicit examples and numerical results
In this section we propose two explicit examples of the price dynamics. We
consider a specific form of the cash dynamics and of the performance criterion,
and we numerically find the optimal inventory trajectories.
3.2.3.1 Geometric Le´vy model
We propose an exponential model for the best bid price process, so to ensure its
positivity at every point in time:
dSbu
Sb
u−
=
(
µ¯b − µνu
)
du+ dJb,1u − dJb,2u . (3.8)
In (3.8) we have let µb
(
t, sb, v
)
= (µ¯b−µv)sb and hbi(t, sb) = sb(1{i=1}−1{i=2}).
Furthermore, the processes {Jb,1u } and {Jb,2u } are defined as in Equation (3.2), and
we let the random variables zb,ij be sequences of non-negative independent and
2We refer to Section 7.1 for details on its derivation.
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uniformly distributed random variables3. In Equation (3.8) we interpret dJb,1
as the change in the best bid price due to the submission of limit buy orders at
a more favourable price, whereas dJb,2 models the changes due to: (i) incoming
market sell orders which walk the book, and (ii) the effect of cancellations of
limit buy orders posted at the best price.
We introduce a permanent price impact (parametrised by µ ≥ 0), deriving from
the lit-pool orders submitted by the agent. We further consider a constant drift
coefficient, µ¯b ∈ R. The inventory evolution of the investor is here described by
Equation (3.1), and we model the temporarily impacted best bid price Sˆbu by
Sˆbu = S
b
u − βνu, (3.9)
where β > 0, and the cash process by
dYu = νuSˆ
b
udu, (3.10)
where we have set µy(t, sb, v) = vsˆb. Next we consider an investor who wants
to optimally liquidate their portfolio by placing aggressive sell orders in the ‘lit’
market. For this purpose, we consider the following value function:
V (t,x) = sup
ν∈V
E t,x
[
e−r(τ−t)(Yτ +Xτ (Sbτ − αXτ ))− φ
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)X2udu
]
,
(3.11)
where we have set f (t,x, v) = −φx2 and g(x) = y + x(sb − αx). The inter-
pretation of Equation (3.11) is analogous to the one presented in Chapter 2:
the agent seeks to maximise their terminal cash subject to both (i) a terminal
penalty (parametrised by α) for failing to liquidate the whole inventory, and (ii)
a running penalty (parametrised by φ) for holding the inventory throughout the
3We notice that, in order to guarantee the positivity of the price process, we shall ensure
that zb,1 > −1 and zb,2 < 1.
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whole period. The value function solves the following HJB PIDE
sup
v∈Z
{
rV (t,x)− φx2+ ∂V
∂t
(t,x) +
(
µ¯b − µv)sb ∂V
∂sb
(t,x)− v∂V
∂x
(t,x)
+v
(
sb − βv)∂V
∂y
(t,x) + λb,1E(z
b,1)
[
V
(
t, x, sb(1 + zb,1), y
)− V (t,x)]
+λb,2E(z
b,2)
[
V
(
t, x, sb(1− zb,2), y)− V (t,x)]} = 0,
(3.12)
with terminal condition V
(
τ,x) = y + x(sb − αx) and boundary condition
V (u, 0, sb, y) = y. The expectations in Equation (3.12) are taken with respect
to the random variables zb,1 and zb,2, respectively. In what follows, we plot the
optimal strategy obtained by numerically solving Equation (3.12) and we provide
a detailed analysis of the model’s parameters.
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 we plot a hundred simulated paths for: (i) the inventory
evolution (top left panel), (ii) the cash process (top right panel), (iii) the unim-
pacted best bid price (bottom left panel), and (iv) the impacted best bid price
(bottom right panel).
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Figure 3.1: Simulation of Equations (3.1), (3.10), (3.8) and (3.9). We set β = 0.05,
µ = 0.01, µ¯b = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.01,
T = 10, φ = 0.01, α = 1.
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Figure 3.2: Simulation of Equations (3.1), (3.10), (3.8) and (3.9). We set β = 0.05,
µ = 0.01, µ¯b = −0.01, x = 30, sb = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.01,
T = 10, φ = 0.01, α = 1.
In Figure 3.1 we consider an upward trend (i.e. µ¯b > 0), while in Figure 3.2 we
consider a downward trend (i.e. µ¯b < 0) for the best bid price process.
Contrary to the models presented in Chapter 2, where the optimal strategy only
depends on the inventory level, here it also depends on the current price level. As
such, for the parameters’ analysis, we only plot the mean strategy, as similarly
done in Cartea et al. [23].
In Figure 3.3 we show how the optimal trading speed changes when we vary the
parameters α (left panel) and φ (right panel). As expected, a higher terminal
penalty coefficient α encourages the agent to liquidate a bigger portion of their
inventory by T , while the running penalty φ increases the initial speed of trading.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remain-
ing inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.12). We set β = 0.1, µ = 0.05,
µ¯b = 0, x = 30, sb = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.1, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.01, T = 10. In the left
panel we set φ = 0.001. In the right panel we set α = 1.
In Figure 3.4 we plot the effects of the temporary and permanent price impacts—
left and right panels, respectively—on the selling schedule of the agent. When
the coefficient of the temporary price impact β is low (left panel, upper line), the
agent reduces their trading speed at the beginning of the period, so to benefit
from the submartingale property of the best bid price, which is assumed to
increase on average according to the positive drift parameter µ¯b. The agent
accelerates their trading towards the end of the period, due to the terminal
penalty α. Such an acceleration is less detrimental than in the case of low
instantaneous impact. The analogous holds for the permanent price impact µ.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remain-
ing inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.12). We set α = 0.5, µ¯b = 0.1,
φ = 0.001, x = 30, sb = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.1, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.01, T = 10. In the
left panel we set µ = 0.05. In the right panel we set β = 0.1.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remain-
ing inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.12). We set α = 0.5, β = 0.1,
φ = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 8, µ = 0.05, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), µ¯b = 0, T = 10. In the left panel
we set r = 0.01. In the right panel we set λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.1.
In the left panel of Figure 3.5 we consider different intensities for the jump
processes in the price dynamics. When the latter is a submartingale (upper line)
the agent liquidates slower so to benefit from the increasing market trend. On
the contrary, when the best bid price is a supermartingale, the agent increases
their trading rate (bottom line). The dashed line represents the optimal selling
schedule when the price is a martingale. In the right panel we display the effect
of the discount rate r. Such a rate may model the urgency of the agent for their
liquidation task. We note that while the terminal quantity liquidated does not
change when we vary r, the initial speed increases for higher values of r. This is
coherent with our modelling assumption that a faster liquidation increases the
value function of the agent.
3.2.3.2 Mean-reverting model
Here we modify the best bid price dynamics and model it by a mean-reverting
process—coherently with its observed market features—while leaving the other
state variables unchanged. The shortcoming of this model is that the price may
become negative. We now let the best bid price evolve according to
dSbu = [κ
b
(
S¯ − Sbu−)− µνu]du+ dJb,1u − dJb,2u , (3.13)
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In (3.13) we have set µb
(
t, sb, v
)
= [κb
(
S¯−sb)−µv] and hbi(t, sb) = 1{i=1}−1{i=2},
where κb > 0 is the speed of mean reversion and S¯ > 0 is its long term mean.
For simplicity we consider the same optimisation problem in Equation (3.11) and
the value function now satisfies
sup
v∈Z
{
∂V
∂t
(t,x)− rV (t,x)− φx2+ [κb(S¯ − sb)− µv]∂V
∂sb
(t,x)− v∂V
∂x
(t,x)
+ v
(
sb − βv)∂V
∂y
(t,x) + λb,1E(z
b,1)
[
V
(
t, x, sb + zb,1, y
)− V (t,x)]
+ λb,2E(z
b,2)
[
V
(
t, x, sb − zb,2, y)− V (t,x)]} = 0,
(3.14)
with terminal and boundary conditions given by V (τ,x) = y + x(sb − αx) and
V (u, 0, sb, y) = y, respectively. In Figures 3.6 and 3.7 we plot a hundred simu-
lated paths for: (i) the inventory evolution (top left panel), (ii) the cash process
(top right panel), (iii) the unimpacted best bid price (bottom left panel), and (iv)
the impacted best bid price (bottom right panel). In Figure 3.6 we set Sbt < S¯,
while in Figure 3.7 we set Sbt > S¯.
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Figure 3.6: Simulation of Equations (3.1), (3.10), (3.13) and (3.9). We set β =
0.05, µ = 0.1, x = 30, sb = 5, S¯ = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.001,
T = 10, φ = 0.0001, α = 0.5, κb = 0.1.
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Figure 3.7: Simulation of Equations (3.1), (3.10), (3.13) and (3.9). We set β =
0.05, µ = 0.1, x = 30, sb = 11, S¯ = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.001,
T = 10, φ = 0.0001, α = 0.5, κb = 0.1.
The majority of the model parameters share the same features outlined in Section
3.2.3.1, and thus we here only look at the role of the mean-reversion speed and
the long-term mean, and plot the mean strategy of the agent.
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Figure 3.8: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.14). We set β = 0.05, µ = 0.1,
x = 30, S¯ = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.001, T = 10, φ = 0.0001, α = 2.
In the left panel we set sb = 6. In the right panel we set sb = 10.
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Figure 3.9: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.14). We set β = 0.05, µ = 0.1,
x = 30, S¯ = 8, λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, zb,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.001, T = 10, φ = 0.0001, α = 1.
In the left panel we set κb = 0.1. In the right panel we set κb = 0.001.
In Figure 3.8 we show different trading trajectories for different values of the
speed of mean reversion. First we note that the trading speed in the left panel is
higher than the one appearing in the right panel. This is due to the price sensi-
tivity of the policy and, in particular, to a higher starting price in the left panel
compared to the one in the right panel. Furthermore, we note that if the cur-
rent price is above its long-term average (left panel), the agent liquidates faster
when the speed of mean reversion is higher (solid line). This result incorporates
(i) the opportunity to liquidate at a more favourable price (which is short-lived
compared to the case of low κb—dotted line), and (ii) the lower terminal value of
the remaining portfolio, given by the asset price being, on average, closer to its
long-term mean. Analogous considerations can be made for the case of a starting
price lower than the long-term mean of the asset (right panel). That is, a higher
speed of mean reversion discourages the investor to liquidate faster as the price
is going to quickly mean-revert to a higher value.
Figure 3.9 shows the optimal strategy for different values of the long-term mean
of the asset’s price, while also considering both the cases of high and low speed of
mean reversion. In both panels, in agreement with the considerations made for
Figure 3.8, higher values of the long-term mean S¯ reduce the liquidation speed.
Such difference is more evident for higher values of the mean-reversion speed
(left panel). In particular, as κb → 0, the three inventory evolutions converge to
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a unique path. This is trivial since, if we set κb = 0, the best bid price is not
affected by the parameter S¯.
3.3 Trading in the dark pool
We here propose a more flexible setup than the continuous-time model elaborated
by Kratz and Scho¨neborn [57] and we outline here our main contributions to the
literature.
1. We do not require for the price process to be a martingale.
2. We incorporate the permanent price impact in our model (Kratz and
Scho¨neborn [58] include price impact in a discrete-time model).
3. We allow for partial execution in the dark pool.
4. We consider a general objective function and a general terminal bequest
function to account for: (i) different preferences of agents, (ii) various
ways of calculating P&L, and (iii) minimisation/maximisation of various
performance measures (e.g. implementation shortfall4).
As a shortcoming deriving from a more complex structure, we lose the opportu-
nity of finding a closed-form solution and need to resort to numerical techniques
for describing the optimal selling schedule. Another difference which is worth
noticing is that we do not constrain the inventory to be fully liquidated by T .
While it may be an interesting problem to look at, we believe that practical
market considerations should be set as a priority and fully liquidating a large
inventory under strongly averse conditions may not necessarily be the optimal
choice and/or economically justified. We therefore prefer to keep the terminal
penalty for failing to liquidate the whole inventory, so to account for various ur-
gencies that agents may experience. We believe that current market conditions
should contribute to the choice of the optimal portion to liquidate and they
should, therefore, affect the trading schedule.
4The implementation shortfall (IS) is defined in, e.g., Almgren and Chriss [2] by the difference
between the theoretical and realised gain. That is IS = XtS
b
t −
∫ T
t
νuS
b
udu.
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As mentioned earlier in this work, we assume that trades in the dark pool get
executed at the lit-pool mid-price, for which we still need a model. We decide
to model the spread process {∆u}—from which the mid price Smu = Sbu + ∆u/2
derives—for the following reasons:
1. By providing a flexible model, one can choose dynamics that guarantee the
positivity of the spread process at all times.
2. Market liquidity (understood as the spread’s width) can be easily incor-
porated in the model and its effects on the optimal strategy can be better
understood.
3. By modelling the spread we can capture market features such as, e.g., the
high bid-ask correlation and the mean reversion of the market spread.
In the next sections we present the optimal control problem and we provide
explicit examples which depict the flexibility of our model.
3.3.1 Modified prices, inventory and cash dynamics
The market spread is determined by both the best bid and the best ask prices
movements. In particular, when the bid price experiences a positive jump (in-
creases), the spread should decrease in the same instant, given that the ask price
has not jumped. Analogously, a downward jump of the best bid price should
increase the spread. The opposite holds for jumps in the best ask price. Fur-
thermore, as the lit-pool trades of the agent permanently impact the best bid
price downward, such impact should also be reflected in the spread process. We
thus choose for the latter the following dynamics
d∆u = µ
∆ (u,∆u− , νu) du+
2∑
i=1
h∆i (u,∆u−) dJ˜
∆,i
u +
2∑
i=1
hb,∆i
(
u, Sbu− ,∆u−
)
dJ˜b,iu ,
(3.15)
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with initial value ∆t = ∆. In the above notation, the processes {Jb,iu } are
defined as in Equation (3.2) and we further introduce the compensated compound
Poisson processes
J˜∆,iu = J
∆,i
u − λ∆,iuE
[
z∆,i1
]
=
N∆,iu∑
j=1
z∆,ij − λ∆,iuE
[
z∆,i1
]
,
where i = 1, 2 and {N∆,iu } are independent Poisson processes with intensity λ∆,i.
The jump sizes are modelled by sequences of i.i.d. random variables z∆,ij , where
j=1,2,. . . ,.
The purpose of this section is to find the optimal trading strategy in both ‘lit’
and dark venues at any time u ∈ [t, T ). We denote the optimal order size
in the dark pool by {ηu}, and we define the vector-valued control process by
ν = {νu} := (νu, ηu), where {νu} is progressively measurable and {ηu} ∈ [0, Xu]
is predictable. Next, we modify the inventory and the cash dynamics since they
now also depend on the dark pool activity. Along the lines of Horst and Naujokat
[52], we model the dark-pool execution part by a jump process. We thus write
dXu = −νudu− ηudJyu , (3.16)
and
dYu = µ
y
(
u, Sbu, νu
)
du+ hy
(
u, Sbu− ,∆u− , ηu
)
dJyu . (3.17)
In the above, we define Jyu :=
∑Nyu
j=1 z
y
j , where {Nyu} is a Poisson process with
intensity λy and zyj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , are i.i.d. random variables supported in
[0, 1], which model the executed portion of the order submitted to the dark pool.
3.3.2 The value function
To simplify the notation, we here introduce the space O := [0, x] × R3 and we
define a vector of state variables Xu =
(
Xu, S
b
u,∆u, Yu
) ∈ O with initial values
x = (x, sb,∆, y) ∈ O. Next we consider a generalised optimisation problem of
the form
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V (t,x) = sup
ν∈Z
E t,x
[∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)f1
(
u,Xu, νu
)
du+ e−r(τ−t)g1
(
Xτ
)]
, (3.18)
where τ is defined by Equation (3.3), Z := V ×N and E t,x[·] is the expectation
given the initial state of the system (t,x ∈ [0, T ) × O). The function f1 may
play the role of a running gain and/or penalty criterion. We include the lit-pool
trading rate ν in f1 as it may reflect a penalisation for the information leakage
to which publicly-displayed orders are subject to. The function g1 is a terminal
bequest function which can include (i) the terminal cash, and (ii) the theoretical
monetised value as well as a terminal penalty for the remaining inventory at time
τ . For p ∈ R4 with components (p1, p2, p3, p4), we define the operator H1 by
H1 (t,x,p) = sup
v∈V
{
f1 (t,x, v)− vp1 + µb
(
t, sb, v
)
p2 + µ
∆ (t,∆, v) p3
+µy(t, sb,∆, v)p4
}
,
and further the operators Bb,∆(t,x, ϕ), B∆(t,x, ϕ) and By(t,x, ϕ) by
Bb,∆ (t,x, ϕ) =
2∑
i=1
λb,iE(z
b,i)
[
ϕ
(
t, x, sb + hbi
(
t, sb
)
zb,i,∆ + hb,∆i
(
t, sb,∆
)
zb,i, y
)
−ϕ(t,x)− hbi(t, sb)zb,i ∂ϕ∂sb (t,x)− hb,∆i (t, sb,∆)zb,i ∂ϕ∂∆(t,x)
]
,
(3.19)
B∆ (t,x, ϕ) =
2∑
i=1
λ∆,iE(z
∆,i)
[
ϕ
(
t, x, sb,∆ + h∆i
(
t,∆
)
z∆,i, y
)− ϕ(t,x)
−h∆i
(
t,∆
)
z∆,i
∂ϕ
∂∆
(
t,x
)] (3.20)
and
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By(t,x, ϕ) = sup
n∈N
λyE(z
y)
[
ϕ(t, x− nzy, sb,∆, y + hy(t, sb,∆, n)zy)− ϕ(t,x)
]
,
(3.21)
Standard dynamic programming arguments suggest that the HJB equation as-
sociated to the optimisation problem in (3.18) is a PIDE of the form
rV (t,x)− ∂V
∂t
(t,x)−H1 (t,x, DxV )− Bb,∆(t,x, V )− B∆(t,x, V )
−By(t,x, V ) = 0,
(3.22)
on [0, T )×O, with terminal condition V (τ,x) = g1(x) and boundary condition
V (u, 0, sb,∆, y) = y. In Chapter 7 we show that V (t,x) is the unique continuous
viscosity solution of Equation (3.22).
3.3.3 Explicit examples and numerical results
We now look at the same examples presented in Section 3.2.3, only this time we
start with the mean-reverting model, which is the one that is widely known to
better reflect empirical market features.
3.3.3.1 Mean-reverting model
As well-known by practitioners and as also taken into account in much of the
current literature (see e.g. Cartea et al. [24], and Fodra and Pham [38]), the
LOB prices—and, thus, the market spread—mean-revert quickly to their long-
term mean. Thus we choose the following dynamics for the best bid price and
the spread processes:
dSbu =
[
κb
(
S¯ − Sbu−
)− µνu]du+ dJb,1u − dJb,2u , (3.23)
d∆u =
[
κ∆
(
∆¯−∆u−
)
+ µνu
]
du+ dJ∆,1u − dJ∆,2u − dJb,1u + dJb,2u , (3.24)
where we have set µb
(
t, sb, v
)
= [κb
(
S¯ − sb) − µv], hbi(t, sb) = 1{i=1} − 1{i=2},
µ∆
(
t,∆, v
)
= [κ∆
(
∆¯−∆)+µv], h∆i (t,∆) = 1{i=1}−1{i=2} and hb,∆i (t, sb,∆) =
1{i=2} − 1{i=1}. We let S¯ and ∆¯ be the long-term means and κb and κ∆ are the
speeds of mean reversion of {Sbu} and {∆u}, respectively. In Equation (3.23) we
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interpret dJb,1 to be the change in the best bid price due to the submission of limit
buy orders at a more favourable price, whereas dJb,2 models the changes due to
incoming market sell orders which walk the book and the effect of cancellations
of limit buy orders posted at the best price. As we stated earlier in this work,
when the best bid price jumps upward by means of dJb,1, the spread process
should simultaneously jump downward and this is the reason why dJb,1 also
appears in Equation (3.24). The analogous holds for dJb,2. The remaining
compound Poisson processes that appear in the spread dynamics are associated
to the movements of the best ask price, which jumps upward thanks to marker
buy orders that walk the book, and jumps downward when a limit sell order is
posted at a price lower than the current best ask price. Finally, we note that
the the trading rate in the ‘lit’ pool appears in the drift of the spread dynamics
since, by pushing the best bid price down, it simultaneously widens the spread.
The top of the book (TOB) simulation in Figure 3.10 depict very similar features
to those shown in real data.
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Figure 3.10: Simulation of Equations (3.23) and (3.24). We set , zb,i, z∆,i ∼
U [0, 1), λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.5, ∆¯ = 0.2, S¯ = 40, κb = κ∆ = 0.0002,
St = 40, ∆t = 0.2, T = 100.
Next, we consider an investor who wants to optimally liquidate their portfolio
by placing sell orders in both the ‘lit’ market and the dark pool. The inventory
process of the investor is here modelled by (3.16), while we model the cash process
by
dYu = νuSˆ
b
udu+ ηuS
m
u−dJ
y
u , (3.25)
where we define, for β > 0, Sˆbu = S
b
u − βνu. In Equation 3.25 we have set
µy
(
u, sb, ν
)
= νsˆb and hy
(
u, sb,∆, η
)
= ηsm = η(sb + ∆/2). Equation 3.25 can
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be interpreted as follows. The quantity νuSˆ
b
u represents the revenues deriving
from selling the shares at the impacted bid price in the ‘lit’ pool. The quantity
ηuS
m
u− represents the order sent to the dark pool evaluated at the mid-price,
which increases the cash process of the agent, only if it is executed (and for the
quantity executed). The execution in the dark pool is modelled by the compound
Poisson process Jyu .
The maximised expected return derived by the shares sale is obtained by solving
the optimisation problem
V (t,x) = sup
ν∈Z
E t,x
[
e−r(τ−t)(Yτ +Xτ (Smτ − αXτ ))− φ
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)X2udu
]
,
(3.26)
where we have set f1 (t,x, v) = −φx2 and g1(x) = y + x(sm − αx), where τ
is defined by Equation (3.3) and φ ∈ R+ ∪ 0. In the considered performance
criterion, we allow for a maximisation of the terminal cash Yτ together with
the terminal theoretical value of the portfolio Smτ Xτ (i.e. the remaining shares
evaluated at the mid-price), and a penalty for a non-zero inventory level at time
τ given by −αX2τ , where α > 0. The integral term, as in Cartea et al. [18, 20],
penalises for the inventory holding over the whole period in which the strategy
is applied. The associated HJB PIDE is given by
sup
v∈Z
{
∂V
∂t
(t,x)− rV (t,x)− φx2 + [κb(S¯ − sb)− µv]∂V
∂sb
(t,x)
+
[
κ∆
(
∆¯−∆) + µv]∂V
∂∆
(t,x) + v(sb − βv)∂V
∂y
(t,x)− v∂V
∂x
(t,x)
+λyE(z
y)
[
V
(
t, x− nzy, sb,∆, y + nzy(sb + ∆/2))−V (t,x) ]
+λb,1E(z
b,1)
[
V
(
t, x, sb + zb,1,∆− zb,1, y)−V (t,x) ]
+λb,2E(z
b,2)
[
V
(
t, x, sb − zb,2,∆ + zb,2, y)−V (t,x) ]
+λ∆,1E(z
∆,1)
[(
t, x, sb,∆ + z∆,1, y
)−V (t,x) ]
+λ∆,2E(z
∆,2)
[
V
(
t, x, sb,∆− z∆,2, y)−V (t,x) ]} = 0,
(3.27)
with terminal condition V (τ,x) = y+ (sb + ∆/2−αx)x and boundary condition
V
(
u, 0, sb,∆, y
)
= y.
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Figure 3.11: Simulation of Equations (3.16), (3.25), (3.23) and (3.24). We set
β = 0.001, µ = 0.001, x = 30, sb = 8, S¯ = 8, ∆ = 1, ∆¯ = 1, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 =
λ∆,2 = 0.5, zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], r = 0.02, T = 10, φ = 0.001,
α = 2, κb = κ∆ = 0.1. In the bottom panels, the black lines depict the impacted
prices while the corresponding blue lines represent the theoretical unimpacted prices.
First, we plot a hundred simulations of the state variables of the model and,
in Figure 3.11, we show: (i) the inventory evolution (top left panel), (ii) the
cash evolution (top right panel), (iii) the best bid price (bottom left panel),
and (iv) the spread (bottom right panel). For the parameters’ analysis, we plot
the mean strategy and we consider three different scenarios for the dark-pool
liquidity: (i) no execution takes place in the dark pool throughout the entire
trading period (upper/dotted line), (ii) partial execution (middle/dashed line),
and (iii) full execution (bottom/solid line). We let the dark-pool executions, if
any, take place at τ1 = 4 and τ2 = 7. Furthermore, we let the partial execution
to account for 50% of the order posted. We emphasise that τ1 and τ2, as well
as the execution portion in the dark pool, are fixed arbitrarily—for the sake of
illustration only—after a complete solution has been found. The reason for this
choice is to make comparison between graphs rather straightforward.
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Figure 3.12: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remain-
ing inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.27). We set κb = κ∆ = 0.01,
β = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 0.5, S¯ = 5, ∆¯ = 1, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2,
zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), µ = 0.01, λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], α = 2, T = 10. In the top panels
we set r = 0.01, φ = 0.001, α = 4 (left), α = 0.5 (right). In the middle panels we
set r = 0.01, α = 2, φ = 0.1 (left), φ = 0.0001 (right). In the bottom panels we set
φ = 0.001, α = 2, r = 0.1 (left), r = 0.0001 (right).
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In Figures 3.12 we see that higher values of the terminal penalty α increase the
total portion of inventory liquidated by T , while higher value of the parameter φ
and r increase the liquidation speed throughout the whole period, while leaving
the terminal-inventory level almost unchanged. As noted earlier, α penalises
only for the terminal holdings, while φ penalises for the current holdings, and r
increases the reward for the shares liquidated earlier.
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Figure 3.13: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the re-
maining inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.27). We set κ∆ = 0.01,
β = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 1, ∆¯ = 0.5, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2,
zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), µ = 0.01, λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], α = 2, φ = 0.001, r = 0.01,
T = 10. In the top panels we set S¯ = 3, κb = 0.1 (left), κb = 0.0005 (right). In the
bottom panels we set S¯ = 7, κb = 0.1 (left), κb = 0.0005 (right).
The speed of mean reversion of the best bid price (i.e. κb) has a different impact
on the selling schedule, depending on the initial value of the bid price Sbt and,
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in particular, whether it is higher or lower than its long-term mean S¯. In the
top panels of Figure 3.13 we set Sbt > S¯, which implies that, on average, the
price is going to decrease to get closer to its long-term mean. The agent is
thus incentivised to liquidate faster at the beginning since the price is higher
than it is supposed to be. This feature is more evident when the speed of mean
reversion κb is higher. In fact, the price reverts faster and the agent increases
their liquidation speed so to exploit the opportunity of selling at a higher price.
In the bottom panels of Figure 3.13, the starting price is lower than its long-term
mean, i.e. Sbt < S¯, and thus the agent waits for it to revert, so to liquidate at a
more favourable price. As opposed to the previous case, a higher κb reduces the
liquidation speed. This is rather intuitive: the agent is willing to wait for the
price to increase, which, on average, takes less time than the case of low κb.
In Figure 3.14 we analyse the role of the speed of mean reversion κ∆ of the spread
process. Before entering into details, we make a few considerations on how the
spread affects the agent’s trading strategy. First and foremost, we acknowledge
that the spread is a measure of the market liquidity. In particular, a tighter
spread models a highly liquid market, while less liquid markets usually have
wider spreads. Also, in liquid markets, the spread mean-reverts faster than in
an illiquid market, where trades have higher permanent impact. Finally, a wider
spread makes the trading in the dark pool more advantageous, than the case of
a tighter spread. We thus expect larger trades in the dark pool when the spread
is higher.
In the top panels of Figure 3.14, we set ∆t > ∆¯ and, therefore, the spread is
expected to decrease by reverting to its long-term mean ∆¯. For high values of
the speed of mean reversion κ∆, the agent increases their liquidation speed in
both venues, compared to the case of low κ∆. In fact, when the speed of mean
reversion is low, the benefits of a fast liquidation decrease (top right panel). In
the bottom panels, we set ∆t < ∆¯ and thus the spread is expected to increase.
For a high speed of mean reversion (bottom left panel), the agent dramatically
reduces their dark-pool posting as they are encouraged to wait for a larger spread.
The opposite holds when the spread is expected to revert slowly (bottom left
panel).
Chapter 3. Optimal execution in ‘lit’ and dark pools 85
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
R
e
m
a
in
in
g
in
v
e
n
to
ry
5
10
15
20
25
30
Selling schedule - high κ∆,∆t > ∆¯
No dark-pool execution
Partial dark-pool execution
Full dark-pool execution
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
R
e
m
a
in
in
g
in
v
e
n
to
ry
5
10
15
20
25
30
Selling schedule - low κ∆,∆t > ∆¯
No dark-pool execution
Partial dark-pool execution
Full dark-pool execution
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
R
e
m
a
in
in
g
in
v
e
n
to
ry
5
10
15
20
25
30
Selling schedule - high κ∆,∆t < ∆¯
No dark-pool execution
Partial dark-pool execution
Full dark-pool execution
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
R
e
m
a
in
in
g
in
v
e
n
to
ry
5
10
15
20
25
30
Selling schedule - low κ∆,∆t < ∆¯
No dark-pool execution
Partial dark-pool execution
Full dark-pool execution
Figure 3.14: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the re-
maining inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.27). We set κb = 0.01,
β = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 0.5, S¯ = 5, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2, µ = 0.01,
zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], α = 2, φ = 0.001, r = 0.01, T = 10. In
the top panels we set ∆¯ = 0.3, κ∆ = 0.1 (left), κ∆ = 0.0005 (right). In the bottom
panels we set ∆¯ = 0.7, κ∆ = 0.1 (left), κ∆ = 0.0005 (right).
In Figure 3.15 we analyse the role of both the permanent and the temporary
price impacts.
As expected, higher impacts reduce the quantity we post in the ‘lit’ pool (left
panels) while lower impacts encourage the lit-pool posting (right panels).
This is in agreement with the results previously obtained.
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Figure 3.15: Optimal mean selling strategy displayed as a function of the remain-
ing inventory. We set κb = κ∆ = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 0.5, S¯ = 5, ∆¯ = 0.5,
λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2, zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), φ = 0.001, α = 2, λy = 0.1,
zy ∼ U [0, 1], r = 0.01, φ = 0.001, T = 10. In the top panels we set β = 0.01, µ = 0.1
(left), µ = 0.001 (right). In the bottom panels we set µ = 0.01, β = 0.03 (left),
β = 0.001 (right).
Figure 3.16 shows the optimal selling schedule for different values of the arrival
rates of the jump processes in both the best bid price and the spread processes.
We show that the agent’s trading schedule crucially depends on both the price
dynamics and the market liquidity. In particular, a trading acceleration in both
venues is optimal when the spread is subject to more downwards jumps rather
than upwards jumps. The opposite holds for the case of more frequent upwards
jumps.
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Figure 3.16: Optimal mean selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remain-
ing inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.27). We set κb = κ∆ = 0.01,
β = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 0.5, S¯ = 5, ∆¯ = 0.5, µ = 0.01, λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1],
zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), r = 0.01, φ = 0.001, α = 2, T = 10. In the top panels we set
λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2, λb,1 = 0.7, λb,2 = 0.1 (left), λb,1 = 0.1, λb,2 = 0.7 (right). In the
bottom panels we set λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.2, λ∆,1 = 0.7, λ∆,2 = 0.1 (left), λ∆,1 = 0.1,
λ∆,2 = 0.7 (right)
Figure 3.17 shows the optimal selling schedule for different values of the arrival
rate of the dark-pool executions, λy. Higher values of λy act as a deterrent for
lit-pool trading, as dark-pool executions are more likely than in the case of low
λy. We note that the lit-pool liquidation speed decreases for high λy (left panel)
while it increases for low λy (right panel). This confirms both our intuition and
the results previously obtained in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 3.17: Optimal selling strategy—displayed as a function of the remaining
inventory—found by solving the HJB equation (3.27). We set κb = κ∆ = 0.01,
β = 0.01, φ = 0.01, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 0.5, S¯ = 5, ∆¯ = 0.5, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 =
λ∆,2 = 0.2, zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), µ = 0.01, zy ∼ U [0, 1], r = 0.01, φ = 0.001, α = 2,
T = 10. In the left panel we set λy = 0.5. In the right panel we set λy = 0.01.
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Figure 3.18: Optimal ‘lit’ and dark-pool strategies—found by solving the HJB
equation (3.27)—for an inventory of 30 (left and right panels, respectively). We set
κb = κ∆ = 0.01, β = 0.01, φ = 0.01, S¯ = 5, ∆¯ = 0.5, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2,
zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), µ = 0.01, λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], r = 0.01, φ = 0.001, α = 2,
T = 10. In the top panels, we set Sbt > S¯. In the bottom panels we set S
b
t < S¯.
Finally, in Figure 3.18, we plot the optimal ‘lit’ and dark-pool strategies as
functions of the bid price and the spread. The plots are to be read as follows:
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Each surface represents the optimal posting in the venue specified in the title,
for the time t specified in the legend, if the inventory at that particular time is
30,000. This is only to show the qualitative features of the optimal strategy, as a
complete solution would also require an optimal posting for all levels of inventory
at all times (we here only plot surfaces for one-second time intervals). We can
see that roundtrips in dark pools are not necessarily beneficial, especially when
adding features such as permanent impact and prices dynamics different from
martingales. As a final consideration, we note that the posting in both venues
increases—as maturity approaches—due to the terminal penalty α.
3.3.3.2 Geometric Le´vy model
For the sake of completeness, we propose an exponential model so to ensure the
positivity of the best bid price and the spread processes at every time u ∈ [t, T ].
(We here shall further require |zb,i| < 1, z∆,1 > −1 and z∆,2 < 1, almost surely).
We let the best bid price be defined by Equation (3.13) and we let the market
spread evolve according to
d∆u
∆u−
=
(
µ¯∆ + µνu
)
du− dJb,1u + dJb,2u + dJ∆,1u − dJ∆,2u , (3.28)
where we have set µ∆
(
t,∆, v
)
=
(
µ¯∆ + µv
)
∆, h∆i (t,∆) = ∆(1{i=1} − 1{i=2})
and hb,∆i (t, s
b,∆) = ∆(1{i=2} − 1{i=1}). In Figure 3.19 we plot a simulation of
the best ask, the mid and the best bid prices. We keep the inventory and the
cash dynamics as in Equations (3.16) and (3.25) respectively, and we consider
the value function stated in Equation (3.26).
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Figure 3.19: Simulation of Equations (3.13) and (3.28). We set , zb,i, z∆,i ∼
U [0, 1), λb,1 = λb,2 = 0.5, λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.6, µ¯b = µ¯∆ = 0, S¯ = 40, St = 40,
∆t = 0.2, T = 100.
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The associated HJB PIDE is given by
sup
v∈Z
{
∂V
∂t
(t,x)− rV (t,x)− φx2 + (µ¯b − µv)sb ∂V
∂sb
(t,x)
+
(
µ¯∆ + µv
)
∆
∂V
∂∆
(t,x) + v(sb − βv)∂V
∂y
(t,x)− v∂V
∂x
(t,x)
+λyE(z
y)
[
V
(
t, x− nzy, sb,∆, y + nzy(sb + ∆/2))−V (t,x) ]
+λb,1E(z
b,1)
[
V
(
t, x, sb(1 + zb,1),∆(1− zb,1), y)−V (t,x) ]
+λb,2E(z
b,2)
[
V
(
t, x, sb(1− zb,2),∆(1 + zb,2), y)−V (t,x) ]
+λ∆,1E(z
∆,1)
[(
t, x, sb,∆(1 + z∆,1), y
)−V (t,x) ]
+λ∆,2E(z
∆,2)
[
V
(
t, x, sb,∆(1− z∆,2), y)−V (t,x) ]} = 0,
(3.29)
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Figure 3.20: Simulation of Equations (3.16), (3.25), (3.13) and (3.28). We set
β = 0.001, µ = 0.001, x = 30, sb = 5, ∆ = 0.5, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.5,
zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], r = 0.02, T = 10, φ = 0.001, α = 2,
µ¯b = µ¯∆ = 0. In the bottom panels, the black lines depict the impacted prices while
the corresponding blue lines represent the theoretical unimpacted prices.
As we provided an extended analysis of the model parameters in Section 3.3.3.1,
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we here only show the state-variables simulations and the optimal ‘lit’ and dark-
pool strategies, in Figures 3.20 and 3.21 respectively. In the top panels of Figure
3.21, the spread and the best bid price are assumed to be supermartingales
while in the bottom panels thy are assumed to be submartingales. We note that
the optimal quantity to be posted in both venues is smaller in the latter case
compared to the former. Finally, we note that roundtrips are not necessarily
beneficial.
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Figure 3.21: Optimal ‘lit’ and dark-pool strategies—found by solving the HJB
equation (3.29)—for an inventory of 30 (left and right panels, respectively). We set
β = 0.01, x = 30, λb,1 = λb,2 = λ∆,1 = λ∆,2 = 0.2, zb,i, z∆,i ∼ U [0, 1), µ = 0.01,
λy = 0.1, zy ∼ U [0, 1], r = 0.01, φ = 0.001, α = 2, T = 10. In the left panel we set
µ¯b = µ¯∆ = 0.001. In the right panel we set µ¯b = µ¯∆ = −0.001.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we present a more sophisticated model than the one introduced
in Chapter 2. First, we consider a class of models that can be adapted to the
particular situation at hand. Next, we treat in details two explicit examples for
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the dynamics of the bid-price and market-spread processes. Finally, we study
the role of the model’s parameters and plot the optimal strategy of the agent.
We note that the selling schedule crucially depends on both the price dynamics
(the best bid) and the market’s liquidity (the spread). We consider a mean-
reverting model so to reproduce observed market features, and a geometric Le´vy
model so to ensure the positivity of the prices processes involved.
We take as main reference the papers by Kratz and Scho¨neborn [57] and Horst
and Naujokat [52], and we here outline the main differences. Compared to Kratz
and Scho¨neborn [57], we: (i) introduce an explicit model for the spread process,
(ii) consider the permanent price impact for both the best bid price and the
spread processes, (iii) consider processes other than martingales, (iv) allow for
partial execution in the dark pool and (v) provide a general setup so to account
for various modelling preferences. On the other hand, we consider continuous-
time trading in the ‘lit’ pool as opposed to Horst and Naujokat [52], who consider
discrete-time trading when crossing the spread. Points (iv) and (v) mentioned
above are also a novelty compared to the work by Horst and Naujokat [52].
Chapter 4
The market-making problem
in a customised liquidity pool
4.1 Overview of the chapter
Market makers are liquidity providers. They set bid and ask quotes and trade
with impatient investors who seek to immediately buy or sell a certain quantity
of a financial asset. A portion of the market-maker’s P&L derives from the
spread charged to the clients. On the other hand, holding a non-zero inventory
carries an intrinsic risk associated with the unpredictable changes to which an
asset price is subject. This risk is further increased by a potential information
asymmetry due to which a market maker trades in the wrong direction.
We consider a financial entity that offers a dealer service to its clients. Such
an entity may be a small financial shop, an individual trading desk of large
institutions, as well as large firms which provide liquidity to a selected pool of
clients. Among these, we find, e.g., investment banks,1 hedge funds and high-
frequency traders. In the industry, such financial entity is sometimes referred to
as CLP1. These bespoke liquidity pools share some characteristics with so-called
dark pools, while additionally providing the dealer service. As such CLPs may be
viewed as “grey pools”, that is, a kind of hybrid between a dark pool and a ‘lit’
pool. CLPs typically offer two-way prices to their clients while preserving their
1The terminology ‘alternative liquidity pool’ is also used.
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anonymity. Clients can compare prices from various dealers through internal
GUI applications, but there is no centralised liquidity pool2 that displays those
prices, which are streamed directly to the clients in conditions of market opacity
and confidentiality. CLPs thus offer for all practical purposes a market-making
service, though they have no obligation to offer two-sided liquidity at any time.
In the remainder of the paper, we use the terms “dealer activity” and “market
making” interchangeably.
In the situation at hand the CLP (i) offers liquidity to its clients (who may
be both buyers and sellers) and (ii) may post limit and market orders in a
‘lit’ exchange to control the level of its inventory. We emphasise that the work
presented here has no particular asset class in mind, since the CLP may specialise
in, e.g. stocks, commodities and foreign exchange trading.
While Section 2.3.2 already treats part of the original work included in this
thesis, the model presented there is very limited in that (i) it does not allow the
CLP to choose the prices it offers to clients, (ii) it only allows the CLP to post
limit orders in the lit pool on top of the book and not deeper, (iii) the lit-pool
spread is assumed to be constant, and (iv) the model is very specific, thus not
allowing for much flexibility.
In what follows, we address the aforementioned four points by providing a more
flexible and structured model. We start by presenting the trading strategies
of the CLP for the purpose of inventory management. Next we formulate the
optimisation problem and we provide some examples by numerically solving the
associated HJB equation. This chapter is based on Crisafi & Macrina [31].
Throughout the present chapter we use standard finite difference methods to
solve—backward in time—the HJB equations stated herein. We thus obtain and
plot the numerical solution. The algorithm and techniques used are described in
detail in Section 7.5.2. Furthermore, under each plot there are the values of the
parameters used, for reproducibility purposes.
2In foreign exchange, examples of centralised liquidity pools include EBS, FXAll, Hotspot,
Thomson Reuters, etc., and in equity we may mention LSE, NYSE, NASDAQ, etc.
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4.2 Market making in CLPs
We consider a CLP that trades with buyers and sellers by being their counter-
party. It executes incoming buy and sell orders by its clients over a finite period
of time t ≤ u ≤ T < ∞ and may resort to the centralised exchange platform if
its inventory becomes critically small or large.
We fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Fu}t≤u≤T ,P) satisfying the usual con-
ditions and we assume that: (i) the CLP mid-price is aligned with the standard
exchange mid-price {Su}, and (ii) the CLP chooses the spread it charges to
clients. We define the LOB mid-price by
dSu = k¯
±
Mu
dMu, (4.1)
where {Mu} is a Poisson process with intensity λm and k¯±Mu is a collection of i.i.d.
random variables valued in {−k¯, k¯}. We choose such simple dynamics in Equa-
tion (4.1)—i.e. the mid-price can only move a tick a.s.—because our intention is
to focus on the market-making activity of the CLP, disregarding any potential
market-view it may have, or sudden price moves. Along the lines of Guilbaud and
Pham [47], we model the LOB bid-ask half spread by a continuous-time Markov
chain {ku}t≤u≤T with a discrete state space K := {k0, k1, k2, . . . , kn}, where k0 <
k1 < k2 < · · · < kn are set so to reflect the granularity of the standard-exchange
prices. In particular, for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1, we let kj+1−kj = k¯ > 0. The chain
is generated by {Q} = (rij) such that P[ku+du = kj |ku = ki] = rijdu + o(du)
and P[ku+du = ki|ku = ki] = 1 + riidu + o(du), with rij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i and
rii = −
∑
j 6=i rij . Such a choice has interesting financial justifications. Because
the spread is a measure of the market liquidity, lower states in K (e.g. k0) may be
associated with periods of higher liquidity compared to higher states (e.g. kn).
Also, by correctly choosing the transition probabilities, one can postulate the
existence of a “normal” level of the spread—for each particular class of assets—
from which deviations are unlikely to happen. Furthermore, the transition from
one state to another can be associated with the submission of both aggressive
and passive orders by market participants.
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We remark that when we write ku, we mean the level of the spread at time
u ∈ [t, T ], whereas with the notation k ∈ K we refer to a particular state kj , for
j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n.
At any time u ∈ [t, T ], the best LOB bid and ask prices are given by Sbu = Su−ku
and Sau = Su + ku, respectively. In Figure 4.1 we provide two sample paths for
the ‘lit’-pool TOB.
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Figure 4.1: Sample paths for (4.1). We set k¯ = 0.01 and K = {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.1}.
At each time u ∈ [t, T ], we consider three options for the inventory management:
(i) the CLP’s order flow may be controlled by accordingly choosing the prices
offered to its clients, (ii) a limit order—of which execution is uncertain—is posted
to the standard exchange, or (iii) a costly market order is submitted to the
standard exchange. Our goal is thus to obtain the critical levels of the inventory
for which it is optimal to (i) skew the CLP prices, (ii) submit limit orders, and
(iii) submit market orders.
4.2.1 Pricing strategy
We consider the processes δ+u , δ
−
u to be (i) the controls of the optimisation prob-
lem presented in Section 4.2.3 and (ii) part of the pricing strategy of the CLP.
The CLP chooses the values of {δ±u }. We denote by Su − δ−u and Su + δ+u the
base prices and by δ+u + δ
−
u the base spread from which the CLP derives the
prices offered to its clients, since the actual spread paid by the client to the CLP
is also a function of the order-size of the client, see Equation (4.3). In order to
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maintain competitiveness with respect to standard exchanges and other liquidity
providers, we assume that the CLP base spread does not exceed the standard
exchange spread under normal circumstances (i.e., acceptable inventory levels).
Nonetheless, it may be skewed with respect to the ‘lit’-exchange spread on the
protect side (e.g. the sell side when the CLP has a negative inventory), while
we assume that the aggress side (e.g. the buy side when the CLP has a negative
inventory) shall not cross the mid-price level. This last assumption is justified
since crossing the mid-price leaks to buy-side agents very sensitive information
regarding the CLP level of inventory. We thus suppose that δ+u and δ
−
u are pre-
dictable processes valued in [0, δ¯], where the upper bound is justified by practical
considerations (N.B., an infinite spread results in an infinite price), as well as by
the incentive for the CLP to maintain its quotes within a constant range.
The CLP flow of client orders can be affected by changing δ+u and δ
−
u (that is,
the arrival intensity of buyers and sellers is a function of the quotes posted by
the market maker). We might assume for example that the CLP has a positive
inventory at time u ∈ [t, T ]. It can make trading more attractive to buyers
rather than sellers, so to rebalance its inventory level. In particular, by lowering
δ+u and increasing δ
−
u , the CLP encourages buyers to place orders while sellers
are discouraged to do so. We further assume that the CLP accepts clients’ orders
at time u (i.e., it keeps streaming dealable prices to clients) only if the inventory
at time u− lies within
[ − X¯, X¯], where X¯ > 0 so that, if either boundary
is surpassed, the CLP may only trade in one direction. Such an assumption
is supported by the following financial interpretation: the CLP is subject to
regulatory constraints (e.g. internal risk-management) which do not allow to
hold or short-sell a position bigger than a fixed authorised quantity. Throughout
the market-making activity (i.e., between hedging times), we define the CLP
inventory process {Xu} by
dXu = dJ
−
u 1{Xu−≤X¯} − dJ
+
u 1{Xu−≥−X¯}, (4.2)
where J±u :=
∑N±u
i=1 q
±
i and where the Cox processes {N±u } have intensities λ±δ =
λ±(δ±u ). The random variables q
±
i are i.i.d. with support Q := {0, q1, . . . , qN}
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where these model the size of the trades executed by the CLP. At any time
u ∈ [t, T ], we have sign[Xu] = {−1, 0, 1} where we include short-selling for the
case sign[Xu] = −1. We model the CLP cash process {Yu} by
dYu = f
(
u, Su− , δ
+
u , q
+
u
)
dJ+u 1{Xu−≥−X¯} − f
(
u, Su− , δ
−
u , q
−
u
)
dJ−u 1{Xu−≤X¯},
(4.3)
where q±u is shorthand notation for q
±
N±u
. The function f allows the CLP to offer
a stream of prices related to the size of the client’s order3. In particular the CLP
offers tighter spreads for smaller sizes and wider spreads for larger sizes. The
function f further allows for various ways to calculate P&L. We remark that
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) are strongly coupled. For example, the arrival of a
seller at time u increases the inventory Xu− by q
−
u and reduces the cash amount
Yu− by f
(
u, Su− , δ
−
u , q
−
u
)
q−u . The analogous holds for the arrival of buyers.
4.2.2 Hedging strategy
The CLP can resort to the standard exchange to liquidate (respectively refill)
part of its inventory; we assume that it cannot post speculative orders. This
means that at time u ∈ [t, T ] a buy order can be posted only if Xu < 0 while
a sell order can be posted if Xu > 0. We refer to Remark 7.1 for the compact
version of the equations treated in the present section.
4.2.2.1 Limit orders
The CLP can post a limit order by specifying a quantity η and a limit price
S ± (k + κ), where κ is the optimal distance from the best price, at which it
wants to buy or sell. We only consider IOC orders and we model their execution
percentages by a [0, 1]-valued sequence of i.i.d. random variables zi, of which
cumulative distribution function heavily depends on the limit-price chosen by
3We wish to remark that, within this context, the function f is fixed a priori by the market
maker and is not the object of the optimisation.
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the CLP. In particular, if a limit order is posted at time τ `i , for i = 1, 2 . . . , then
it impacts the inventory and the cash processes as follows:
Xτ`i
= Γ
(
ηi, Xτ`i −
, zi
)
, Yτ`i
= χ
(
ηi, Y τ`i −
, zi, Sτ`i −
, kτ`i −
, κi
)
. (4.4)
Since the CLP cannot post speculative orders in the ‘lit’ pool, it must hold∣∣Γ(ηi, Xτ`i − , zi)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Xτ`i − ∣∣, almost surely. For example a limit buy order, which
if executed increases the inventory, can only be posted if the CLP holds a negative
inventory, and vice versa. The cash process changes accordingly. We state these
assumptions rigorously in Chapter 7. We let TtT be the set of stopping times
valued in [t, T ], and N := [min (0,−Xτ`i − ),max (0,−Xτ`i − )] be the set of all
admissible control actions. A limit-order strategy is a collection of stopping times
and actions L = (τ `i , ηi, κi)i≥1 ∈ TtT × N × K`, where the elements in K` ⊂ K
reflect the price-granularity of the ‘lit’ exchange.
4.2.2.2 Market orders
Alternatively, the CLP can submit a market order, which (i) is more expensive
and (ii) benefits from sure execution as it is matched with existing limit orders.
A market order of size ξi posted at a time τ
m
i impacts the inventory and cash
processes as follows:
Xτmi = Λ
(
ξi, Xτmi −
)
, Yτmi = c
(
ξi, Y τmi − , Sτmi − , kτmi −
)
, (4.5)
where
∣∣Λ(ξi, Xτmi − )∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Xτmi − ∣∣. A market-order strategy is a collection of stop-
ping times and actions M = (τmi , ξi)i≥1 ∈ TtT × X , where the set X is defined
by X = [min (0,−Xτmi − ),max (0,−Xτmi − )].
The level of generality in the limit-order and the market-order impulses offers the
flexibility to include various features. For example, there are different methods
to compute the P&L. Furthermore, one may like to account for the fees paid to
the exchange for using their services and for possible liquidity rebates for limit
orders.
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4.2.3 The value function
We consider the problem of maximising expected terminal cash subject to a ter-
minal penalty for holding a non-zero inventory by the terminal date. In defining
the objective function, we are led by Guilbaud and Pham [47] and we propose
the following
V (t, x, y, s; k) = sup
D,L,M
E
[
U (XT , YT , ST , kT ) +
∫ T
t
g(u,Xu) du
−
∑
t≤τmi <T
m −
∑
t≤τ`i<T
`
]
,
(4.6)
where D := (δ+u , δ
−
u )u≥t, the function U is the utility derived from the cash and
inventory holdings at time T , and g is a running penalty for the risk of holding
the inventory. In the summations of Equation (4.6), we include the penalties
m and ` for submitting market and limit orders in the standard exchange,
where m > l > 0. Throughout the paper we have the vector of state variables
x := [x, y, s] ∈ O := [−X¯ − qN , X¯ + qN ]×R2. Equation (4.6) satisfies the DPP,
see Fleming and Soner [37]. That is, for all τ ∈ TtT , we have
V (t,x; k) = sup
D,L,M
E
∫ τ
t
g(u,Xu)du−
∑
t≤τmi <τ
m −
∑
t≤τ`i<τ
` + V (τ,Xτ ; kτ )
 .
(4.7)
This is an optimal double-obstacle impulse control problem. We define the non-
local operators L and M, for limit and market orders respectively, by
LV (t,x; k) = sup
η∈N ,κ∈K`
E(z)
[
V (t,Γ(η, x, z), χ(η, y, z, s, k, κ), s; k)
]
− `, (4.8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variable z, and
MV (t,x; k) = sup
ξ∈X
V (t,Λ(ξ, x), c(ξ, y, s, k), s; k)− m. (4.9)
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We introduce the operator A¯ defined by
A¯(t,x, k, p, ϕ, δ+, δ−) = p+
∑
k′ 6=k
rkk′
[
ϕ(t,x; k′)− ϕ(t,x; k)]
+ λm E(k¯
±)
[ (
ϕ
(
t, x, y, s+ k¯±; k
)− ϕ (t,x; k)) ]
+ λ+δ E
(q+)
[ (
ϕ
(
t, x− q+, y + f(t, s, δ+, q+)q+, s; k)− ϕ (t,x; k)) ]1{x≥−X¯}
+ λ−δ E
(q−)
[ (
ϕ
(
t, x+ q−, y − f(t, s, δ−, q−)q−, s; k)− ϕ (t,x; k)) ]1{x≤ X¯},
(4.10)
where the expectations are taken with respect to the random variables k¯±, q+
and q−, respectively. Furthermore, we set
A(t,x, k, p, ϕ) = sup
δ±∈[0,δ¯]
A¯(t,x, k, p, ϕ, δ+, δ−).
The value function V (t,x; k) satisfies the HJB system of QVIs4
min {−g(t, x)−A (t,x, k, ∂tV, V ) ; (V −MV ) (t,x; k) ; (V − LV ) (t,x; k)} = 0,
(4.11)
on [t, T )×O×K, with terminal condition V (T, x, y, s; k) = U(x, y, s, k). Equation
(4.11) can be interpreted as follows: if V −MV > 0 and V − LV > 0, then
the value function cannot be improved by an impulse and thus no orders are
submitted to the standard exchange. As soon as V −MV < 0 or V − LV < 0,
the value function is set to V −MV = 0 or V − LV = 0 and an impulse takes
place. In the event V −MV < 0 and V − LV < 0, the value function is set to
V −max{MV,LV } = 0. We thus consider intervention times (τ `i and τmi ) and
impulses (ηi, κi and ξi) by which the CLP can control the evolution of the state
variables Xu and Yu. For this purpose, we define the continuation region (CR),
the limit orders impulse region (LI) and the market orders impulse region (MI)
by
CR := {(u,x, k) ∈ [t, T )×O ×K : V > LV & V >MV } ,
LI := {(u,x, k) ∈ [t, T )×O ×K : LV = V & LV >MV } ,
MI := {(u,x, k) ∈ [t, T )×O ×K :MV = V & MV > LV } .
(4.12)
4We refer to Section 7.1 for details on its derivation.
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The system of QVIs introduced in Equation (4.11) is highly non-linear and some-
what similar to the one studied in Guilbaud and Pham [47], although in the
present model two distinct impulses can take place. Some dimension reduction
is possible if the mid-price is assumed to be a martingale (see e.g. Cartea and
Jaimungal [20] and Guilbaud and Pham [47, 48]), since the optimal strategy in
feedback-form will only be a function of the inventory. We make this assumption
in the numerical section that follows, while keeping the general model presented
in this section at a higher degree of generality. In the next section we provide
some explicit examples of the model and we find numerically the optimal strategy
by means of the solving algorithm proposed in Guilbaud and Pham [47, 48].
4.3 Explicit examples and numerical results
We started this chapter with the intention of addressing some of the shortcom-
ings of the model presented in Section 2.3.2. In the previous section we presented
a class of models which allows for various choices of the state variables dynamics,
the control sets and the performance criterion. In the present section, we specif-
ically consider the points mentioned in Section 4.1—i.e. (i) the CLP can choose
optimally the prices it offers to clients, (ii) the CLP can post limit orders deep
in the book, (iii) the lit-pool spread is not constant—and we provide numerical
examples5 in which we progressively add such features to the model presented
in Section 2.3.2. We briefly recall the state variables dynamics—though they
are very similar to the ones in Section 2.3.2—for readability. Throughout this
section, we assume that the mid-price is modelled by Equation (4.1) and that
limit orders in the ‘lit’ exchange cannot be partially filled. This is not a strong
assumption as long as we consider unit-sized orders posted in the standard ex-
change. In fact, the majority of the times, posting unit-sized orders in a ‘lit’
market serves as to reduce consistent price slippage deriving from the order-
book imbalance. We assume that clients pay the “adjusted base spread” to the
CLP, where in the latter the size of the client’s order is taken into account. We
5While it would obviously be desirable to base the analysis on CLPs real data, it does not
come as a surprise that such sensitive information is strictly private and not shared outside
firms.
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thus assume that the inventory and the cash processes evolve according to
dXu = dJ
−
u 1{Xu−≤X¯} − dJ
+
u 1{Xu−≥−X¯},
dYu =
(
Su− + δ
+
u (1 + c)
q+u
)
dJ+u 1{Xu−≥−X¯}−
(
Su− − δ−u (1 + c)q
−
u
)
dJ−u 1{Xu−≤X¯},
where we have set f
(
t, s, δ±, q±
)
=
(
s + δ±(1 + c)q±
)
and 0 < c < 1 is a pre-
determined fixed constant. The convexity of the non-linear function (1 + c)q
+
u
reflects the fact that for the CLP it is more expensive to hedge a larger order due
to the price slippage in the exchange. Thus, the CLP charges more for each unit
of such an order. Next, we introduce the possibility of submitting unit-sized
market and limit orders in the standard exchange. At each time ti, the CLP
checks whether it is more convenient to (i) execute trades in the CLP only, (ii)
submit a market order such that
Xti = Xti− + ξi, Yti = Yti− − ξi
(
Sti− + ξikti−
)
, (4.13)
where ξi ∈ X := {−1{x>0},1{x<0}}, or (iii) submit a limit order such that
Xti = Xti− + ηizi, Yti = Yti− − ηi
(
Sti− − (kti− + κi)ηi
)
zi, (4.14)
where ηi ∈ N = {−1{x>0},1{x<0}} and zi are i.i.d. random variables supported
in {0, 1}. In Equation (4.6) we set U(x, y, s, k) = y + x(s − αx) and g(u, x) =
−φx2, where φ > 0. In order to thoroughly understand the marginal effects of the
three changes mentioned above, we think it is better to add them progressively
to the model. We thus start by considering a situation where the CLP can skew
its prices but (i) it can only post limit orders on top of the book, and (ii) the lit
pool spread is constant, only to remove them later in the discussion. The form
of the terminal condition suggests we can use the ansatz(see, e.g., Cartea et al.
[23]) V (t,x) = y + xs + h(t, x), which henceforth will be inserted in Equation
(4.11).
4.3.1 Optimal dark-pool spread
We let the CLP choose between three possible scenarios.
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(i) It can choose not to skew the prices and thus to let δ+ = δ− and λ+ = λ−
(which we call no skew), (ii) it may skew the prices downward such that δ+ < δ−
and λ+ > λ− (which we call left or downward skew), and (iii) it may skew the
prices upward such that δ+ > δ− and λ+ < λ− (which we call right or upward
skew). The upward skew penalises buyers over sellers while the opposite holds
for the downward skew. Mathematically, the above reduces to assuming that the
CLP optimally chooses the prices (δ+, δ−) ∈ D := {(δ+n , δ−n ), (δ+r , δ−r ), (δ+l , δ−l )}
for the no skew, the right skew and the left skew scenarios, respectively. Asso-
ciated to such prices, we assume arrival intensities of the form (λ+δ , λ
−
δ ) ∈ I :={
(λ+n (δ
+
n ), λ
−
n (δ
−
n )), (λ
+
r (δ
+
r ), λ
−
r (δ
−
r )), (λ
+
l (δ
+
l ), λ
−
l (δ
−
l ))
}
. The QVI now reads:
min
{
− sup
(δ+,δ−)∈D
(
λ+δ E
(q+)
[
δ+q+(1 + c)q
+
+ h(t, x− q+)− h(t, x)
]
1{x≥−X¯}
+λ−δ E
(q−)
[
δ−q−(1 + c)q
−
+ h(t, x+ q−)− h(t, x)
]
1{x≤ X¯}
)
φx2 − ∂h(t, x)
∂t
− λmxE(k¯±)[k¯±] ; h(t, x)− sup
ξ∈X
[
− k − m + h(t, x+ ξ)
]
;
h(t, x)− sup
η∈N
E(z)
[
kz − ` + h(t, x+ ηz)
]}
= 0,
(4.15)
with terminal condition h(T, x) = −αx2. We numerically solve (4.15) to find
the optimal CLP pricing and hedging strategy. We expect to find additional
boundaries to the one obtained in Section 2.3.2, since the CLP now has different
pricing alternatives.
Figure 4.2: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equa-
tion (4.15). We set α = 2, D := {(0.5, 0.5), (0.3, 0.6), (0.6, 0.3)}, I :=
{(0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.4), (0.4, 0.6)}, ` = 3, m = 6, c = 0.05, λm = 0.5, k = 1,
q± ∼ U [1, 10], z ∼ U [0, 1], s = 40, E[k¯±] = 0, x = y = 0, X¯ = 100. In the left
panel we set φ = 0.01. In the right panel we set φ = 0.0001.
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In Figure 4.2 we show two simulated inventory paths (relative to a unique stock-
price path) and we plot them above the optimal boundaries found by solving
Equation (4.15). We see that when the inventory is relatively small, it is optimal
not to skew the prices so to receive on average an equal number of buy and
sell orders (here we assume that no-skewing implies equal arrival intensities of
buyers and sellers, which may not be the case in particular market conditions,
e.g. new information is available to a number of clients which are incentivised
to trade in the same direction). If the the inventory increases (resp. decreases),
the CLP employs a left/downward (resp. right/upward) skew so to encourage
buyers (resp. sellers). As in the toy model, there are inventory levels for which
it is optimal to resort to the standard exchange. The critical inventory level
at which the CLP begins placing orders in the standard exchange falls as the
terminal liquidation date is approached. We plot the optimal boundaries for the
case of moderate risk aversion (right panel) and high risk aversion (right panel).
We notice that the hedging activity of the CLP is highly correlated to its degree
of risk aversion. Indeed, for high values of φ, the CLP starts posting orders to
the standard exchange for smaller inventory values and vice versa.
Remark 4.1. While the inventory thresholds shown are the optimal boundaries
found numerically by solving the HJB equation (4.15), the (superimposed) sim-
ulated inventory paths are meant for illustration purposes only. In particular,
they crucially depend on the partition of the time grid. For example, when the
hedging boundaries are surpassed and the optimal strategy suggests that limit
orders should be posted, the simulated paths only capture one limit order per
time-grid point. If the grid points are, e.g., one second apart, the plot would show
one limit order per second until the inventory is back within the market-making
region. If instead the grid was finer and points were one millisecond apart, the
paths would show one limit order per millisecond. Put it in another way, if the
time grid had N points, then a maximum of N − 1 optimal stopping times could
take place (we do not allow for an impulse at the terminal time). We wish to
stress that the solution of (4.15) comprises of the optimal boundaries only, while
the simulated paths are a visual aid to better understand the business of the
CLP.
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4.3.2 Optimal lit-pool posting
In the previous section we have included the option of skewing the prices that
the CLP offers, but the model is still limited in that the hedging in the standard
exchange by means of limit orders can only be done on top of the book. Here we
modify this assumption and we allow the CLP to also post at the second best
and third best prices. According to the LOB model presented in Section 4.2, we
let the minimum price tick by k¯, and thus allow the CLP to post limit sell orders
at prices s + k, s + k + k¯ and s + k + 2k¯, while limit buy orders can be posted
at prices s − k, s − k − k¯ and s − k − 2k¯. According to the notation used in
Equation (4.14), we assume that the limit price at which the CLP posts in the
standard exchange can be optimally chosen between κ ∈ K` := {0, k¯, 2k¯}.
By posting deeper in the book, the CLP earns a higher spread if its order gets
executed, while the filling probability of such an order is reduced. In fact, for a
deep limit order to be executed a market order that walks the book is needed,
and the latter are quite rare. To reflect the fact that the filling-probability of
a limit order depends on how far from the mid-price such an order is posted,
we assume that P[zi = 0] = `κ(z0) and P[zi = 1] = `κ(z1) = 1 − `κ(z0). The
associated QVI for the function h(t, x) is
min
{
− sup
(δ+,δ−)∈D
(
λ+δ E
(q+)
[
δ+q+(1 + c)q
+
+ h(t, x− q+)− h(t, x)
]
1{x≥−X¯}
+λ−δ E
(q−)
[
δ−q−(1 + c)q
−
+ h(t, x+ q−)− h(t, x)
]
1{x≤ X¯}
)
φx2 − ∂h(t, x)
∂t
− λmxE(k¯±)[k¯±] ; h(t, x)− sup
ξ∈X
[
− k − m + h(t, x+ ξ)
]
;
h(t, x)− sup
η∈N ,κ∈K`
E(z)
[
(k + κ) z − ` + h(t, x+ ηz)
]}
= 0.
(4.16)
with terminal condition h(T, x) = −αx2. In Figure 4.3, the optimal strategy
obtained by solving (4.16) is shown. We notice that after skewing the prices,
the CLP should start submitting limit orders deep in the book and progressively
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moves towards the top of the book. Shortly before the end of the trading pe-
riod, it should resort to market orders. Again, we show the different strategies
employed by a highly risk-averse and a moderately risk-averse CLP (in the left
and right panels, respectively). In Figure 4.4 we show the different strategies
for high and low values of the terminal-penalty parameter α. When the penalty
for holding a non-zero inventory at T increases, we notice that the boundaries
shrink dramatically, especially towards the end.
Figure 4.3: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equa-
tion (4.16). We set α = 2, D := {(0.5, 0.5), (0.3, 0.6), (0.6, 0.3)}, I :=
{(0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.4), (0.4, 0.6)}, ` = 3, m = 6, c = 0.05, λm = 0.5, k = 1,
q± ∼ U [1, 10], z ∼ U [0, 1], s = 40, E[k¯±] = 0, x = y = 0, X¯ = 100, k¯ = 0.01,
`κ=0(z1) = 0.9, `
κ=k¯(z1) = 0.8, `
κ=2k¯(z1) = 0.6. In the left panel we set φ = 0.01. In
the right panel we set φ = 0.0001.
Figure 4.4: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equa-
tion (4.16). We set φ = 0.001, D := {(0.5, 0.5), (0.3, 0.6), (0.6, 0.3)}, I :=
{(0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.4), (0.4, 0.6)}, ` = 3, m = 6, c = 0.05, λm = 0.5, k = 1,
q± ∼ U [1, 10], z ∼ U [0, 1], s = 40, E[k¯±] = 0, x = y = 0, X¯ = 100, k¯ = 0.01,
`κ=0(z1) = 0.9, `
κ=k¯(z1) = 0.8, `
κ=2k¯(z1) = 0.6. In the left panel we set α = 6. In
the right panel we set α = 0.5.
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We emphasise that if the terminal preferred inventory level was non-zero, it
would produce a shift in the optimal boundaries by an equal amount.
4.3.3 P&L distribution
Here we simulate the model described in Section 4.3.2 and we find numerically
the terminal P&L distribution, calculated by YT +XT (ST − k¯× sign[XT ]), where
we are assuming that the terminal inventory is liquidated via a market order.
In Table 4.1 we list the values of the parameters we choose for the simulation,
while in Figure 4.5 we show the empirical distribution of the terminal cash for
different levels of the risk aversion of the CLP. We simulate five hundred paths
for the stock price and a thousand paths for inventory, making a total of five
hundred thousand different scenarios.
Table 4.1: Parameters value
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Figure 4.5: Terminal cash distribution as defined in Section 4.3.2. In the left panel
we set α = 0.5 and φ = 0.00001. In the right panel we set α = 6 and φ = 0.01.
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First, we notice that the activity is, on average, profitable and thus the CLP is
incentivised to act as a market maker by offering a stream of prices to its clients.
A unremarkably risk-averse CLP employs a less expensive hedging strategy and
the average P&L is higher than the case of high risk aversion (in the plots above
we have 28,384 versus 20,366 for the left and right panels, respectively). On
the other hand, there is more dispersion around the mean, and the standard
deviations are 13,813 and 9,182 for the left and right panels, respectively. As a
matter of fact, the choice relies on the willingness to take risk specific to each
CLP, which may be further conditioned by the regulations in place. A less risk-
averse CLP holds its inventory for longer compared to a high risk averse, and
hopes to liquidate its inventory by means of its market-making activity, rather
than through hedging. On the other hand, such a CLP may be subject, from
time to time, to larger losses caused by the price moving against its holdings.
4.3.4 Stochastic lit-pool spread
In the last simulation we relax assumption (d) and introduce a stochastic bid-ask
spread. We let K := {1, 2}, that is the market can be in a tight-spread regime and
a wide-spread regime, depending on whether there is good or poor liquidity in the
market, respectively. The generator matrix can be chosen in various ways, so to
model the specific features of the market under consideration. For example, we
could consider a “seasonal” pattern where transitions between regimes happen
rarely and last for longer periods of time. Also, we could reproduce features
similar to mean-reversion by choosing a “preferred” state by making reversion
to that state very likely. The matrices Q1 and Q2 are examples of seasonal and
mean-reverting patterns, respectively:
Q1 =
 −r r
r −r
 , Q2 =
 −rlow rlow
rhigh −rhigh
 , (4.17)
where r, rlow, rhigh > 0. In Q1 the lower r, the rarer the transition between
states happens. In Q2, we choose k = 1 as the preferred state, and the higher
rhigh, compared to rlow, the higher is the transition rate to state 1. The two-
dimensional system of QVIs now reads as
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min
{
− sup
(δ+,δ−)∈D
(
λ+δ E
(q+)
[
δ+q+(1 + c)q
+
+ hk(t, x− q+)− hk(t, x)
]
1{x≥−X¯}
+λ−δ E
(q−)
[
δ−q−(1 + c)q
−
+ hk(t, x+ q
−)− hk(t, x)
]
1{x≤ X¯}
)
φx2 − ∂hk(t, x)
∂t
− λmxE(k¯±)[k¯±] −∑
k′ 6=k
rkk′
[
hk′(t, x)− hk(t, x)
]
;
hk(t, x)− sup
ξ∈X
[
− k − m + hk(t, x+ ξ)
]
;
hk(t, x)− sup
η∈N ,κ∈K`
E(z)
[
(k + κ) z − ` + hk(t, x+ ηz)
]}
= 0,
(4.18)
with terminal condition hk(T, x) = −αx2. In Equation (4.18) where we have
used the ansatz V (t, x, y, s; k) = y + xs + hk(t, x). The subscript k indicates
that we refer to the regime k ∈ K. In Figures 4.6 and 4.7 we plot the optimal
boundaries found by solving (4.18) for the case of seasonal and mean-reverting
patterns, respectively.
Figure 4.6: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equa-
tion (4.18). Seasonal pattern. We set α = 2, , r = 1, φ = 0.001, D :=
{(0.5, 0.5), (0.3, 0.6), (0.6, 0.3)}, I := {(0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.4), (0.4, 0.6)}, ` = 3, m = 6,
c = 0.05, λm = 0.5, k = 1, q± ∼ U [1, 10], z ∼ U [0, 1], s = 40, E[k¯±] = 0, x = y = 0,
X¯ = 100, k¯ = 0.01, `κ=0(z1) = 0.9, `
κ=k¯(z1) = 0.8, `
κ=2k¯(z1) = 0.6, K = {1, 2}.
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Figure 4.7: Optimal inventory thresholds found by solving the HJB equation
(4.18). Mean-reverting pattern. We set α = 2, rhigh = 6, rlow = 0.5, φ = 0.001,
D := {(0.5, 0.5), (0.3, 0.6), (0.6, 0.3)}, I := {(0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.4), (0.4, 0.6)}, ` = 3,
m = 6, c = 0.05, λ
m = 0.5, k = 1, q± ∼ U [1, 10], z ∼ U [0, 1], s = 40, E[k¯±] = 0,
x = y = 0, X¯ = 100, K = {1, 2}, k¯ = 0.01, `κ=0(z1) = 0.9, `κ=k¯(z1) = 0.8,
`κ=2k¯(z1) = 0.6.
We first note that in the case of high-spread regime in Figure 4.6, the CLP starts
(i) earlier to submit limit orders and (ii) later to submit market orders, compared
to the case of low-spread regime. The same shape is observable in Figure 4.7,
although it is more evident since the return to the state of low-spread regime
(preferred state) is highly likely. This behaviour has the following interpretation:
when the spread is high, limit orders are more remunerative (or, better, cheaper if
we also consider the penalty for posting in the standard exchange), while market
orders are more expensive and thus their submission is postponed.
4.4 Conclusions
In the present work we study an optimal market-making problem faced by a
CLP. The CLP earns the optimally selected spread by trading with its clients.
Market participants, who consider trading via CLPs, may be of the view that it
is desirable to take advantage of favourable prices offered by the CLPs and to
benefit from avoiding price impact—to which they would be otherwise exposed—
especially if forced to submit market orders in a ‘lit’ exchange.
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A stream of two-way prices is offered to each client. Such prices are functions of
the size traded by the client and the CLP holding. Throughout the activity the
pool faces an inventory risk, which can be reduced (i) by controlling the width
and the skew of the CLP spread, and (ii) by resorting to the standard exchange
via both market and limit orders. Internal CLP transactions are preferred so to
avoid information leakage. Such a feature is modelled via a fixed penalty incurred
by the CLP whenever it submits an order to the ‘lit’ exchange. As confirmed
by the numerical results, the CLP will refrain from placing orders in a standard
exchange as long as the size of the inventory is small. Whenever the optimal
boundary is exceeded, the CLP resorts to the standard exchange by means of
limit orders. A limit order is cheaper though its execution is uncertain. The CLP
can choose the limit price; we find that the more the inventory grows, the closer
to the mid-price the CLP will post. This is reasonable since the filling probability
of limit orders depends on how far from the mid-price they are posted. If the
inventory becomes critically large, market orders will be preferred instead, which
are costly but benefit from sure execution. When the end of the market-making
activity approaches (which, e.g., might be thought of as the end of the trading
day) the market-orders region in the ‘lit’ exchange widens while the CLP and
limit-order regions in the standard exchange diminish. In fact, the market maker
will incur in a higher penalty for holding a large inventory at the terminal date.
These conclusions are obtained by formulating and numerically solving a double
obstacle standard stochastic and impulse control problem, for which we provide
four numerical examples with increasing complexity. Compared to the state-
of-the-art literature on ‘lit’ pool market making (see e.g. Gue´ant et al. [45],
Cartea et al. [24], and Guilbaud & Pham [47, 48]), adding a CLP to the model
substantially modifies the “standard” ‘lit’ exchange market-making problem for
the following reasons: (i) the prices offered to clients can be functions of the size
traded (which would not be possible in a classic LOB), and (ii) there are no such
things as minimum tick size, minimum quantities or queues in the CLP that may
be assumed, and (iii) the standard exchange is only utilised as a hedging venue,
while two-way prices are offered to clients and are not available to general market
participants. This work provides a rather flexible setup for the management of a
CLP inventory. The pricing and the hedging strategies are illustrated in detail.
Chapter 5
Market making: an application
to the eFX spot market
5.1 Overview of the chapter
In this chapter we adapt the framework introduced in Chapter 4 to a broker-
dealer firm that operates in the electronic foreign exchange (eFX) market. The
academic literature on FX spot-trading has its main focus on empirical studies
of aggregated data to evaluate trading strategies, to forecast short-term price
movements, and to analyse the effects of information asymmetry on trading and
price discovery. In this category we find, e.g., the work by Deng et al. [35] who
employ multiple kernels learning and genetic algorithm to forecast future price
movements and test their model on the USDJPY pair. We also find the work
by Menkhoff et al. [66], who utilise ten years of aggregated daily data of fifteen
different currency pairs, and show that the customers’ order flow has significant
predictive content. Such an order flow is also the object of the study carried out
by Berger et al. [8] who confirm that, within electronic markets, such an order
flow has predictive power for up to a minute. Next, Chen and Gau [27] utilise
daily Electronic Broking Services (EBS) data to accept their hypothesis that the
bid quote offers more price discovery compared to the ask quote. Genc¸ai and
Gradojevic [?] utilise EBS data of EURUSD, USDJPY and USDCHF to cluster
patterns of informed traders and find that early morning and late afternoon
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UTC (coordinated universal time) have the highest concentration of asymmetric
information. Informed trading in FX markets has also been studied by Payne
[71], who employs a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to quantify the effects of
informed flow on market prices, and shows that the impact of such flow accounts
for around 60% of the quoted spread. In this context, we further mention (i)
the work by King et al. [55], who provide an extensive survey of the FX market
microstructure literature, (ii) the seminal papers by Lyons [64, 65], who proposes
discrete-time inventory-control models, and “hot-potato” models for inventory
management, respectively, and (iii) the work by Evans and Lyons [36], in which
the authors consider the predictive content of the order-flow for the first time in
the literature.
Academic research more pertinent to the work presented in this chapter is very
limited when it comes to the FX asset class. The work by Chaboud et al.
[26] provides an in-depth econometric analysis of the effects of algorithmic and
computerised trading on market efficiency. They find a substantial reduction
of triangular arbitrage opportunities, which derives from a faster circulation of
information. Kozhan et al. [56] modify the Lyons [36] framework to include limit
and market orders, thus reproducing the features of an order-driven market. A
structural VAR model is used by Schmidt [76] to describe a multi-dealer FX
spot electronic order-driven market and find that the trading volume is the main
source of market impact. An optimal market-making problem in the FX market
has been proposed by Veraart [84], who considers a multi-dealer market in which
a firm can optimise the quotes proposed to its customers and can reduce its
inventory by trading with other dealers. They set up an optimisation problem in
which the agent maximises the terminal value of the portfolio, while penalising for
high-variance portfolios. The optimal strategy is found via numerical techniques.
Veraart in [85] further analyses an optimal investment problem in the foreign
exchange market, in which the investor aims to maximise the terminal value of
a portfolio which consists of domestic and foreign currencies.
Impulse-control problems are primarily used, within the FX literature, to study
central bank policy intervention. In this context we mention the works by Ca-
denillas and Zapatero [16], Bertola et al. [9], Mundaka and Øksendal [68], and
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Kercheval and Moreno [54].
The present chapter is organised as follows. We first provide an introduction to
the FX market and its specific features. We then explain in detail the dissim-
ilarities among a standard market-making problem adaptable to general asset
classes (e.g. equity) and an analogous problem specific to FX trading. Next,
we consider a scenario where one currency pair is traded (EURUSD) and a joint
service of brokerage and principal trading is offered by the firm to its clients. We
assume that the firm can hedge its position via market orders in the standard
exchange. We assume that—due to potential regulatory needs of producing a
harmonised balance sheet to which the firm may be subject—the terminal P&L
are calculated in a reference currency. We choose the latter to be USD and thus,
at the end of the trading period, the terminal EUR inventory is converted to
USD. Finally, we move to a three-currency-pair scenario (from which the gen-
eralisation to n currency pairs is trivial) and we consider the same problem of
mixed principal/agency trade execution and hedging. The questions we aim to
address in the present chapter are:
1. What is the optimal proportion of principal-versus-agency trading that the
CLP should offer?
2. What is the optimal hedging strategy when trading specifically in the FX
market?
To answer those questions, we modify the framework presented in Chapter 4 and
we find the optimal trading strategy of the CLP.
5.1.1 The FX spot market
The FX market is mainlyan OTC market, which at the present time is little-
regulated. We take the perspective of a financial firm, such as a CLP, which has
the technological means to offer its clients a competitive financial service in high-
speed markets. The clients can also count on a network of trade counterparties
provided by the firm, which we assume plays the role of a liquidity provider.
CLPs have access to a number of ECNs (Electronic Communication Networks)
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which provide a real-time facility for price discovery. An example of an ECN is
EBS (ICAP Group) which provides services such as EBS Live (real-time prices
delivered from the EBS matching platform direct to the CLP) and EBS Market
(global trading platform). The CLPs access EBS Live via EBS Ai (a direct two-
way interface with the EBS spot market). EBS updates the order book (available
liquidity and prices) every 100ms.
The CLP takes into account the prices and liquidity shown in the ECNs when
making a decision as to what price to offer to its client depending also on the “in-
house” liquidity that the CLP can provide. Such considerations also influence
the decision as to what percentage of the client’s order the CLP wishes to execute
against its principal liquidity and what it will place in the ECN markets via its
brokerage service.
The advantages for a market participant to place orders by utilising a CLP are:
(i) anonymity (which mitigates the information leakage), (ii) no or limited market
impact for the client, (iii) access to state-of-the-art trading technology offering a
24/7 trade service, (iv) reduction of latency, and (v) access to additional liquidity
offered by the CLP (through principal trading) beyond what is available in ECNs
or other markets.
5.1.2 Trading spot FX: the CLP perspective
The spot-FX pricing mechanism adopted by the CLP does not need to be dis-
similar from the one of any other asset class. In fact the CLP can take the
ECN’s printed prices as a reference to establish its own quotes. On the other
hand, the hedging mechanism in foreign exchange is slightly different to the one
in stock markets in that every currency can be exchanged with any other, while
shares usually are exchanged (sold or bought) receiving cash in return (there are
exceptions as in, e.g., exchange options where one share is “exchanged” for a
share of another asset).
The above argument suggests that, when taking hedging decisions, the firm shall
further choose between direct and/or cross hedging, depending on inventory
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levels and market conditions. We refer to Section 5.3 for mathematical and
numerical details.
We now provide an example to clarify the difference between direct and cross
liquidation1 (the underlying principle can be applied to direct and cross hedging).
1. Let us consider a stock market with three assets: A, B and C, where C is
cash in, say, dollars. Assume that the price of asset A is SA ($) per share
and SB ($) is the price per share of asset B. Assume further that we have
a portfolio consisting of XA units of stock A, XB units of stock B and an
amount XC of dollars. Liquidating the portfolio is usually referred to as
the actions of (i) buying/selling XA shares of A in exchange for XASA ($),
and (ii) buying/selling XB shares of B in exchange for XBSB ($). The
terminal value of the portfolio is, therefore, XC +XASA +XBSB ($).
2. Let us now consider an FX market where three currencies are traded: e
(EUR), £ (GPB), and $ (USD). Assume further that our portfolio consists
of X£, Xe and X$ units of GBP, EUR and USD, respectively. The cur-
rent exchange rates are given by Se$ (EURUSD), S£$ (GBPUSD) and Se£
(EURGBP). Liquidating the portfolio—be it to check the cumulative P&L
or to decrease the risk for the exchange rates to move in an unfavourable
direction with respect to our holdings—is referred to as the action of con-
verting two of the inventories in what is considered being the reference
currency. For this purpose, we choose the latter to be USD. We have the
following three options for the conversion into USD:
(a) We can exchange both X£ and Xe for USD and calculate the P&L
by the formula X$ +XeSe$ +X£S£$, or
(b) we can first exchange X£ for EUR and then exchange the updated
EUR holding to USD, which gives a P&L of X$ +(Xe+X£/Se£)Se$,
and finally
(c) we can first exchange Xe for GBP and then exchange the updated
GBP holding to USD, which gives a P&L of X$ + (XeSe£+X£)S£$.
1While people who are familiar with FX will find such an example trivial, we believe it is
important to clarify the motivation behind the choice of such an asset class.
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This is different from the first scenario in that we do not have the option
of exchanging asset A for asset B, as there is not a quoted price (or,
incidentally, “exchange rate”) SAB.
If there is only one price available in the market for each currency pair, then the
triangular arbitrage relation
Se£ =
Se$
S£$
(5.1)
shall hold, and the liquidating options (a), (b) and (c) in the FX example (2.)
are identical, regardless of the levels of X$, Xe and X£. On the contrary, when
bid and ask prices are available for each currency pair, the above liquidation al-
ternatives cease to be equivalent. Given the tedious calculations and the amount
of algebra involved to formally show this result, we postpone such a discussion
to Section 7.6 in the Appendix, at the end of the present work.
5.2 One currency pair
We start by considering a market where only one currency pair (EURUSD)
is traded. While being less interesting than the three-currency-pair case, and
similar to the analysis carried out in Chapter 4, we believe it is worth exploring
for the following reason: we here consider a firm which offers a joint service of
(i) providing principal liquidity to its clients as well as (ii) providing a brokerage
service for a fee (which is a substantial difference from Chapter 4, where the CLP
could only execute 100% of the orders principally). By looking at this simple
case first, we have the opportunity to understand the structure of the model and
the principal-versus-agency trading relationship before focusing on the hedging
part.
5.2.1 Financial problem
Let us assume that a client (e.g. a pension fund) wishes to execute a sizeable
order when both a ‘lit’ and a CLP are available.
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From the client perspective, the situation is analogous to the one treated in
Chapter 3 if the CLP activity is restricted to anonymous order-matching. On the
other hand, if the CLP offers principal liquidity, the problem is slightly different
in that (i) the execution in the CLP is fully guaranteed (except in rare circum-
stances when, e.g., the so-called “last look” is applied), and (ii) the principal
prices offered by the CLP are commensurate to the size traded by the client.
The latter point may incentivise the client to split such a sizeable order between
the ‘lit’ and the dark venues, since the resulting cumulative trading conditions
may be more favourable than the price offered only by the CLP on its own (this
type of problem has been solved in, e.g., Laruelle et al [60]).
From the CLP perspective, the problem is different to the one treated in
Chapter 4 for three main reasons. Firstly, the CLP can only offer principal liq-
uidity, thus leaving the clients with no other choice but to resort to the lit pool
by themselves, if they wished to trade in multiple venues. Secondly, by choos-
ing the amount of principal liquidity offered, the CLP can implement a more
efficient hedging strategy and inventory management. Thirdly by offering an op-
timal combination of principal liquidity and brokerage, the CLP has control on
the amount sent to the ECN and on the resulting market impact, and can thus
program its hedging strategy (along with its internalisation means) accordingly.
Ultimately, we want to find the optimal ratio of principal vs ECN liquidity that
the CLP should choose to offer to its clients.
5.2.2 Mathematical model
We consider a CLP which offers a market-making service for EURUSD. At each
time u ∈ [t, T ] the CLP carries both EUR and USD inventories; in the spirit of
Chapter 4, we find an analogy between the USD inventory and the cash process.
In fact, being the reference currency, the USD inventory does not carry any risk,
which can all be attributed to the EUR inventory. We assume that the currency
pair is traded in the ECN at {Se$u −∆e$u /2, Se$u + ∆e$u /2}, where {∆e$u } is the
market spread for EURUSD. At each time u ∈ [t, T ], a portion αu ∈ [0, 1] of
principal liquidity for an order of random size q+ is offered to buyers and a
Chapter 5. Market making: an application to the eFX spot market 120
portion βu ∈ [0, 1] of principal liquidity for an order of random size q− is offered
to sellers. The quotes set by the CLP should reflect the current ECN quotes, its
EUR inventory position and the amount of principal liquidity offered. We denote
the prices offered by the CLP by p+u and p
−
u for buyers and sellers, respectively.
We refer to Section 5.2.2.1 for an in-depth discussion on the pricing mechanism of
the CLP. The remaining portions of clients’ orders, i.e. (1−αu)q+u and (1−βu)q−u ,
are traded by the CLP in the ECN on behalf of the client. For the latter service,
the CLP charges a commission η > 0 commensurate to the size of the order. The
EUR inventory of the CLP thus evolves according to
dXeu =
(
βu + (1− βu)η
)
dJ−u −
(
αu − (1− αu)η)dJ+u , (5.2)
where Xet = x
e. We define J±u :=
∑N±u
i=1 q
±
i , where the Cox processes {N±u } have
intensities λ±p = λ±(p±), and q
±
i , i ≥ 0, are i.i.d. random variables which model
the order size. When the Cox process {N+u } jumps, the CLP sells q+N+u EURUSD
by offering αuq
+
N+u
principal liquidity and a brokerage service for (1 − αu)q+N+u .
An analogous interpretation holds when the Poisson process {N−u } jumps and
the CLP buys EURUSD. The USD inventory thus evolves according to
dX$u = αup
+
u dJ
+
u − βup−u dJ−u . (5.3)
Trading in the ECN on behalf of the client causes a permanent impact on prices,
which we model by γ ∈ R+. We consider such impact to affect both sides of the
LOB, as it is well known that they are strongly correlated. The second and third
term in Equation (5.4) serve this purpose for buyers and sellers, respectively. We
assume that the ECN mid-price and spread processes satisfy
dSe$u = κ
(
S¯ − Se$u−
)
du+ σs,e$dW s,e$u + γ(1− αu)dJ+u − γ(1− βu)dJ−u (5.4)
and
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d∆e$u = σ
∆,e$∆e$u dW
∆,e$
u , (5.5)
respectively. In Equations (5.4) and (5.5) we let Se$t = s
e$, ∆e$t = ∆
e$, S¯
is the exchange-rate long-term mean, κ ≥ 0 is the speed of mean reversion
and σs,e$, σ∆,e$ ∈ R+. Furthermore
{
W s,e$u
}
and
{
W∆,e$u
}
are independent
Brownian motions. We acknowledge that the model defined by Equation (5.4)
may produce negative prices. On the other hand, it captures realistic features
(such as mean reversion and random jumps) which are commonly observed in
market data.
5.2.2.1 Pricing strategy
We here describe the pricing mechanism of the CLP. We believe that the CLP’s
quotes should depend on (i) the current ECN price, (ii) the sign of the risky
(EUR) inventory, and (iii) the portion of principal liquidity offered to the clients.
The pricing process of the CLP can thus be summarised as follows:
1. In order to be more competitive, the base spread offered by the CLP is
tighter than the ECN one and set to ξ1∆
e$
u− , where ξ1 is a constant in [0, 1].
The CLP’s base quotes are, therefore, Se$
u− + ξ1∆
e$
u−/2 and S
e$
u− − ξ1∆e$u−/2,
respectively.
2. The CLP applies an inventory skew to its quotes. In particular, it skews
the prices down when it is long EURUSD and skews its prices up when it is
short EURUSD. We define the position-adjusted ask and bid prices by Se$
u−+
ξ1∆
e$
u−/2 − ξ2 sign [Xeu− ] and Se$u− − ξ1∆e$u−/2 − ξ2 sign [Xeu− ], respectively,
where ξ2 ≥ 0.
3. The CLP widens its spread for larger portions of principal liquidity offered.
This feature reflects both an increase in the risk of unfavourable price
movements as well as an increase in the expected hedging costs the CLP is
subject to when large orders are executed principally. We therefore set the
final prices offered to clients at p+u = S
e$
u− + ξ1∆
e$
u−/2− ξ2 sign [Xeu− ] + ξ3αu
and p−u = Se$u−− ξ1∆e$u−/2− ξ2 sign [Xeu− ]− ξ3βu, respectively, where ξ3 ≥ 0.
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We define the distance of the CLP prices from the ECN mid-price by δ+CLP =
ξ1∆
e$
u−/2 − ξ2 sign [Xeu− ] + ξ3αu and δ−CLP = ξ1∆e$u−/2 + ξ2 sign [Xeu− ] + ξ3βu.
Furthermore, along the lines of Cartea et al. [23], we let λ±p = λ±e−cδ
±
CLP , where
c ≥ 0.
5.2.2.2 Hedging strategy
When skewing the quotes offered by the CLP is not sufficient for reducing its
EUR inventory, the firm resorts to the ECN for hedging purposes. Let us assume
that it is optimal at time τ to reduce the magnitude of the EUR inventory by one
unit2 (by symmetry, this will also reduce the magnitude of the USD inventory).
Analogously to Chapter 4, the EUR inventory is subject to the following impulse
Xeτ = X
e
τ− + 1
{
Xe
τ−<0
} − 1{
Xe
τ−>0
}. (5.6)
The USD inventory changes accordingly. In particular, if Xe
τ− > 0, the CLP is
selling EURUSD at the current ECN bid, while if Xe
τ− < 0 it is buying EURUSD
at the current ECN ask price. Therefore, for the USD inventory, we have
X$τ = X
$
τ− −
(
Se$τ− + ∆
e$
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−<0
} + (Se$τ− −∆e$τ−/2)1{Xe
τ−>0
}.
The ECN mid-price is impacted similarly to Equation (5.4), that is
Se$τ = S
e$
τ− + γ1
{
Xe
τ−<0
} − γ1{
Xe
τ−>0
}. (5.7)
Also, we consider a fixed cost the CLP sustains when crossing the spread. This
can be seen as a fixed ECN fee as well as the cost of information leakage, which
we model via a positive constant . The hedging strategy, as defined in this
context, is a collection of stopping times M : (τi)i≥0 at which it is optimal to
cross the spread in the ECN so to reduce the EUR position.
2A “unit” can be intended as a standard lot, which in FX can be of 105 or 106 of the left-hand
side currency, depending on the specific ECN rules.
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5.2.3 The value function
For simplicity, we write the control processes by α = {αu} and β = {βu}, and
the vector of state variables by x := {xe, x$, se$,∆e$}. We define the value
function of the CLP by
V (t,x) = max
α,β,M
Et,x
[
P&LT − αˆ(XeT )2 − φ
∫ T
t
(
Xeu
)2
du−
∑
t≤τi<T

]
, (5.8)
where the term P&LT is the terminal theoretical cash of which components
are derived from the USD inventory and the EUR inventory evaluated at the
ECN mid-price. That is, P&LT = X
$
T +X
e
T S
e$
T . The terminal and the running
penalties for holding a non zero inventory are parametrised by3 αˆ ≥ 0 and φ ≥ 0,
as done in Chapters 3 and 4. The value function satisfies the following HJB quasi
variational inequality4:
min
{
φ(xe)2 − κ(S¯ − se$) ∂V
∂se$
− 1
2
(σs,e$)2
∂2V
(∂se$)2
− 1
2
(σ∆,e$∆e$)2
∂2V
(∂∆e$)2
−∂V
∂t
− L−V (t,x)− L+V (t,x);V (t,x)−MV (t,x)
}
= 0,
(5.9)
where the operators L−, L+ and M are defined by
L+V (t,x) = sup
α
λ+p
E(q
+)
[
V
(
xe − (α− (1− α)η)q+, x$ + αp+q+, se$ + γ(1− α)q+,∆e$)− V (t,x)],
L−V (t,x) = sup
β
λ−p
E(q
−)[V (xe + (β + (1− β)η)q−, x$ − βp−q−, se$ − γ(1− β)q−,∆e$)− V (t,x)],
3To keep consistency with the previous chapters, we here call the terminal penalty αˆ. The
latter shall not be confused with the portion of principal liquidity offered to sellers, i.e. {αu}.
4We refer to Section 7.1 for details on its derivation.
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and
MV (t,x) = V (xe + Xe, x$ + X$, se$ + Se$,∆e$)− , (5.10)
respectively. In Equation (5.10) we define Xe = 1{xe<0}−1{xe>0}, Xe = (se$−
∆e$/2)1{xe>0} − (se$ + ∆e$/2)1{xe<0} and Se$ = γ1{xe<0} − γ1{xe>0}. Next
we solve numerically the QVI in Equation (5.9) and discuss the optimal pricing
and hedging strategy of the CLP.
5.2.4 Numerical results
In this section we explore some features of the model. For convenience, if the
inventory is positive, we define α to be the aggress liquidity and β the protect
liquidity. This is because α helps to reduce the inventory and thus the CLP wants
to be more aggressive on α and more conservative on β. On the other hand, if
the inventory is negative, for analogous reasons we define α to be the protect
liquidity and β the aggress liquidity. For simplicity, we first assume that the
EURUSD exchange rate is a martingale, i.e., there is no mean reversion (κ = 0)
and no permanent price impact (γ = 0). Thereafter, we include such features
and show how the optimal strategy changes as a function of the FX rate.
We numerically approximate the solution of Equation (5.9) by an explicit—
backward in time—finite difference scheme. Within this section, we consider an
equally-spaced time grid valued in [0, 100] with increments of 0.1, an equally-
spaced inventory grid (xe) valued in [−50, 50] with increments of 0.1, an equally
spaced price grid (se$) values in [1.07, 1.08] with increments of 0.01 and an
equally spaced spread grid (∆e$) valued in [0,0.0002] with increments of 0.0001.
The random variables q± can take values in {0, 1, 2, . . . , 20} with equal proba-
bility of 121 and the controls α and β can take values in {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}. At every
node, we check which combination of α and β is optimal (i.e. maximises the
value function) and we store the values, which we plot below. At every time,
and for each node, we further check whether a hedging action improves the value
function, and we store the inventory level at which it is optimal to cross the
spread and reduce the firm’s holdings. The solving algorithm we use is very
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similar to the one used for Chapter 4 and described in Section (7.5.2). Finally,
as noted in Chapters 2 and 4, when se$ or ∆e$ are martingales, we can use the
usual ansatz (see Cartea et al. [23] for details) and reduce the number of state
variables. Such reduction benefits the computational speed.
5.2.4.1 Martingale property of the FX rate
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Figure 5.1: Optimal principal-liquidity strategy (top panels) and hedging strategy
(bottom panels)—displayed as a function of time and inventory—found by solving
the HJB equation (5.9). We set λ± = 0.5, q± ∼ U [0, 20], η = 25 × 10−6, φ = 0.05,
γ = κ = 0, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001,  = 5, s
e$ = 1.075, ∆e$ = 2 pips. In
the left panels we set αˆ = 6. In the right panels we set αˆ = 0.5.
If we neglect both (i) the permanent impact of the brokerage and hedging ac-
tivities on the mid-price, and (ii) the mean-reversion property of the mid-price,
we can reduce the dimensionality of the problem. The optimal strategy α, β
and M now only depends on the time and the inventory level. In Figure 5.1
we show the principal strategy α and β (top panels) and the hedging strategy
(bottom panels) for different values of the terminal penalty αˆ. A higher terminal
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penalty (cf. left panels) discourages the firm from offering high percentages of
principal liquidity, towards maturity, on the protect side compared to a lower
terminal penalty. Furthermore the optimal hedging boundaries tighten towards
maturity compared to low values of the terminal penalty. We further note that
the hedging strategy is less aggressive than the one featured in Chapter 4. The
reason is that, towards maturity, very little principal liquidity is offered on the
protect side, while it is mainly offered on the aggress side.
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Figure 5.2: Optimal principal-liquidity strategy (top panels) and hedging strategy
(bottom panels)—displayed as a function of time and inventory—found by solving
the HJB equation (5.9). We set λ± = 0.5, q± ∼ U [0, 20], η = 25 × 10−6, αˆ = 2,
γ = κ = 0, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001,  = 5, s
e$ = 1.075, ∆e$ = 2 pips. In
the left panels we set φ = 0.1. In the right panels we set φ = 0.001.
In Figure 5.2 we show the optimal principal-liquidity (top panels) and hedging
strategies (bottom panels) for high and low values of the running penalty. High
values of φ reduce the percentage of principal liquidity offered to clients through-
out the period and tighten the hedging boundaries, while low values of φ increase
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the percentage of principal liquidity and widen the hedging boundaries. Such
results are in agreement with the ones shown in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.3: Optimal principal-liquidity strategy (top panels) and hedging strategy
(bottom panels)—displayed as a function of time and inventory—found by solving
the HJB equation (5.9). We set q± ∼ U [0, 20], η = 25 × 10−6, αˆ = 2, φ = 0.05,
γ = κ = 0, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001,  = 5, s
e$ = 1.075, ∆e$ = 2 pips. In
the left panels we set λ+ = 0.7 and λ− = 0.3. In the right panels we set λ+ = 0.3
and λ− = 0.7.
In Figure 5.3 we show the effect of different expectations regarding the client’s
arrival-flow. When the CLP is confident that buyers arrive at a higher frequency
than sellers, (i.e. λ+ > λ−), its inventory is expected to decrease and thus
more principal liquidity is offered to sellers (higher β compared to α). On the
hedging side, the optimal boundaries are skewed upward. That is, the CLP
starts hedging sooner when it holds a negative inventory compared to a positive
one. The opposite holds when the arrival-flow of sellers is higher than the one
of buyers.
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5.2.4.2 Permanent price impact
The addition of a permanent price impact adds interesting features to the optimal
strategy.
Figure 5.4: Optimal principal-liquidity strategy (top panels) and hedging strategy
(bottom panels)—displayed as a function of time and inventory—found by solving the
HJB equation (5.9). We set q± ∼ U [0, 20], η = 25× 10−6, αˆ = 2, φ = 0.05, λ± = 0.5,
κ = 0, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001,  = 5, s
e$ = 1.075, ∆e$ = 2 pips. In the
left panels we set γ = 0.01. In the right panels we set γ = 0.0001.
In Figure 5.4, we show the optimal principal strategy through time (top panels),
the optimal principal strategy at the initial time (central panels) and the hedging
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strategy (bottom panels). In the left panels we consider a high price impact
while in the right panels a low price impact is considered. It is interesting to
note that while a high price impact implies less principal liquidity being offered
to clients on the protect side, when we are at time 0 and for a neutral position,
more principal liquidity is offered for higher permanent impact. The financial
justification of such a feature is as follows. The CLP accepts a higher inventory
risk (when starting from a neutral position) so to avoid unfavourable impact on
the market price through its brokerage activity and relies on its internalisation
means.
5.2.4.3 Mean-reversion
When the FX rate mean-reverts to its long-term mean S¯, both principal and
hedging decisions are made on the basis of the value of the current price with
respect to S¯.
Figure 5.5: Optimal principal-liquidity strategy (top panels) and hedging strategy
(bottom panels)—displayed as a function of time and inventory—found by solving
the HJB equation (5.9). We set q± ∼ U [0, 20], η = 25 × 10−6, αˆ = 2, φ = 0.05,
S¯ = 1.075, λ± = 0.5, γ = 0, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001,  = 5, ∆e$ = 2 pips.
In the left panels we set κ = 0.05. In the right panels we set κ = 0.005.
Chapter 5. Market making: an application to the eFX spot market 130
In Figure 5.5, we note that when the FX rate is below its long-term mean, more
principal liquidity is offered to sellers than buyers. On the other hand, when
the FX rate is above its long-term mean, more principal liquidity is offered to
buyers. Such a feature is more evident when the speed of mean reversion κ is high
(top-left panel). This can be justified by the intention of the CLP to exploit a
short-lived opportunity of a market mis-pricing. On the hedging side, we notice
that for a high mean-reversion speed, hedging is postponed when the price is
unfavourably high or low (for a negative and positive inventory, respectively).
5.2.5 Price and inventory simulation
We here plot two distinct simulations (left and right panels) of the typical activity
of the CLP.
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Figure 5.6: Inventory simulation (top panels) and prices simulation (bottom pan-
els). We set q± ∼ U [0, 50], η = 25 × 10−6, αˆ = 2, φ = 0.05, S¯ = 1.075, λ± = 0.5,
γ = 0, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001,  = 5, ∆
e$ = 2 pips, κ = 0.005.
In the top panels of Figure 5.6 we plot the EUR and USD inventory, and super-
impose the hedging boundaries. In the bottom panels we simulate the ECN and
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the CLP prices. We notice that the CLP spread is, as expected, tighter than
the ECN one. When the inventory skew is applied, the aggress price is closer to
the mid-price, while the protect side may be less advantageous than the ECN
one. In the price simulation we further include the mean-reversion of prices and
the permanent impact of trades. Around time t = 50, in the top-left panel, we
notice that the CLP is short EURUSD to the point it needs to resort to the ECN
for hedging. Buying EURUSD in the centralised market causes a market impact
which is evident in the bottom left panel, where prices have a clear increasing
trend around the same time. On the other hand, in the top-right panel around
time t = 30, the CLP is long EURUSD. The bottom-right panel shows indeed
the consistent slippage (starting around the same time), which is caused by the
CLP through its hedging activity.
5.3 Three currency pairs
In this section we assume that the CLP offers liquidity for three currency pairs,
two of which are direct pairs (i.e. EURUSD and GBPUSD) and one is a cross
pair (EURGBP), and that it hedges its positions in a single ECN (which may be
a synthetic ECN constructed via aggregation of the books belonging to different
ECNs). When we refer to direct pairs, we mean that one of the legs is USD
and by cross pair we indicate those currency pairs of which neither leg is USD.
Typically direct pairs are more liquid (i.e. have tighter spreads) than cross pairs.
The CLP activity can be summarised as follows:
1. On the pricing side, the CLP receives orders from buyers and sellers
for each of the currency pairs. It provides principal liquidity for a portion
of such orders, while the remainder is traded in the ECN on behalf of
the client, and it is executed at the market price. Analogously to Section
5.2.2, the CLP chooses the prices at which it offers principal liquidity, and
it charges a commission fee for the brokerage service.
2. On the hedging side, the CLP needs to manage the risk of holding the
inventories deriving from offering principal liquidity to clients. Its options
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are as follows: (i) the CLP skews its prices and/or reduces the portion of
principal liquidity on the protect side (while increasing the proportion of
principal liquidity on the aggress side), and (ii) it can post market orders
in the ECN. In the latter option, as briefly mentioned in Section 5.1.2,
the CLP has the choice of hedging via direct and/or cross pairs. As it is
typically more expensive to hedge via the cross-pair, we would expect the
hedging to happen through the direct pairs. Nonetheless, there may be
circumstances which make the cross-pair hedging optimal, as we shall see
in Section 5.3.3.
In the remainder of the chapter, we assume that
• EURUSD is traded at {Se$u −∆e$u /2, Se$u + ∆e$u /2},
• GBPUSD is traded at {S£$u −∆£$u /2, S£$u + ∆£$u /2},
• EURGBP is traded at {Se£u −∆e£u /2, Se£u + ∆e£u /2},
where {∆e$u }, {∆£$u }, {∆e£u } are the bid/ask spreads for EURUSD, GBPUSD
and EURGBP, respectively. By means of standard arguments we can derive the
triangular arbitrage relations, given by
Se$u −∆e$u /2(
Se£u + ∆
e£
u /2
)(
S£$u + ∆
£$
u /2
) ≤ 1, (5.11)
and
(
S£$u −∆£$u /2
)(
Se£u −∆e£u /2
)
Se$u + ∆
e$
u /2
≤ 1; (5.12)
which shall hold at any time u ∈ [t, T ].
We note that Equation (5.1) implies both (5.11) and (5.12). For simplicity, we
assume that Equation (5.1) holds and that the EURGBP spread is given by
∆e£u = k(∆
e$
u + ∆
£$
u ), where k > 0. As a byproduct of the above assumptions,
we have two fewer processes to model.
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5.3.1 A revision of the state-variables dynamic
For notational simplicity, we write the state variables dynamics as a seven-
dimensional vector. In particular, we letXu :=
(
Se$u , S
£$
u ,∆
e$
u ,∆
£$
u , X
e
u , X
£
u , X
$
u
)
,
with initial value given by x :=
(
se$, s£$,∆e$,∆£$, xe, x£, x$
)
.
The first two components of the vector Xu are the mid-prices for the EURUSD
and GBPUSD exchange rates, respectively. The third and fourth elements are
the market spreads for the EURUSD and GBPUSD, respectively. Finally, the
last three components are the EUR, GBP and USD inventories, respectively.
We also define the vector of principal-liquidity controls by αu := (α
e$
u , α
£$
u , α
e£
u )
and βu := (β
e$
u , β
£$
u , β
e£
u ). Each component of the above controls is the principal-
liquidity portion of orders offered to clients who: (i) buy EURUSD (αe$u ), (ii)
buy GBPUSD (α£$u ), (iii) buy EURGBP (α
e£
u ), (iv) sell EURUSD (β
e$
u ), (v)
sell GBPUSD (β£$u ), and (vi) sell EURGBP (β
e£
u ). The stochastic process Xu
satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:
dXu = σ(u,Xu)dW u + h(u,Xu,αu,βu, qu)dNu, (5.13)
where {W u} :=
({
W s,e$u
}
,
{
W s,£$u
}
,
{
W∆,e$u
}
,
{
W∆,£$u
})′
is a 4-dimensional
Brownian motion and the 6-dimensional jump process is defined by {Nu} :=({
N+,e$u
}
,
{
N+,£$u
}
,
{
N+,e£u
}
,
{
N−,e$u
}
,
{
N−,£$u
}
,
{
N−,e£u
})′
. The elements of
both the diffusion and the jump vectors are assumed to be independent. Also,
for i = e$, £$, e£, each element of the jump vector is a Cox processes {N±,iu }
with intensity λ±,ip = λ±(p±,i) and q±,i are i.i.d. random variables which model
the order size. Furthermore, we have σ : [t, T ] × R7 → R7×4, and h : [t, T ] ×
R7 × [0, 1]3 × [0, 1]3 × [0, q¯]7 → R7×6, where q¯ > 0. In particular, we let
σ(u,Xu) =

σs,e$Se$u 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 σs,£$S£$u 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ∆,e$∆e$u 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ∆,£$∆£$u 0 0 0

′
,
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and
h(u,Xu,αu,βu, qu) =
[
h+,e$, h+,£$, h+,e£, h−,e$, h−,£$, h−,e£
]
=

0 0 0 0 −(αe$u − (1− αe$u )η)q+,e$ 0 αe$u p+,e$u q+,e$
0 0 0 0 0 −(α£$u − (1− α£$u )η)q+,£$ α£$u p+,£$u q+,£$
0 0 0 0 −(αe£u − (1− αe£u )η)q+,e£ αe£u p−,e£u q+,e£ 0
0 0 0 0
(
βe$u + (1− βe$u )η
)
q−,e$ 0 −βe$u p−,e$u q−,e$
0 0 0 0 0
(
β£$u + (1− β£$u )η)q−,£$ −β£$u p−,£$u q−,£$
0 0 0 0
(
βe£u + (1− βe£u )η
)
q−,e£ −βe£u p+,e£u q−,e£ 0

′
.
In analogy with the pricing method described in Section 5.2.2.1, we define p+,j$u =
Sj$
u−+ξ1∆
j$
u−/2−ξ2 sign [Xju− ]+ξ3αj$u and p−,j$u = Sj$u−−ξ1∆j$u−/2−ξ2 sign [Xju− ]−
ξ3β
j$
u for direct pairs, i.e. where j = e,£. For the cross pair, we shall make
the following consideration for the inventory skew. If the CLP is long EURUSD
and short GBPUSD (which is similar to being long EURGBP) then it should
skew its prices down as incoming trades from buyers of EURGBP are 100% risk-
decreasing. Analogously, when the CLP is short EURUSD and long GBPUSD,
then it should skew its prices up so to encourage sellers of EURGBP. Assume,
on the other hand, that the CLP is long in both EURUSD and GBPUSD. An
upward skew would be aimed at reducing the GBP inventory (risk decreasing)
and increase the EUR inventory (risk increasing). Analogously, a downward skew
would be aimed at reducing the EUR inventory (risk decreasing) and increase
the GBP inventory (risk increasing). The same considerations hold when the
CLP is short in both EURUSD and GBPUSD. We therefore believe that, on
such occasions, no inventory skew should be applied to the EURGBP quotes
as there is no such thing as a ‘preferred’ trade direction. The last scenario
we can encounter is being neutral on one inventory and not so in the other.
We believe that in such a case the preferred trade direction should be the one
that rebalances the non-neutral inventory, as a trade in the opposite direction
would be 100% risk increasing. In view of the above thoughts, we shall define
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p+,e£u = Se£u− + ξ1∆
e£
u−/2 − ξ2 sign [Xeu− ] + ξ2 sign [X£u− ] + ξ3αe£u and p−,e£u =
Se£
u− − ξ1∆e£u−/2 − ξ2 sign [Xeu− ] + ξ2 sign [X£u− ] − ξ3βe£u . It is easy to see that
when the EUR and GBP inventories have the same sign, the skews cancel each
other out. When one of the positions is neutral, the prices are moderately
skewed. Finally, when the two inventories have opposite signs, the prices are
highly skewed. We define δ±,iCLP in the same fashion we did in Section 5.2.2.1 and
we let λ±,ip = λ±,ie−cδ
±,i
CLP .
When the risk associated with holding the EUR and/or GBP inventories in-
creases, the CLP may consider crossing the spread in the ECN by submitting
market orders. Assuming that at time τ an hedging action is optimal, the CLP
has the following alternatives: It can trade EURUSD by
Xeτ = X
e
τ− + 1
{
Xe
τ−<0
} − 1{
Xe
τ−>0
},
X$τ = X
$
τ− −
(
Se$τ− + ∆
e$
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−<0
} + (Se$τ− −∆e$τ−/2)1{Xe
τ−>0
},
Alternatively, it can trade GBPUSD by
X£τ = X
£
τ− + 1
{
X£
τ−<0
} − 1{
X£
τ−>0
},
X$τ = X
$
τ− −
(
S£$τ− + ∆
£$
τ−/2
)
1{
X£
τ−<0
} + (S£$τ− −∆£$τ−/2)1{X£
τ−>0
},
Finally, it can trade EURGBP by
Xeτ = X
e
τ− + 1
{
Xe
τ−<0, X
£
τ−>0
} − 1{
Xe
τ−>0, X
£
τ−<0
},
X£τ = X
£
τ−−
(
Se£τ− +∆
e£
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−<0, X
£
τ−>0
}+(Se£τ− −∆e£τ−/2)1{Xe
τ−>0, X
£
τ−<0
}.
The hedging strategy is thus a collection of stopping times and currency pairs,
i.e. M : (τ`, y`)`≥0, where y` ∈ {e$,£$,e£}, for which it is optimal to submit
a market order for that specific pair. Furthermore, every time the CLP posts a
market order in the ECN, it is subject to a fixed penalty given by y > 0. We
assume that e$ = £$ < e£.
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The reasoning behind this last assumption is that hedging through cross pairs
is typically more expensive and it is done only when reducing the risk of both
inventories. This gives to other market participants more information on the CLP
current inventories and such leakage comes with a cost. The impulse part can be
rewritten, in matrix notation, as Xτ = Xτ− +m
y(τ,Xτ−), where m(τ,Xτ−) is
defined by
m(τ,Xu) =
[
me$,m£$,me£
]
=

0 0 0 0
1{
Xe
τ−<0
}
−1{
Xe
τ−>0
} 0 −
(
Se$
τ−+∆
e$
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−<0
}
+
(
Se$
τ−−∆
e$
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−>0
}
0 0 0 0 0
1{
X£
τ−<0
}
−1{
X£
τ−>0
} −
(
S£$
τ−+∆
£$
τ−/2
)
1{
X£
τ−<0
}
+
(
S£$
τ−−∆
£$
τ−/2
)
1{
X£
τ−>0
}
0 0 0 0
1{
Xe
τ−<0, X
£
τ−>0
}
−1{
Xe
τ−>0, X
£
τ−<0
} −
(
Se£
τ−+∆
e£
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−<0, X
£
τ−>0
}
+
(
Se£
τ−−∆
e£
τ−/2
)
1{
Xe
τ−>0, X
£
τ−<0
} 0

′
.
5.3.2 The value function
We here define the value function and the associated HJB equation, while in the
next section we show the optimal strategy, which we obtain numerically. We
define the value function by
V
(
t,x
)
= sup
α,β,M
Et,x
[
X$T +X
e
T
(
Se$T − αˆXeT
)
+X£
(
S£$T − αˆX£T
)
− φ
∫ T
t
((
Xeu
)2
+
(
X£u
)2)
du−
∑
y∈{e$,£$,e£}
∑
t≤τyi <T
yi
]
.
(5.14)
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By making use of the same notation employed by Pham [74, 75] and Øksendal
and Sulem [70], we can write the HJB equation as follows
min
{
− 1
2
tr(σσ′D2xV )− sup
α,β
∑
i=e$,£$,e£
j=+,−
λj,ip E(q
j,i)
[
V (t,x+ hj,i)− V (t,x)]
φ
(
xe
)2
+ φ
(
x£
)2
;V (t,x)− sup
y∈{e$,£$,e£}
(
V (t,x+m(t,x))− y
)}
= 0,
(5.15)
where D2xV denotes the Hessian matrix of the function V . In Equation (5.15) the
part containing the impulse has to be interpreted as follows: if arg maxV (t,x+
m(t,x))−y = e$, the CLP crosses the spread by trading EURUSD in the ECN
and the value function becomes V (t,x+me$(t,x))− e$. The direction of such
trade is chosen according to the sign of the EUR inventory (sell if the latter is
positive and buy if it is negative). In financial terms, assuming that a hedging
action is optimal, the CLP needs to decide which is the best currency to trade
in the ECN by considering both: (i) risk reduction, and (ii) cost of trading.
5.3.3 Numerical results
Below we show the optimal strategy found by numerically solving the HJB in
Equation (5.15). In Figure 5.7 we show the principal strategy employed by the
CLP for the three currency pairs. In the left panels we show the strategy for
t = 0, while in the right panels we have t → T . We notice that the principal
liquidity offered on the protect side is reduced as we approach the terminal
time. The large proportion of cross liquidity offered (bottom-left panel) is due
to the larger spread earned when trading the cross pair. Such increased reward
is nonetheless offset by a doubly increased risk (starting from a neutral position).
We further notice that the principal strategy is analogous to the one-currency-
pair case. The new information provided by the current setting is given by the
hedging strategy, which we plot in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. The numerical technique
is analogous to the one described in Section 5.2.4.
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Figure 5.7: Optimal principal-liquidity strategy found by solving the HJB equation
(5.15). We set q± ∼ U [0, 20], η = 25 × 10−6, αˆ = 2, φ = 0.05, λ± = 0.5, ξ1 = 0.5,
ξ2 = 0.5 pips, ξ3 = 0.001, 
e$,£$ = 5, e£ = 10, ∆e$ = ∆£$ = 2 pips, ∆e£ = 3 pips.
In each of the twelve plots in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, the grey area defines the region
of the plane (i.e. the EUR and GBP inventory levels) for which it is optimal to
hedge through the pair specified in the figure. In Figure 5.8 we plot the hedging
strategy for low values of the EURGBP spread. We notice that the cross-pair
hedging regions are wider than the ones shown in Figure 5.9 (right, top and bot-
tom panels). This reflects the tradeoff between the cost of the hedging strategy
and the benefit of reducing both inventories at once.
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Figure 5.8: Optimal hedging strategy found by solving the HJB equation (5.15).
Top panels: t = 0. Bottom panels: t→ T .
Hedging strategy - high ∆e£
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Figure 5.9: Optimal hedging strategy found by solving the HJB equation (5.15).
Top panels: t = 0. Bottom panels: t→ T .
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5.3.4 Price and inventory simulation
In Figure 5.10 we show the qualitative features of the CLP activity. In the top
and bottom-left panels we plot the ECN and CLP prices.
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Figure 5.10: Price simulation (top panels and bottom-left panel) and inventory
simulation (bottom-right panel).
In the bottom-right panel we plot the EUR, GBP and USD inventories and su-
perimpose the direct and cross-pair mean hedging boundaries. Such boundaries
have to be interpreted as follows. If the interior boundaries are surpassed by
either the EUR or GBP inventories, then the CLP starts hedging via EURUSD
or GBPUSD, respectively. The only exception to the above occurs when the
exterior boundaries are surpassed by both the EUR and GBP inventories, and
they do so in opposite directions. For example, if the upper exterior boundary is
surpassed by the EUR inventory while the lower exterior boundary is surpassed
by the GBP inventory, then the CLP is long EURGBP and it is optimal to hedge
in the ECN by selling EURGBP. The opposite holds when the CLP is severely
short EURGBP, i.e. the upper exterior boundary is surpassed by the GBP in-
ventory and the lower exterior boundary is surpassed by the EUR inventory. In
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the latter case, the CLP should hedge by buying EURGBP. In the simulation
provided in Figure 5.10, such an occurrence happens at around time t = 50,
when the CLP is long EURGBP. We can further notice that, around the same
time, the prices offered by the CLP to its clients are set according to its posi-
tion. In the top-left panel, the prices are skewed down due to the CLP being
long EUR. In the top-right panel the prices are skewed up due to the CLP being
short GBP. Finally, in the bottom-left panel, the prices are skewed down so to
encourage buyers of EURGBP.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we study the activity of a CLP which offers a joint service of
principal and agency trading to its clients by streaming tailored two-way prices
and by executing orders while preserving the counterparty’s anonymity. The
CLP earns a commission from the brokerage service while a spread is earned
through principal trading. During the activity the CLP is subject to an inventory
risk which is mitigated by skewing its prices, as well as by crossing the spread in
the ‘lit’ market. We focus on the foreign exchange market and we consider both
one-currency-pair and three-currency-pair cases.
When only one currency pair is traded, and thus we have fewer state variables to
model, we can study the effects of mean-reversion and permanent price impact.
If the FX rate mean reverts, the principal liquidity offered depends on where the
current price is in its mean-reversion cycle. For example, when the FX rate is
below its long-term mean, more principal liquidity should be offered to sellers.
We further analyse the effect of the permanent price impact when trading in the
ECN and show that for a neutral position, the CLP should offer more principal
liquidity when the price impact is high. The financial interpretation of such a
feature is that the CLP tries to avoid unfavourably impacting the market price
at which it may need to hedge its new position in the case it fails to internalise
the received flow.
Finally we present the case where three currency pairs are available for trading
and gain insights on the hedging strategy the CLP should offer. We assume
Chapter 5. Market making: an application to the eFX spot market 142
that the cross pair is less liquid and thus a higher spread (compared to direct
pairs) is earned when trading with clients. Such benefit is nevertheless offset
by a higher risk accepted by the CLP (we are referring to the cases of: (i) a
neutral position held by the CLP, and (ii) short—or long—positions are held
by the CLP in both direct pairs). With regards to the hedging strategy, the
CLP refrains from hedging through the cross pair unless the benefit of doing so,
i.e. the simultaneous reduction of both inventories, counterbalances the higher
spread paid in the ECN.
Chapter 6
Final conclusions
6.1 Summary of main results and contributions
In the present work we go through some of the typical situations that agents
and firms face when trading in electronic markets. Nowadays most venues have
limit order books and market participants trade among each other in a supply
and demand setting. Various considerations should be made before trading. In
particular we refer to present market conditions, terminal goal, market impact,
et cetera.
Today more than ever, and especially in high-speed markets, such considerations
need to be made in advance by planning for potential future scenarios and by
constructing algorithms which take the current market situation as an input and
output the best strategy. Real-time market data are in fact processed by high
powered machines which then take trading decisions accordingly.
In a nutshell, we propose models that can be used when trading in electronic
markets. It is worth emphasising that they can be applied to many distinct
situations. For example, nothing prevents us from taking the optimal execution
model presented in Chapter 3 and integrating it in the model shown in Chapter
4, thus solving an optimal liquidation problem every time the CLP starts its
hedging procedures.
In this work we answer various questions:
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1. How shall an agent execute a large trade in an order-driven market?
2. What changes when the agent can simultaneously trade in a dark pool?
3. How shall a firm, which provides liquidity to clients, set its prices and hedge
its position?
4. How shall a firm choose the ratio of principal versus agency liquidity when
providing a hybrid execution service within the FX market?
The first two questions have been addressed elsewhere, too. We contribute to
the current literature by adding and explaining important financial features to
the governing system of SDEs (e.g. permanent price impact when trading in the
standard exchange). As such, when trading in a less liquid market, our model
should provide a more accurate approximation of the optimal strategy compared
to models in which the price is assumed to be a martingale and the permanent
price impact is neglected. Questions 3 and 4 are a novelty in the literature. While
market-making problems have been extensively studied, the specific behaviour
of firms trading with clients in a protected pool and hedging in an order-driven
market have not. The mathematics applied therein is analogous to the ones
used to solve standard market-making problems a` la Cartea et al. [23]. However
the contribution of the present work lies in the development of financial models
which (i) allow for transparent interpretations, and (ii) to a great extent are
ready for applications in the financial industry.
There are various financial features that come into play in both the optimal-
liquidation and the optimal market-making problems. First, there is the risk
caused by uncertain future price movements. On the other hand, liquidating
the position faster has two main drawbacks: (i) price impact, and (ii) adverse
selection. We do not treat the latter in this thesis, but we mention it in Section
6.2 when giving directions for possible future work. The optimal strategy de-
pends on the trade-off between exploiting market opportunities (as in the case of
mean reversion) while trying to minimise unfavourable market disruption, such
as price slippage.
The shape of the optimal policy is determined, among other things, by the
risk appetite of the agents or firms. We find that a strongly risk-averse player
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should always choose early execution, whether this is in the form of liquidation
or hedging. On the other hand, slightly more risk-prone agents are willing to
bear price and time uncertainty in the hope to achieve a better final outcome.
As we show in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3, the market maker faces a trade-off
between accepting a higher risk (measured via the variance of the performance)
in favour of higher expected returns. Unfortunately risk preferences, which are
agent-specific, are difficult to quantify and estimate, especially when they are
also subject to legal and compliance requirements.
6.2 Future work
There is a number of directions that future research on these topics may take.
For example, it would be appropriate to include some adverse-selection measure
in our models. The main idea behind adverse-selection within this context can
be illustrated as follows. Assume that a limit sell order is executed. This implies
a potential increase in the best ask price, which would make the posting agent
regret their trading decision as now the price has moved in what would have been
their favour. Such a feature could be included in the context of a firm hedging
its inventory in the ‘lit’ pool.
Another modification which could be done to the hedging strategy of the firm
would be to consider a model a` la optimal-liquidation framework to be integrated
in the optimal market-making setting. As of now, in the models presented in
Chapters 4 and 5, the firm may only hedge one unit or one lot at any given
time, through an impulse in the model. It would be interesting to have, at each
time the firm enters in a position which requires hedging, a liquidation schedule
based on more sophisticated models, rather than the current setting, which can
be assimilated to the constant-liquidation-rate strategy.
When it comes to FX e-trading, the future directions the research may take are
many. We here mention the two which we believe would have the greatest impact
in both academic research and industry practice. First, it is worth extending the
framework treated in Chapter 6 toN currency pairs, including the synthetic ones.
When we refer to synthetic currency pairs, we indicate those pairs for which
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there is no quoted price in the ECN. An example of such pairs is TRYDKK.
There is no price for Turkish lira and Danish krone, while there are quoted
prices for USDTRY and EURDKK and, of course, EURUSD. The TRYDKK
pair can not be traded directly in the ECN. Nevertheless one can, for example,
buy USDTRY, sell EURDKK and buy EURUSD in order to sell TRYDKK. A
client may occasionally want to see such a pair directly quoted by the firm,
without having to work through multiple transactions. On the firm’s side, this
would require an algorithm which aggregates the information available on pairs
directly traded in the ECN and outputs a reasonable spread for such a synthetic
pair, further considering its potential hedging needs.
Another interesting extension we consider includes the modelling of multiple
competing firms which offer liquidity within the same pool of clients and try to
win the business. Typically, clients have their own algorithms which aggregate
the various sources of liquidity and trade with the most convenient one at every
point in time. A reasonable assumption is that every firm has access to the
same pool of ECNs and thus starts with the same information set. Analysing
the competition among liquidity providers requires assumptions on the pricing
mechanisms of multiple firms and some ambiguity measure to take into account
the potential errors in the modelling assumptions. This would answer questions
like: Assuming a client is allowed to trade with multiple firms sequentially, which
price should be offered so that our firm is on top of the queue, while still making
the trade profitable? How would the hedging strategy change, given that other
firms may be hedging at the same time in the same direction? Would trading
within firms (for hedging purposes, as opposed to cross the spread in the ECN)
be preferable?
These are the types of projects which are being pursued in ongoing research.
Chapter 7
Viscosity solutions and
numerical procedures
The objectives of this chapter are as follows:
1. We state—as a reference—the DPP for a mixed optimal stochastic and
impulse-control problem;
2. We show that the value functions resulting from the models presented in
this thesis are the unique viscosity solutions of the associated HJB equa-
tions;
3. We provide a description of the numerical schemes used to obtain the
results shown in Chapters 3 and 4. The numerical scheme used in Chapter
5 is analogous to the one used in Chapter 4.
The proofs detailed in this chapter are based on already existing mathematical
results and therefore, although they are adapted to the specific models presented
in this thesis, we do not wish to include them in the original work presented
herein. We refer to Shreve [78, 79] and Steele [82] for an introductory overview
on stochastic calculus, which is the main mathematical tool used throughout this
thesis.
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7.1 Background material
7.1.1 Dynamic programming and HJB equation
We intentionally keep the tone of this section general, so to accommodate the
various cases presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In particular, we state the DPP
for a mixed optimal stochastic and impulse-control problem. Let us assume we
have a well-defined Rn-valued process, starting at a value x ∈ Rn,
dXu = b(u,Xu,vu)du+ σ(u,Xu,vu)dBu + γ(u,Xu− ,vu)dJu (7.1)
that has a unique and strong solution, and where {vu} is valued in the set U
of admissible processes. We let b : [0, T ] × Rn → Rn, σ : [0, T ] × Rn → Rn×m,
γ : [0, T ] × Rn × R` → Rn×`. The process {Bu} is an m-dimensional Brownian
motion and Ju is an `-dimensional compound Poisson process. The components
of such multidimensional processes are assumed to be independent. Furthermore,
let us consider a continuous time Markov chain k, with discrete state space K,
generated by {Q} = (rij).
Discrete impulses can take place at a cost Φ(u,x, ζ) to shift the process to a new
value Ψ(u,x,k, ζ), where ζ ∈ Υ is the action decision. That is, if at time τ an
impulse takes place, we have
Xτ = Ψ(τ,Xτ− ,kτ− , ζτ ) = Xτ− + Ψ¯(τ,kτ− , ζτ ). (7.2)
Remark 7.1. Following the notation in Davis et al. [33], we wish to mention
that Equations (7.1) and (7.2) can be compactly written by
dXu = b(u,Xu,vu)du+ σ(u,Xu,vu)dBu + γ(u,Xu− ,vu)dJu
+
∑
i
δ(u− τi)Ψ¯(τi,kτ−i , ζτi),
(7.3)
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where δ(·) denotes the Dirac delta function. A third alternative is to follow
the notation employed by Horst and Naujokat [52], who define a non-decreasing
counting ca`dla`g process Mu and write the state-variable dynamics by
dXu = b(u,Xu,vu)du+ σ(u,Xu,vu)dBu + γ(u,Xu− ,vu)dJu
+Ψ¯(u,ku− , ζu)dMu,
(7.4)
where the process {Mu} jumps every time the agent gives an impulse to the
system. The three dynamics mentioned allow for an impulse of size Ψ¯(τi,kτ−i
, ζτi)
to take place at the discretion of the agent and thus have the same meaning.
Throughout the present work we prefer to adopt the non-compact notation, i.e.
Equations (7.1) and (7.2), in line with most of the literature relevant to this
thesis (e.g. Seydel [77] and Cartea et al. [23] and the references therein).
The value function is defined by
V (t,x;k) = sup
{vu}t≤u≤Tˆ ,(τi,ξi)i≥0
Et,x,k
[ ∫ Tˆ
t
ϑ(u,Xu,vu)du + %(X Tˆ ,kTˆ )
−
∑
τi∈[t,Tˆ )
Φ(τi,Xτ−i
, ζi)
]
,
(7.5)
where Tˆ := inf(u < t|x /∈ O) ∧ T , where O ⊆ Rn is the domain of the state
variable Xu. The above is a stochastic/impulse control problem for controlled
jump diffusions with regime switching (given by the Markov chain k). In absence
of impulses, let ν∗ denote the optimal control. For θ ∈ [t, T ], we define the control
νˆu by
νˆu :=

νu, u ∈ [t, θ]
ν∗u, otherwise.
We can let τr be the first time the regime switches from its initial state. For all
θ ≤ τr we can rewrite the value function by
Chapter 7. Proofs and numerical procedures 150
V (t,x;k) = sup
{vu}t≤u≤θ
Et,x,k
[ ∫ θ
t
ϑ(u,Xu,vu)du+
∫ Tˆ
θ
ϑ(u,Xu,v
∗
u)du
+%(X Tˆ ,kTˆ )
]
,
= sup
{vu}t≤u≤θ
Et,x,k
[∫ θ
t
ϑ(u,Xu,vu)du+ Eθ,Xθ,kθ
[ ∫ Tˆ
θ
ϑ(u,Xu,v
∗
u)du
+%(X Tˆ ,kTˆ )
]]
,
= sup
{vu}t≤u≤θ
Et,x,k
[ ∫ θ
t
ϑ(u,Xu,vu)du+ V (θ,Xθ;kθ)
]
,
= V (t,x;k) + sup
{vu}t≤u≤θ
Et,x
[ ∫ θ
t
ϑ(u,Xu,vu) +
(
∂
∂t
+ L
)
V (u,Xu;ku)du
]
,
where the last inequality comes from an application of Dynkin’s formula to the
function V and L is the infinitesimal generator of the processes {Xu,ku}, given
by
LV (t,x;k) =
n∑
i=1
(b)i
∂V
∂xi
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(σσT )ij
∂2V
∂xi∂xj
+
∑
k′ 6=k
rkk′
[
V (t,x;k′)− V (t,x;k)
]
;
+
∑`
i=1
λiE[V (t,x+ (γ)·izi;k)− V (t,x;k)],
where (b)i is the i-th component of the vector b in Equation (7.1), (σσT )ij is the
entry on the i-th row and j-th column in the matrix σσT and (γ)·i is the i-th
column of the matrix γ. By letting θ = t + h ∧ τr, dividing by h and letting
h→ 0 we obtain
sup
v
{
ϑ(t,x,v) +
(
∂
∂t
+ L
)
V (t,x;k)
}
= 0. (7.6)
If a discount factor is present, we have
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V (t,x;k) = sup
{vu}t≤u≤θ
Et,x,k
[ ∫ θ
t
e−r(u−t)ϑ(u,Xu,vu)du+ e−r(θ−t)V (θ,Xθ;kθ)
]
,
= V (t,x;k)
+ sup
{vu}t≤u≤θ
Et,x,k
[ ∫ θ
t
e−r(u−t)
(
ϑ(u,Xu,vu) +
(
∂
∂t
− r + L
)
V (u,Xu;ku)
)
du
]
,
By letting θ = t+ h ∧ τr, dividing by h and letting h→ 0 we obtain
sup
v
{
ϑ(t,x,v) +
(
∂
∂t
− r + L
)
V (t,x;k)
}
= 0. (7.7)
When we add the possibility of having impulses, we follow the same approach
but with θ = t + h ∧ τr ∧ τ1, where τ1 is the first time an impulse takes place.
When we let h→ 0 we face two distinct possibilities: (i) τ1 > t, and (ii) τ1 = t.
If τ1 > t, then (7.6) holds. If, on the other hand, τ1 = t, the value function is
subject to the following impulse
MV (t,x;k) = sup
ζ∈Υ
V (t,Ψ(t,x,k, ζ);k)− Φ(t,x, ζ).
We can thus conclude that V (t,x;k) satisfies the following system of quasi vari-
ational inequalities (QVI)

min
{
− ∂V∂t − supv{LV (t,x;k) + ϑ(t,x,v)};V (t,x;k)−MV (t,x;k)
}
= 0
on [t, T )×O
V (t,x;k) = %(x,k) on T × ∂O.
(7.8)
Remark 7.2. A QVI is referred as to an inequality since, on [t, T ) × O × K,
Equation (7.8) is a compact version of the three following conditions, which shall
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hold simultaneously:
−∂V∂t − supv{LV (t,x;k) + ϑ(t,x,v)} ≥ 0,
V (t,x;k)−MV (t,x;k) ≥ 0,(
− ∂V∂t − supv{LV (t,x;k) + ϑ(t,x,v)}
)(
V (t,x;k)−MV (t,x;k)
)
= 0.
Equation (7.8) is meaningful only if the function V (t,x;k) is sufficiently smooth,
but this does not need to be the case. We thus make use of the weaker notion of
viscosity solutions, which do not require the smoothness of the value function, so
to ensure the convergence of the numerical scheme. In fact, convergence results
for numerical schemes have been proved starting from the characterisation of
the value function by the unique viscosity solution to the associated dynamic
programming equation (see, e.g., Fleming and Soner [37]). Loosely speaking,
Barles and Souganidis [6] prove that, provided a comparison result is proved
for a viscosity solution, any monotone, stable and consistent numerical scheme
converges to the correct solution.
7.1.2 Viscosity solutions
Viscosity solution theory is a powerful tool when it comes to HJB equations,
since proving the regularity and smoothness of the value function may not be an
easy task. Viscosity solutions are defined for both continuous and discontinuous
functions, depending on whether the continuity of the value function wants to be
shown as a separate result, or it comes as a byproduct of the strong comparison
result which guarantees uniqueness of the viscosity solution. For the sake of
generality, we here report the definitions of viscosity solution for discontinuous
functions. First, for each k, we need to define the lower and the upper semi-
continuous envelopes (l.s.c. and u.s.c. envelopes, respectively) of the function
V (t,x;k), given by
V ∗(t,x;k) = lim
t′→t
sup
x′→x
V (t′,x′;k), V∗(t,x;k) = lim
t′→t
inf
x′→x
V (t′,x′;k).
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Definition 7.3. (Viscosity Supersolution). A function V ∈ PB([0, T ]×Rn×K)
is a viscosity supersolution of the HJB (7.8) if for each φ ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rn ×
K) ∩ PB([0, T ] × Rn × K) such that V (t,x;k) − φ(t,x;k) attains its minimum
at (t¯, x¯, kˆ) ∈ [0, T )× Rn ×K, we have

min
{
− ∂φ∂t − supv{Lφ(t¯, x¯; kˆ) + ϑ(t¯, x¯, v)};V∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ)−MV∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ)
}
≥ 0
on (t¯, x¯, kˆ) ∈ [0, T )×O ×K
V∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ) ≥ %(x¯, kˆ) on T × ∂O ×K.
(7.9)
Definition 7.4. (Viscosity Subsolution). A function V ∈ PB([0, T ] × Rn × K)
is a viscosity supersolution of the HJB (7.8) if for each φ ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rn ×
K) ∩ PB([0, T ] × Rn × K) such that V (t,x;k) − φ(t,x;k) attains its maximum
at (t¯, x¯, kˆ) ∈ [0, T )× Rn ×K, we have

min
{
− ∂φ∂t − supv{Lφ(t¯, x¯; kˆ) + ϑ(t¯, x¯,v)};V ∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ)−MV ∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ)
}
≤ 0
on (t¯, x¯, kˆ) ∈ [0, T )×O ×K
V ∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ) ≤ %(x¯, kˆ) on T × ∂O ×K.
(7.10)
Definition 7.5. (Viscosity Solution). A function V is a viscosity solution of the
HJB (7.8) if it is both a supersolution and a subsolution.
Another important result in the theory of viscosity solution is the so-called com-
parison result, from which it immediately follows the uniqueness of the viscosity
solution. In general terms and for parabolic PDE, it states that, if U and V are
an u.s.c. subsolution and a l.s.c. supersolution respectively, such that U < V
on T × ∂O × K, then U < V on the whole domain [0, T ] × O × K. Uniqueness
immediately follows from such a result, given that if W and V are two viscosity
solutions, by the comparison principle it follows that
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W ∗ ≤ V∗ and V ∗ ≤W∗.
Since, by construction, we already have that W∗ ≤ W ∗ and V∗ ≤ V ∗, we have
the following equality
W∗ = W ∗ = V∗ = V ∗.
As a byproduct, we obtain the continuity of the value function, since a function
that is both u.s.c. and l.s.c. is continuous.
7.2 Reconciliation of notation
In this section we show that the models in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are special cases
of Equations (7.1) and (7.5). Therefore, the derivation of HJB (7.8) applies to
the models presented in the main body of the thesis1. The notation is kept
consistent with the relevant sections of the thesis.
7.2.1 Chapter 2
In Chapter 2 we consider: (i) optimal liquidation, and (ii) optimal market-making
problems. While the former has no impulse, the latter has some. We here aim
to show that all such models are special cases of the general model described in
Section 7.1. We note that we don’t have any Markov chain in Chapter 2, hence
we drop the dependence on k.
7.2.1.1 Optimal liquidation
We here look at the models described in Sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.3.1.1.
1We do not include Chapter 5 since it’s notation is already in line with Equations (7.1) and
(7.5) and therefore it is straightforward to see that it is a special case.
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1. Section 2.2.1.1;
The controlled process Xu in (7.1) is here given by setting Xu = (Xu, S
b
u),
where γ ≡ 0, b = [−νu,−µνu]′, σ = [0, σ]′, Bu = [Wu] and Ju = 0.
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) =
sˆbν − φx2 and %(x) = (sb − αx)x.
2. Section 2.3.1.1;
The controlled processXu in (7.1) is here given by settingXu = (Xu, Yu, Su),
where γ = [−ηu, ηuSu, 0]′, b = [−νu, νuSˆu, 0]′, σ = [0, 0, σ]′, Bu = [Wu],
and Ju = [Nu]. Furthermore, the jumps here are assumed to be one-sized,
hence the compound Poisson process (Ju) is a simple Poisson process (Nu).
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) =
−φx2 and %(x) = y + (s− αx)x.
7.2.1.2 Optimal market making
We here look at the models described in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.3.2.1.
1. Section 2.2.2.1;
The controlled processXu in (7.1) is here given by settingXu = (Xu, Yu, Su),
where b ≡ 0 and σ = [0, 0, σ]′, Bu = [Wu], Ju = [N−u , N+u ]′ and
γ =

1 −1
−Su + k Su + k
0 0
.
For the impulse part, we have Φ(u,x, ζ) =  and Ψ(u,x, ζ) = [x + ζ, y −
ζ(s+ kζ), 0]′.
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) =
−φx2 and %(x) = y + (sb − αx)x.
2. Section 2.3.2.1;
The controlled processXu in (7.1) is here given by settingXu = (Xu, Yu, Su),
where b ≡ 0 and σ = [0, 0, σ]′, Bu = [Wu], Ju = [N−u , N+u ]′ and
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γ =

1 −1
−Su + k Su + k
0 0
.
For the impulse part, we have Φ(u,x, ζ) = m1{if market} + `1{if limit}
and Ψ(u,x, ζ) = [x + ζ, y − ζ(s + kζ), 0]′1{if market} + [x + ζz, y − ζ(s −
kζ)z, 0]′1{if limit}.
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) =
−φx2 and %(x) = y + (sb − αx)x.
7.2.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 we discuss two general models for optimal liquidation. The first
one—Section 3.2—treats optimal liquidation when only the ‘lit’ pool is available
to the agent. The second one—Section 3.3—treats optimal liquidation when both
‘lit’ and dark pools are available to the agent. We here show that both models
are special cases of the general model described in Section 7.1. We note that we
don’t have any Markov chain in Chapter 3, hence we drop the dependence on k.
Section 3.2;
The controlled process Xu in (7.1) is here given by setting Xu = (Xu, S
b
u, Yu),
where b = [−νu, µb(u, Sbu, νu)−
∑2
i=1 λ
b,iuE[zb,i], µy(u, Sbu, νu)]′, Bu = 0,
γ =

0 0
hb1(u, S
b
u) h
b
2(u, S
b
u)
0 0
.
σ ≡ 0, and Ju = [Jb,1u , Jb,2u ]′.
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) = f(u,x, ν)
and %(x) = g(x).
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Section 3.3;
The controlled processXu in (7.1) is here given by settingXu = (Xu, S
b
u,∆u, Yu),
where Bu = 0, σ ≡ 0, Ju = [Jb,1u , Jb,2u , J∆,1u , J∆,2u , Jyu ], and
b =
[
− νu, µb(u, Sbu, νu)−
2∑
i=1
λb,iuE[zb,i],
µ∆(u,∆u, νu)−
2∑
i=1
λb,iuE[zb,i]−
2∑
i=1
λ∆,iuE[z∆,i], µy(u, Sbu, νu)
]′
γ=

0 0 0 0 −ηu
hb1(u, S
b
u) h
b
2(u, S
b
u) 0 0 0
hb,∆1 (u, S
b
u,∆u) h
b,∆
2 (u, S
b
u,∆u) h
∆
1 (u,∆u) h
∆
2 (u,∆u) 0
0 0 0 0 hy(u, Sbu,∆u, ηu)
.
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) = f1(u,x, ν)
and %(x) = g1(x).
7.2.3 Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we outline one general model in Section 4.2. We here show that
such a model is a special case of the general model described in Section 7.1.
The controlled process Xu in (7.1) is here given by setting Xu = (Xu, Yu, Su),
where b ≡ 0, Bu = 0, σ ≡ 0, Ju = [J−u , J+u ,Mu], where Mu is a Poisson process,
and
γ =

1{Xu−≤X¯} −1{Xu−≥−X¯} 0
−f(u, Su, δ−u , q−u )1{Xu−≤X¯} f(u, Su, δ
+
u , q
+
u )1{Xu−≥−X¯} 0
0 0 k¯±u
.
For the impulse part, we have Φ(u,x, ζ) = m1{if market} + `1{if limit} and
Ψ(u,x,k, ζ) =[∆(ζ, x), c(ζ, y, s, k), 0]′1{if market}
+ [Γ(η, x, ζ), χ(η, y, z, s, k, κ), 0]′1{if limit}.
Chapter 7. Proofs and numerical procedures 158
The value function in Equation (7.5) is here given by setting ϑ(u,x,ν) = g(u,x)
and %(x,k) = U(x,k).
7.3 Proofs for Chapter 3
In this section we show that the value function of the optimal control problem
presented in Chapter 3 is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the HJB
PIDE given by Equation (3.22).
7.3.1 Dark pool optimal control problem
We adapt the definitions given in the previous section to the particular problem
at hand.
Definition 7.6. A continuous function V : [0, T )×O → R is a viscosity subso-
lution (resp. supersolution) of the HJB Equation (3.22) if
rφ (t¯, x¯)− ∂φ
∂t
(t¯, x¯)−H1 (t¯, x¯, Dxφ)−Bb,∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−B∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−By(t¯, x¯, φ) ≤ 0
(resp. ≥ 0) for each φ ∈ C1,1([0, T )×O)∩PB such that V (t,x)−φ(t,x) attains
its maximum (resp. minimum) at (t¯, x¯) ⊂ [0, T )×O. A continuous function is a
viscosity solution if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
We here assume that all the real-valued functions defined in this paper satisfy the
Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth conditions, uniformly in the control
variables. We assume that the real value functions ψ(t,y,v) defined by
ψ(t,y,v) ∈
{
µb(·), hb1,2(·), µ∆(·), h∆1,2(·), hb,∆1,2 (·), µy(·), hy(·), f(·), g(·),
f1(·), g1(·)
}
,
such that
|ψ(t1,y1,v)− ψ(t2,y2,v)| ≤ C(|t1 − t2|+ ||y1 − y2||)
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and
|ψ(t1,y1,v)| ≤ C(1 + |t1|+ ||y1||),
where y1,2 is the vector of state variables and v is the vector of controls associated
to every function (the latter may also be empty). Standard results—see, e.g.,
Ikeda and Watanabe [53]—ensure that there exists a strong and path-wise unique
solution of the price, the spread and the wealth models defined by Equations
(3.2), (3.15) and (3.17).
7.3.2 Moments estimates
We now provide some moments estimates of Sbu. We note that both the following
proposition and its proof, are analogous for ∆u, Xu and Yu. In the remainder of
the paper, we write Xt,x(u) for the state variables at time u with initial values
(t,x) since we need the initial conditions explicitly.
Proposition 7.7. Fix p = 1, 2 and let Sb
t, sb
(u) be the random variable at a fixed
time u ∈ [t, T ] with initial values (t, sb) ∈ [0, T ]× R+. Then, for any v ∈ V and
for any stopping time τ0 ≤ h ∈ [0, T ] there exists a constant K = K(p, C, T ) > 0
such that
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0) ∣∣p] ≤ K (1 + ∣∣ sb ∣∣p) ,
E
[ ∣∣Sb
t, sb1
(τ0)− Sbt, sb2(τ0)
∣∣p] ≤ K ( ∣∣ sb1 − sb2 ∣∣p) ,
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0)− sb ∣∣p] ≤ K (1 + ∣∣ sb ∣∣p) (h− t) p2 ,
E
[
sup
0≤u≤h
∣∣Sbt, sb(u)− sb ∣∣p
]
≤ K
(
1 +
∣∣ sb ∣∣p) (h− t) p2 .
(7.11)
Proof. We adapt the proof in Pham [75] to the present work and indeed we shall
consider the proof only for p = 2 as it suffices to ensure the relation for p = 1,
according to Ho¨lder’s inequality. In order to reduce notation, here K is a generic
positive constant which may take different values in different places. Define Th
as the set of all stopping times smaller than h ∈ [0, T ]. By the optional sampling
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theorem and the Le´vy-Itoˆ isometry, we have
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0) ∣∣2] ≤KE
[ ∣∣ sb ∣∣2+∫ τ0
t
∣∣∣µb(u, Sbt, sb(u), νu)∣∣∣2 du
+
2∑
i=1
λb,iE
[∣∣zb,i1 ∣∣2] ∫ τ0
t
∣∣∣hbi(u, Sbt, sb(u))∣∣∣2 du
]
,
for τ0 ∈ Th. By the linear growth conditions on µb, hb1, hb2, we have
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0) ∣∣2] ≤ K [1 + ∣∣ sb∣∣ 2 + E∫ τ0
t
∣∣Sbt, sb(u) ∣∣2du] . (7.12)
As noted in Pham (1998), if τ0 were a deterministic time, (7.12) would yield
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0) ∣∣2] ≤ K [1 + ∣∣ sb ∣∣2] .
By definition of Th, we note that
E
[∫ τ0
t
∣∣Sbt, sb(u) ∣∣2du] ≤ E [∫ h
t
∣∣Sbt, sb(u) ∣∣2du] .
Thus, by applying Fubini’s theorem to exchange the order of integration and by
Gronwall’s lemma,
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0) ∣∣2] ≤ K [1 + ∣∣ sb ∣∣2 +∫ h
t
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(u) ∣∣2] du] ≤ K [1 + ∣∣ sb ∣∣2] ,
(7.13)
for a suitable constant K = K(p, C,M, T ). Define the process Zu by Zu =
Sb
t, sb1
(u)− Sb
t, sb2
(u). Then by an application of Itoˆ’s formula to |Zu|2, we have
E
[
|Zτ0 |2
]
= E
[∣∣∣sb1 − sb2∣∣∣2+∫ τ0
t
2Zu
(
µb
(
u, Sb
t, sb1
(u), νu
)− µb(u, Sb
t, sb2
(u), νu
))
du
+
2∑
i=1
λb,iE
[∣∣zb,i1 ∣∣2] ∫ τ0
t
∣∣∣hbi(u, Sbt, sb1(u))−hbi(u, Sbt, sb2(u))∣∣∣2du
]
.
From the Lipschitz condition on µb, hb1 and h
b
2, it follows that
E
[ ∣∣Zτ0 ∣∣2]≤KE[ ∣∣ sb1 − sb2 ∣∣2+∫ τ0
t
∣∣Sb
t, sb1
(u)− Sb
t, sb2
(u)
∣∣2du].
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By making use of Fubini’s Theorem and Gronwall’s lemma we get
E
[ ∣∣Sb
t, sb1
(τ0)− Sbt, sb2(τ0)
∣∣2] ≤KE[ ∣∣ sb1 − sb2 ∣∣2+∫ h
t
∣∣Zu∣∣2du]≤ K ∣∣ sb1 − sb2 ∣∣2,
for a suitable constant K = K(p, C, T ). For the third moment estimate, we make
use of the first moment estimate in (7.11) to obtain
E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(τ0)− sb ∣∣2] ≤ K [∫ τ0
t
(
1 + E
[ ∣∣Sbt, sb(u) ∣∣2]) du] ≤ K (1 + ∣∣ sb ∣∣2) (h−t).
The fourth moment estimate in (7.11) follows from the third moment estimate,
Doob’s maximal inequality, and the fact that the constant K does not depend
on the control process. 
7.3.3 Viscosity solution
In what follows, we note that it suffices to show the viscosity property for the
model presented in Section 3.3, since the model discussed in Section 3.2 is a
special case.
Proposition 7.8. The value function V : [0, T ] × O → R defined in (3.18) is
continuous on [0, T ]×O. Furthermore, for K > 0 and ∀ x ∈ O, it satisfies
V (t,x) ≤ K (1 + ‖x‖1) . (7.14)
Proof. We proceed in two steps. We first show that the value function is Lipschitz
continuous in x, uniformly in t. Next we show that it is continuous in t. We
take x,y ∈ O and since | sup(A)− sup(B)| ≤ sup |(A−B)|, we have that
|V (t,x)− V (t,y) | =∣∣∣∣∣ supν∈Z E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)f1(u,Xt,x(u), νu) du+ e−r(τ−t)g1(Xt,x(τ))
]
− sup
ν∈Z
E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)f1(u,Xt,y(u), νu) du+ e−r(τ−t)g1(Xt,y(τ))
] ∣∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
ν∈Z
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)
(
f1(u,Xt,x(u), νu) du− f1(u,Xt,y(u), νu)
)
du
+ e−r(τ−t)
(
g1(Xt,x(τ))− g1(Xt,y(τ))
)]∣∣∣∣∣.
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The Lipschitz continuity of f1 and g1 give
|V (t,x)− V (t,y) |
≤ sup
ν∈Z
E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)K||Xt,x(u)−Xt,y(u)||1du
+ e−r(τ−t)K||Xt,x(τ)−Xt,y(τ)||1
]
≤ K||x− y||1,
where the last inequality is justified by the moments estimates in Proposition
7.7. We note that an analogous calculation will produce Equation (7.14). We
now take 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < T and we apply the DPP to obtain
|V (t1,x)− V (t2,x) | =
∣∣∣∣∣ supν∈Z E
[∫ t2∧τ
t1
e−r(u−t1)f1(u,Xt1,x(u), νu) du
+ e−r(t2−t1)V (t2,Xt1,x(t2))1{τ≥t2} + e
−r(τ−t1)g1(Xt1,x(τ))1{τ<t2}
]
− V (t2,x)
∣∣∣∣∣.
We can add and subtract the quantity
1{τ<t2}e
−r(τ−t1)(g1(x) + V (t2,x)) + 1{τ≥t2}e
−r(t2−t1)V (t2,x),
to obtain
|V (t1,x)− V (t2,x) | ≤ sup
ν∈Z
E
[∫ t2∧τ
t1
e−r(u−t1)|f1(u,Xt1,x(u), νu) |du
+1{τ≥t2}e
−r(t2−t1)|V (t2,Xt1,x(t2))− V (t2,x)|
+1{τ<t2}e
−r(τ−t1)|g1(Xt1,x(τ))− g1(x)|
+1{τ<t2}e
−r(τ−t1)|g1(x)− V (t2,x)|
+1{τ<t2}|(e−r(τ−t1) − 1)V (t2,x) |
+1{τ≥t2}|(e−r(t2−t1) − 1)V (t2,x) |
]
≤ K|t2 − t1|(1 + ||x||1),
where the last inequality is justified by: (i) the linear growth of f1, g1 and V ,
the Lipschitz continuity of g1 and of V in x uniformly in t, and the moment
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estimates in Proposition 7.7. Thus, we can conclude that
|V (t1,x)− V (t2,y) | ≤ K(|t2 − t1|(1 + ||x||1) + ||x− y||1). 
Proposition 7.9. The value function V defined by Equation (3.18) is a viscosity
solution of the HJB PIDE (3.22).
Proof. We show that V (t,x) is a continuous viscosity solution of (3.22) by proving
that it is both a supersolution and a subsolution. We proceed along the same
lines of Øksendal and Sulem [70] and we first show the supersolution property.
We define a test function φ : [0, T )×O → R such that φ ∈ C1,1([0, T )×O)∩PB
and, without loss of generality, we assume that V − φ reaches its minimum at
(t¯, x¯), such that
V (t¯, x¯)− φ (t¯, x¯) = 0. (7.15)
We let τ1 be a stopping time defined by τ1 = inf {u > t¯ |X t¯, x¯(u) /∈ B(x¯)},
where B(x¯) is the ball of radius  centred in x¯. Then we define the stopping
time τ∗ = τ1 ∧ (t¯ + h) for 0 < h < T − t¯ and note that γ¯ := E t¯, x¯[τ∗ − t¯] > 0.
From the first part of DPP and the definition of φ, it follows that, ∀ ν ∈ Z,
V (t¯, x¯) ≥ E
[∫ τ∗
t¯
e−r(u−t¯)f1
(
u,Xνt¯, x¯(u), νu
)
du+ e−r(τ
∗−t¯)φ
(
τ∗,Xνt¯, x¯(τ
∗)
)]
.
By applying Dynkin’s formula to e−r(τ∗−t¯)φ
(
τ∗,Xνt¯, x¯(τ
∗)
)
at (t¯, x¯), we get
E
[∫ τ∗
t¯
(
e−r(u−t¯)f1
(
u,Xνt¯, x¯(u), νu
)− e−r(u−t¯){rφ(u,Xνt¯, x¯(u))
− ∂φ
∂t
(
u,Xνt¯, x¯(u)
)− H¯1(u,Xνt¯, x¯(u), Dxφ, νu)− Bb,∆(u,Xνt¯, x¯(u), φ)
− B∆
(
u,Xνt¯, x¯(u), φ
)− B¯y(u,Xνt¯, x¯(u), φ, ηu)
})
du
]
≤ 0,
where H¯1 and B¯y are defined respectively by
H¯1
(
t,x,p, v
)
= −vp1 + µb
(
t, sb, v
)
p2 + µ
∆
(
t,∆, v
)
p3 + µ
y
(
t, sb,∆, v
)
p4, and
B¯y(t,x, ϕ, n) = λyE(zy)
[
ϕ
(
t, x− nzy, sb,∆, y + hy(t, sb,∆, n)zy)− ϕ(t,x)].
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We divide both sides by −γ¯ and let h→ 0, resulting in
rφ (t¯, x¯)− ∂φ
∂t
(t¯, x¯)− H¯1 (t¯, x¯, Dxφ, v)− f1(t¯, x¯, v)− Bb,∆(t¯, x¯, φ)
−B∆(t¯, x¯, φ)− B¯y(t¯, x¯, φ, η) ≥ 0.
Due to the arbitrariness of v, we can rewrite the above as
rφ (t¯, x¯)− ∂φ
∂t
(t¯, x¯)−H1 (t¯, x¯, Dxφ)−Bb,∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−B∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−By(t¯, x¯, φ) ≥ 0,
which proves the supersolution inequality. We now prove the subsolution in-
equality. We let φ be a smooth and polynomially-bounded test function such
that V − φ has its maximum at (t¯, x¯). Without loss of generality, we assume
V (t¯, x¯)− φ(t¯, x¯) = 0. We shall show that
rφ (t¯, x¯)− ∂φ
∂t
(t¯, x¯)−H1 (t¯, x¯, Dxφ)−Bb,∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−B∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−By(t¯, x¯, φ) ≤ 0.
Let us assume by contradiction that
e−rT
(
rφ (t¯, x¯)−∂φ
∂t
(t¯, x¯)−H1 (t¯, x¯, Dxφ)−Bb,∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−B∆(t¯, x¯, φ)−By(t¯, x¯, φ)
)
> δ,
(7.16)
for δ > 0 and X t¯, x¯(u) ∈ B(t¯, x¯). We define τ1 = inf
{
u > t¯ |(u, X t¯, x¯(u)) /∈
B(t¯, x¯)
}
and we define the stopping time τ∗ = τ1 ∧ (t¯+ h). By the DPP, there
exists a control ν∗ ∈ Z such that, for all δ > 0, we have
V
(
t¯, x¯
) ≤ E[∫ τ∗
t¯
e−r(u−t¯)f1
(
u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯(u), ν
∗
u
)
du+ e−r(τ
∗−t¯)φ
(
τ∗,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯(τ
∗)
)]
+
δγ¯
2
.
We divide both sides by −γ¯ and get
1
γ¯
E
[∫ τ∗
t¯
−
(
e−r(u−t¯)f1
(
u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯(u), ν
∗
u
)− e−r(u−t¯){rφ(u,Xν∗t¯, x¯(u))
− ∂φ
∂t
(
u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯(u)
)
− H¯1
(
u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯(u), Dxφ, ν
∗
u
)− Bb,∆(u,Xν∗t¯, x¯(u), φ)
− B∆
(
u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯(u), φ
)− B¯y(u,Xν∗t¯, x¯(u), φ, η∗u)
})
du
]
≤ δ
2
.
(7.17)
By substituting Equation (7.16) in Equation (7.17) we obtain the desired con-
tradiction (i.e. δ/2 < 0). 
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Proposition 7.10. Let U (resp. V ) be a viscosity subsolution (resp. super-
solution) of (3.22). If U(T,x) ≤ V (T,x) on O, then U ≤ V on [0, T ] × O.
Proof. Let U be a subsolution and V be a supersolution. Since U , V ∈ PB, then
there exists a p > 1 such that
|U(t,x)|+ |V (t,x)|
(1 + ‖x‖pp) <∞, (7.18)
where the operator ‖·‖pp is the Lp-norm raised to the p-th power. Let V˜ (t,x) :=
V (t,x) + κ(t,x), where  > 0 and κ(t,x) = e−ζt
(
1 + ‖x‖2p2p
)
, for ζ > 0. Then
V˜  is a supersolution of (3.22). Indeed, let φ(t,x) be the test function for V˜ ,
then the test function for V is φ(t,x)− κ(t,x). First note that we have
rκ (t,x)− ∂κ
∂t
(t,x)− sup
v∈Z
H¯1 (t,x, Dxκ,v)− Bb,∆(t,x, κ)
−B∆(t,x, κ)− By(t,x, κ) ≥ 0,
for ζ sufficiently large. By the supersolution property of V , we have
r(φ− κ) (t,x)− ∂(φ− κ)
∂t
(t,x)−H1 (t,x, Dx (φ− κ))− Bb,∆(t,x, φ− κ)
− B∆(t,x, φ− κ)− By(t,x, φ− κ) ≥ 0,
and recalling that sup(A+B) ≤ supA+ supB, we have
rφ (t,x)− ∂φ
∂t
(t,x)−H1 (t,x, Dxφ)− Bb,∆(t,x, φ)− B∆(t,x, φ)− By(t,x, φ) ≥
rκ (t,x)− ∂κ
∂t
(t,x)− sup
v∈Z
H¯1 (t,x, Dxκ,v)− Bb,∆(t,x, κ)
−B∆(t,x, κ)− By(t,x, κ) ≥ 0.
Since by (7.18) limx→±∞ sup[0,T ](U − V˜ )(t,x) = −∞, we can assume w.l.o.g.
that
M := max
[0,T ]×O
(U (t,x)− V (t,x)) ,
is attained at (t¯, x¯) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ, where Σ ⊂ O is a compact set. In order to
prove Proposition 7.10, it suffices to show thatM < 0. Suppose by contradiction
that there exists a (t¯, x¯) ∈ [0, T ) × Σ such that M > 0. For  > 0, we define
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the function Ψ by Ψ (t1, t2,x1,x2) = U (t1,x1)− V (t2,x2)−ψ (t1, t2,x1,x2),
where
ψ (t1, t2,x1,x2) :=
1
2
(|t1 − t2|2 + ‖x1 − x2‖22) .
The function Ψ is continuous and admits a maximum point M, where M ≤
M, at m = (t1, t2,x1,x2). That is, the function U(t1,x1)−ψ(t1, t2,x1,x2) has
a local maximum at m and V (t2,x1)− (−ψ(t1, t2,x1,x2)) has a local minimum
at m. Also, formally lim→0
(
t1, t

2,x

1,x

2
)
converges, up to a subsequence, to
(t¯, t¯, x¯, x¯) (see Crandall et al. [29] for details). We let o = (t1− t2)/, and define
the vector p by
p = (p1, p

2, p

3, p

4) =
(
1

(
x1 − x2
)
,
1

(
sb,1 − sb,2
)
,
1

(
∆1 −∆2
)
,
1

(
y1 − y2
))
.
We can apply the viscosity subsolution and supersolution properties at the point
m to obtain, with a slight abuse of notation2, the following inequalities:
rU (t1,x

1)− o −H1 (t1,x1,p)− Bb,∆ (t1,x1, U, p2, p3)− B∆ (t1,x1, U, p3)
−By
(
t1,x

1, U
) ≤ 0,
rV (t2,x

2)− o −H1 (t2,x2,p)− Bb,∆ (t2,x2, V, p2, p3)− B∆ (t2,x2, V, p3)
−By
(
t2,x

2, V
) ≥ 0,
where, for φ ∈ PB , we have
Bb,∆ (t,x, φ, p, q) =
2∑
i=1
λb,iE(z
b,i)
[
φ
(
t, x, sb + hbi
(
t, sb
)
zb,i,∆ + hb,∆i
(
t, sb,∆
)
zb,i, y
)− φ(t,x)
− hbi
(
t, sb
)
zb,ip− hb,∆i
(
t, sb,∆
)
zb,iq
]
,
B∆ (t,x, φ, q) =
2∑
i=1
λ∆,iE(z
∆,i)
[
φ
(
t, x, sb,∆ + h∆i
(
t,∆
)
z∆,i, y
)
−φ(t,x)− h∆i (t,∆)z∆,iq].
2The equivalence of the two different definitions of viscosity solution has been discussed
extensively in, e.g., Pham [74] and Seydel [77].
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We can subtract the two inequalities and take the limit for  → 0 to get
r [U (t¯, x¯)− V (t¯, x¯)] ≤ 0, which concludes the proof. 
7.4 Proofs for Chapter 4
7.4.1 Assumption
We state all the standing assumptions which are introduced in the modelling
setup presented in Chapter 4.
1. The real-valued functions f , U and g satisfy Lipschitz continuity and the
linear growth conditions.
2. Γ : N×[−X¯−qN , X¯+qN]×[0, 1]→ R and χ : N×R×[0, 1]×R×K×K` → R
are Lipschitz continuous functions satisfying
|x|2 − E(z)[|Γ(η, x, z)|2] > 1, |y|2 − E(z)[|χ(η, y, z, s, k, κ)|2] > 1,
for all η ∈ N , z ∈ [0, 1] and x, y, s ∈ O.
3. Λ : X × [− X¯ − qN , X¯ + qN]→ R and c : X × R2 ×K→ R are Lipschitz
continuous functions satisfying, for M > 0, the following properties:
|x|2 − |Λ(ξ, x)|2 > 1, |y|2 − |c(ξ, y, s, k)|2 > 1,
for all ξ ∈ X and x, y, s ∈ O.
7.4.2 Viscosity solution
Definition 7.1. A system of functions V : [0, T ) × O × K → R is a viscosity
subsolution, (resp. supersolution), of (4.11) if
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min
{
− g(t¯, x¯)−A(t¯, x¯, kˆ, ∂tφ, φ); (V ∗−MV ∗)(t¯, x¯; kˆ); (V ∗−LV ∗)(t¯, x¯; kˆ)}≤0,
(7.19)
(
resp.
min
{
− g(t¯, x¯)−A(t¯, x¯, kˆ, ∂tφ, φ); (V∗−MV∗)(t¯, x¯; kˆ); (V∗−LV∗)(t¯, x¯; kˆ)}≥ 0),
(7.20)
where φ ∈ C1,0,0([0, T ) × O × K) is such that V ∗(t,x; k) − φ(t,x; k) (resp.
V∗(t,x; k) − φ(t,x; k)) attains its maximum (resp. minimum) at (t¯, x¯, kˆ) ⊂
[t, T )×O ×K.
Proposition 7.11. (Existence) The system of functions V (t,x; k) is a viscosity
solution of the QVI (4.11).
Proof. We use definition 7.1 and we show that the system of functions V (t,x; k)
is a viscosity solution by proving that it is both a supersolution and a subsolution.
First we note that we have V (T,x; k) = U(x; k) on {T} × O ×K, thus we need
to prove the viscosity property only on [t, T )×O×K. Results in, e.g., Ly Vath
et al. [63] ensure that MV∗ ≤ (MV )∗ and LV∗ ≤ (LV )∗. By definition of the
value function, we have V ≥ MV and V ≥ LV for all (u,x) ∈ [t, T ) × O. It
follows that V∗ ≥ (MV )∗ ≥MV∗ and V∗ ≥ (LV )∗ ≥ LV∗. That is, to prove the
supersolution property, it suffices to show that
−g(t¯, x¯)−A(t¯, x¯, kˆ, ∂tφ, φ) ≥ 0. (7.21)
Let (V∗ − φ)(t¯, x¯; kˆ) = 0, where (t¯, x¯, kˆ) = arg min(V∗ − φ)(t,x; k). By defini-
tion of V∗, there exists a sequence (tm,xm) → (t¯, x¯) such that V∗(tm,xm; kˆ) →
V∗(t¯, x¯; kˆ) as m→∞. We define the stopping time
θm = inf {u > tm |Xtm xm(u) /∈ B(tm,xm)} , (7.22)
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where B(tm,xm) is the open ball of radius  centred in (tm,xm). We choose
a strictly positive sequence hm → 0 as m → ∞ and let the stopping time
θ∗m := θm ∧ (tm + hm) ∧ θ∗ ∧ τi, where θ∗ is the first time the regime switches
from its initial value k¯ and where τi is the first time an impulse takes place. By
the DPP and the definition of the function φ, we have for any admissible control
strategy
V (tm,xm; kˆ) ≥ E
[∫ θ∗m
tm
g
(
u,Xtm, xm(u)
)
du+ φ
(
θ∗m,Xtm,xm
(
θ∗m
)
; kθ∗m
)]
. (7.23)
An application of Itoˆ’s formula to φ between tm and θ
∗
m yields
(V∗ − φ)
(
tm,xm; kˆ
) ≥
E
[∫ θ∗m
tm
[
g
(
u,Xtm, xm(u)
)
+ A¯(u,Xtm,xm(u), kˆ, ∂tφ, φ, δ+u , δ−u )]du
]
,
(7.24)
We can divide by −hm, then let m→∞ and apply the the mean value theorem.
Finally, the result follows from the arbitrariness of the control variable.
First note that if V ∗ = MV ∗ or V ∗ = LV ∗, the subsolution property is im-
mediately satisfied. We assume therefore that V ∗ > MV ∗ and V ∗ > LV ∗; we
then need to show that
−g(t¯, x¯)−A(t¯, x¯, kˆ, ∂tφ, φ) ≤ 0. (7.25)
By continuity of the mapping in (7.25), we assume on the contrary that there
exists a 1 > 0 and an 2 > 0 such that −g(t¯, x¯)− A
(
t¯, x¯, kˆ, ∂tφ, φ
) ≥ 1, for all
X t¯, x¯(u) ∈ B2(t¯, x¯). We take the sequences hm → 0 and (tm,xm) → (t¯, x¯), as
m→∞, valued in B2(t¯, x¯) and we define the stopping times θm by (7.22) with
 < 2 and θ
∗
m := θm ∧ (tm + hm) ∧ θ∗ ∧ τi. By Itoˆ’s formula and the DPP, there
exists an admissible control strategy (δ+,∗u , δ−,∗u ) for which
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γm − 1hm
2
≤
E
[∫ θ∗m
tm
[
g
(
u,Xtm, xm(u)
)
+ A¯(u,Xtm,xm(u), kˆ, ∂tφ, φ, δ+,∗u , δ−,∗u )]du
]
,
(7.26)
where γm = (V
∗ − φ)(tm,xm; kˆ). Dividing by −hm, we find that
0 ≥ γm
hm
− 1
2
+
1
hm
E[θ∗m − tm]. (7.27)
Since E[θ∗m−tm]/hm → 1 as m→∞, we get 1/2 ≤ 0, which contradicts 1 > 0.
Proposition 7.2. (Strong Comparison Principle) Let v and u be a supersolution
and a subsolution respectively of the QVI (4.11). Then u∗ ≤ v∗ on [0, T ]×O×K.
We write v and u in place of v∗ and u∗ for simplicity. We first prove that there
exists a ζ-strict supersolution. We refer to, e.g., Seydel [77] for technical details.
We consider the function vζ(t,x; k) = v(t,x; k) + ζeβ(T−t)
(
1 + ||x||2p2p
)
, where
β > 0 and p > 1 are to be determined later. Then we have:
vζ(t,x; k)−Mvζ(t,x; k) ≥
v(t,x; k) + ζeβ(T−t)(|x|2p + |y|2p)−Mv(t,x; k)
− sup
ξ∈X
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|Λ(ξ, x)|2p)]− sup
ξ∈X
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|c(ξ, y, s, k)|2p)]+ m ≥
ζeβ(T−t)
[
|x|2p − sup
ξ∈X
(|Λ(ξ, x)|2p)]
+ζeβ(T−t)
[
|y|2p − sup
ξ∈X
(|c(ξ, y, s, k)|2p)]+ m > ζ,
(7.28)
where the second-to-last inequality follows from the supersolution property of
the function v, while the last inequality follows from assumption (3) and the fact
that |a| > |b| ⇒ |a|p > |b|p ∀ p > 1. Analogously, we have:
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vζ(t,x; k)− Lvζ(t,x; k) ≥ ζeβ(T−t)
[
|x|2p − sup
η∈N , κ∈K`
E(z)
[ (|Γ(η, x, z)|2p) ]]
+ ζeβ(T−t)
[
|y|2p − sup
η∈N , κ∈K`
E(z)
[ (|χ(η, y, z, s, k, κ)|2p) ]]+ `
> ζ.
Finally we take into consideration the PIDE part. We let φζ be the test function
for vζ . Then φ := φζ−ζeβ(T−t)(1+||x||2p2p) is the test function for v. We therefore
have:
−g(t, x)−A(t,x, k, ∂tφζ , vζ)
≥
−g(t, x)−A (t,x, k, ∂tφ, v) + βζeβ(T−t)
(
1 + ||x||2p2p
)
−λm E(k¯±)
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|s+ k¯±|2p − |s|2p) ]
− sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|x− q+|2p + |y + f(t, s, δ+, q+)q+|2p − |x|2p − |y|2p)
1{x≥−X¯}
]
− sup
δ−∈[0,δ¯]
λ−δ E
(q−)
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|x+ q−|2p + |y − f(t, s, δ−, q−)q−|2p − |x|2p − |y|2p)
1{x≤X¯}
]
≥
+βζeβ(T−t)
(
1 + ||x||2p2p
)− λm E(k¯±)[ζeβ(T−t) (|s+ k¯±|2p − |s|2p) ]
− sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|x− q+|2p + |y + f(t, s, δ+, q+)q+|2p − |x|2p − |y|2p)
1{x≥−X¯}
]
− sup
δ−∈[0,δ¯]
λ−δ E
(q−)
[
ζeβ(T−t)
(|x+ q−|2p + |y − f(t, s, δ−, q−)q−|2p − |x|2p − |y|2p)
1{x≤X¯}
]
≥ ζ,
for β sufficiently large. Now we set
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vm =
(
1− 1
m
)
v +
1
m
vζ , um =
(
1 +
1
m
)
u− 1
m
vζ . (7.29)
Using Definition 7.1, one can prove that
min
{
− g(t, x)−A (t,x, k, ∂tφm, φm) ; (vm−Mvm) (t,x; k) ; (vm−Lvm) (t,x; k)
}
≥ ζ
m
.
(7.30)
where φm := φ+ 1mζe
β(T−t)(1 + ||x||2p2p) is the test function for vm and φ is the
test function for v and
min
{
− g(t, x)−A (t,x, k, ∂tϕm, ϕm) ; (um−Mum) (t,x; k) ; (um−Lum) (t,x; k)
}
≤ − ζ
m
,
(7.31)
where ϕm :=
m+1
m ϕ − 1mφ − 1mζeβ(T−t)
(
1 + ||x||2p2p
)
is the test function for um
and ϕ is the test function for u. We further note that u and v are polynomially
bounded (see e.g. Crisafi & Macrina [20], Proposition 6.3, for details). Thus, we
have for each k ∈ K
lim
x→±∞ (um − vm) (t,x; k) = limx→±∞
(
1 +
1
m
)
(u− v) (t,x; k)
− 2
m
ζeβ(T−t)
(
1 + ||x||2p2p
)
=−∞,
(7.32)
where we set p larger than the degree of the bounding polynomial of u and
v. Thus the supremum is attained in a bounded set. Since um − vm is upper
semicontinuous, it attains a maximum over a compact set. Next we show that,
for all m large, we have
M := max
t,x,k
(um(t,x; k)− vm(t,x; k)) ≤ 0, (7.33)
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where (t¯, x¯, kˆ) = arg max(um(t,x; k)−vm(t,x; k)). We define the auxiliary func-
tion Ψ by
Ψ (t1, t2,x1,x2; k) := um (t1,x1; k)−vm (t2,x2; k)− 1
2
(|t1 − t2|2 + ‖x1 − x2‖22) ,
(7.34)
For each k ∈ K, Ψ is upper semicontinuous and therefore it admits a maximum
M ,k at
(
tk,1 , t
k,
2 ,x
k,
1 ,x
k,
2
)
. Let M  be defined by M  = maxk∈KM ,k, attained
at the point (t1, t

2,x

1,x

2, k
) → (t¯, t¯, x¯, x¯, kˆ) as  → 0. Furthermore, we have
that M  ≥ M and M  → M as  → 0. We now wish to prove that M ≤ 0. Let
us assume on the contrary that M  > 0. We go through the various cases. Let
(um −Mum)
(
t1,x

1; k

) ≤ 0. (7.35)
By the supersolution property of vm and by subtracting the two inequalities, we
have
(um −Mum)
(
t1,x

1; k

)− (vm −Mvm)(t2,x2; k)+ ζm ≤ 0. (7.36)
We can now develop a contradiction argument since
M = lim
→0
um
(
t1,x

1; k

)− vm(t2,x2; k)
≤ lim
→0
Mum
(
t1,x

1; k

)−Mvm(t2,x2; k)− ζm ≤M − ζm.
(7.37)
The second case arises when (um − Lum)
(
t1,x

1; k

) ≤ 0. We follow the same
procedure to show that
M = lim
→0
um
(
t1,x

1; k

)− vm(t2,x2; k)
≤ lim
→0
Lum
(
t1,x

1; k

)− Lvm(t2,x2; k)− ζm ≤M − ζm.
(7.38)
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Next we consider the PIDE part. We subtract the argument of the subsolution
from the argument of the supersolution and obtain
g
(
t1, x

1
)
+A(t1,x1, k, 1 (t1 − t2), um)− g(t2, x2)
−A(t2,x2, k, 1 (t1 − t2), vm) ≥ ζm.
Since we assumed M  > 0, we can choose a % > 0 and we have
0 < %M  = %
(
um(t

1,x

1; k
)− vm(t2,x2; k)−
1
2
(|t1 − t2|2 + ‖x1 − x2‖22) )
≤ g(t1, x1)+A(t1,x1, k, 1 (t1 − t2), um)− g(t2, x2)
−A(t2,x2, k, 1 (t1 − t2), vm).
We can now analyse every component in detail. First we note that, due to
Assumption (4),
g
(
t1, x

1
)− g(t2, x2) ≤ ∣∣g(t1, x1)− g(t2, x2)∣∣ ≤ C (∣∣t1 − t2∣∣+ ∣∣x1 − x2∣∣)→ 0
(7.39)
as → 0. For the remaining parts, let us rewrite
Bks
(
t,x, ψ
)
:= E(k¯
±)
[ (
ψ
(
t, x, y, s+ k¯±; k
)− ψ (t,x; k)) ],
Bk+
(
t,x, ψ
)
:= sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[ (
ψ
(
t, x− q+, y + f(t, s, δ+, q+)q+, s; k)
−ψ (t,x; k) )1{x≥−X¯}],
Bk−
(
t,x, ψ
)
:= sup
δ−∈[0,δ¯]
λ−δ E
(q−)
[(
ψ
(
t, x+ q−, y − f(t, s, δ−, q−)q−, s; k)
−ψ (t,x; k) )1{x≤X¯}],
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and
Qψ(t,x; k) := ∑
k′ 6=k
rkk′
[
ψ(t,x; k′)− ψ(t,x; k)] .
We analyse Bk+
(
t1,x

1, um
)−Bk+ (t2,x2, vm) as the other integrals can be treated
analogously. After some manipulation, we find:
Bk+
(
t1,x

1, um
)− Bk+ (t2,x2, vm) ≤ sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[(
Ψ
(
t1, t

2, x

1 − q+, x2 − q+,
y1 + f
(
t1, s

1, δ
+, q+
)
q+, y2 + f
(
t2, s

2, δ
+, q+
)
q+, s1, s

2; k

)−Ψ (t1, t2,x1,x2; k)
+
1
2
(∣∣y1 + f(t1, s1, δ+, q+)q+ − y2 − f(t2, s2, δ+, q+)q+∣∣2 − ∣∣y1 − y2∣∣))1{x1≤X¯}]
+ sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[(
vm(t

2, x

2 − q+, y2 + f
(
t2, s

2, δ
+, q+
)
q+, s2; k
)
− vm(t2,x2; k)
)
1{x1≤X¯}
]
− sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[(
vm(t

2, x

2 − q+, y2 + f
(
t2, s

2, δ
+, q+
)
q+, s2; k
)
− vm(t2,x2; k)
)
1{x2≤X¯}
]
.
Since the function Ψ attains its maximum at
(
t1, t

2,x

1,x

2; k

)
, we have
Bk+
(
t1,x

1, um
)− Bk+ (t2,x2, vm)
≤ sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[
1
2
(∣∣y1 + f(t1, s1, δ+, q+)q+ − y2 − f(t2, s2, δ+, q+)q+∣∣2
− ∣∣y1 − y2∣∣2)1{x1≤X¯}
]
+ sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[(
vm(t

2, x

2 − q+, y2 + f
(
t2, s

2, δ
+, q+
)
q+, s2; k
)
− vm(t2,x2; k)
)
1{x1≤X¯}
]
− sup
δ+∈[0,δ¯]
λ+δ E
(q+)
[(
vm(t

2, x

2 − q+, y2 + f
(
t2, s

2, δ
+, q+
)
q+, s2; k
)
− vm(t2,x2; k)
)
1{x2≤X¯}
]
First we note that, when we let  → 0, we have x1, x2 → x¯. Thus the two last
terms of the previous inequality offset each other. Since the first term tends to
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zero as → 0, we have that
lim
→0
Bk+
(
t1,x

1, um
)− Bk+ (t2,x2, vm) ≤ 0. (7.40)
Finally, we have
Q
(
um
(
t1,x

1; k

)− vm(t2,x2; k)) ≤ 0 (7.41)
since the maximum is attained at k. Thus, by letting  → 0, we get %M ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction since % > 0. Therefore M ≤ 0. Furthermore, since we
have proved that u∗ ≤ v∗, the value function is continuous as it is both upper
and lower semicontinuous. 
7.5 Numerical procedures
In this section we briefly show the numerical schemes adopted to find the optimal
strategy. These are similar to the one proposed by Guilbaud and Pham [47] and
Bian et al. [11], and adapted to the particular models at hand. Such a scheme
has proved to be monotone, stable and consistent in Guilbaud and Pham [47].
We provide pseudocodes for Chapters 3 and 4, since the numerical scheme used
in Chapter 5 is a combination of both of the above.
7.5.1 Chapter 3
We create an equally-spaced grid for (i) the time axis such that ti+1 − ti =
δt, ∀ i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, (ii) the inventory where xj+1 − xj = δx ∀ j =
0, 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1, (iii) the price where sk+1 − sk = δs ∀ k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , p − 1,
(iv) the spread where ∆`+1 −∆` = δ∆ ∀ ` = 0, 1, 2, . . . , q − 1, and (v) the cash
process where yu+1 − yu = δy ∀ u = 0, 1, 2, . . . , o − 1. We write V i,j,k,`,u =
V (ti, xj , sk,∆`, yu) and define the following numerical derivatives:
V i,j,k,`,u(t) :=
V i+1,j,k,`,u − V i,j,k,`,u
δt
, V i,j,k,`,u(x) :=
V i,j+1,k,`,u − V i,j,k,`,u
δx
,
V i,j,k,`,u(s) :=
V i,j,k+1,`,u − V i,j,k,`,u
δs
, V i,j,k,`,u(∆) :=
V i,j,k,`+1,u − V i,j,k,`,u
δ∆
,
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V i,j,k,`,u(y) :=
V i,j,k,`,u+1 − V i,j,k,`,u
δy
.
The pseudocode we use to approximate the solution of Equation (3.27) is as
follows:
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for PIDE (3.27)
1: for all j, k, `, u
2: Set V n,j,k,`,u = e−r(tn−t0)(yu + xj(sk − αxj)).
3: end
4: for i=n-1,n-2,. . . ,0
5: for all j ∈ X, k ∈ S, ` ∈ D, u ∈ Y
6:
7: * Compute the optimal rate of trading (by applying first order conditions)
8:
9: v∗ =
skV
i+1,j,k,`,u
(y)
−µV i+1,j,k,`,u
(s)
−V i+1,j,k,`,u
(x)
+µV i+1,j,k,`,u
(∆)
2βV i+1,j,k,`,u
(y)
.
10: * Compute
11: V i,j,k,`,u = (1− rδt)V i+1,j,k,`,u + δt
(
− φx2j
12: +
(
κb(S¯ − sk)− µv∗
)
V i+1,j,k,`,u(s) − v∗V i+1,j,k,`,u(x)
13: +
(
κ∆(∆¯−∆`) + µv∗
)
V i+1,j,k,`,u(∆) + v
∗(sk − βv∗)V i+1,j,k,`,u(y)
14: +λy supη∈[0,xj ]
∑
ι p(z
y
ι )
[
V i+1,j−ζ1,ι,k,`,u+ζ2,ι − V i+1,j,k,`,u
]
15: +λb,1
∑
ι p(z
b,1
ι )
[
V i+1,j,k+z
b,1
ι ,`−zb,1ι ,u − V i+1,j,k,`,u
]
16: +λb,2
∑
ι p(z
b,2
ι )
[
V i+1,j,k−z
b,2
ι ,`+z
b,2
ι ,u − V i+1,j,k,`,u
]
17: +λ∆,1
∑
ι p(z
∆,1
ι )
[
V i+1,j,k,`+z
∆,1
ι ,u − V i+1,j,k,`,u
]
18: +λ∆,2
∑
ι p(z
∆,2
ι )
[
V i+1,j,k,`−z
∆,2
ι ,u − V i+1,j,k,`,u
])
,
19:
20: where ζ1,ι := arg minξ=0,1,2,...,m−j |xξ − ηzyι |,
21: and ζ2,ι := arg minξ=0,1,2,...,o−u |yξ − ηzyι (sk + ∆`/2)|.
22:
23: * Store the arg max (v∗, η∗)(ti, xj , sk,∆`, yu).
24: end
25: * Compute V i,j,k,`,u for k = 0, 1, . . . , z¯ − 1, k = p− z¯ + 1, . . . , p,
26: ` = 0, 1, . . . , z¯ − 1, ` = q − z¯ + 1, . . . , q,
27: u = 0, 1, . . . , y¯ − 1, u = o− y¯ + 1, . . . , o by interpolation.
28: end
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In the above algorithm, we discretise the distribution of {zb,1, zb,2, z∆,1, z∆,2}
such that they are all supported in a finite set, say, I = 0, 1, 2, . . . , z¯, which
denotes the number of nodes the price and the spread move with probability p(zι),
where ι ∈ I, associated with every state. We thus reduce the space grids of sb and
∆, of which indices are in the sets S := z¯, z¯+1, . . . , p−z¯ and D := z¯, z¯+1, . . . , q−z¯,
respectively. We further reduce the space grid y to be Y := y¯, y¯ + 1, . . . , o − y¯,
where y¯ := arg minξ=0,1,2,...,o |yξ−xm(sp−αxm)|. We provide the pseudocode for
the mean-reverting model—the one for the geometric Le´vy model is analogous.
Throughout Chapter 3, we set an equally-spaced time grid [0,10] with intervals of
0.01, an equally-spaced price grid [0,10] with intervals of 0.1, an equally-spaced
spread grid [0.1,1] with intervals of 0.1 and an equally-spaced inventory grid [0,
30], with intervals of 1. The random variables zb,i and z∆,i can take values in
[0, 0.9] with intervals of 0.1 and probability associated to each state of 0.1. The
random variables zy can take values in [0, 1] with intervals of 0.1 and probability
associated to each state of 111 .
7.5.2 Chapter 4
We present here the stylised numerical scheme used to solve the QVI (4.18).
The previous examples (including the ones in Chapter 2) can be derived as a
special case. We create an equally-spaced time grid 0 = t0, t1, t2, . . . , tn = T ,
where T > 0 and ti+1 − ti = ∆t, ∀ i = 0, 2, . . . , n − 1 and an equally-spaced
space grid −X = x0, x1, x2, . . . , xm = X, where X > 0 and xj+1 − xj = ∆x,
such that 1/∆x ∈ N. To simplify the notation, we write hi,jk = hk(ti, xj), where
i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, j ∈ J := 1/∆x, 1/∆x + 1, . . . ,m − 1/∆x and k ∈ K. Here
we further assume that E[k¯±] = 0. For the random variables q+, q− and zκ
we discretise the sample space and associate to each state ι a probability p(q+ι ),
p(q−ι ) and p(zκι ). In particular, throughout Chapter 4, we set an equally-spaced
time grid [0,50] with intervals of 1 and an equally-spaced inventory grid [-100,
100], with intervals of 0.1. The random variable z can take values in [0, 1] with
intervals of 0.1 and probability associated to each state of 0.1. The random
variables q± can take values in [0, 10] with intervals of 0.1 and probability of 1101 .
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Algorithm 2 Pseudocode for QVI (4.18)
1: for all k ∈ K and j=0,1,. . . ,m
2: Set hn,jk = −αx2j .
3: end
4: for i=n-1,n-2,. . . ,0
5: for all k ∈ K and j ∈ J
6: * Compute
7:
8: T hi,jk = hi+1,jk + ∆t
(
− φx2j +
∑
k′ 6=k rkk′
(
hi+1,jk′ − hi+1,jk
))
9:
10: + supδ±∈D
[∑
ι p(q
+
ι )λ
+
δ
(
δ+q+ι (1 + c)
q+ι + h
i+1,j−q+ι /∆x
k − hi+1,jk
)
11: +
∑
ι p(q
−
ι )λ
−
δ
(
δ−q−ι (1 + c)q
−
ι + h
i+1,j+q−ι /∆x
k − hi+1,jk
)]
,
12: and store the arg max (δ+,∗, δ−,∗)(ti, xj).
13: * Compute Mhi,jk = supξ=±1/∆x
[
− k + hi+1,j+ξk
]
− m,
14: and store the arg max ξ∗i (ti, xj).
15:
16: * Compute
17: Lhi,jk = supη=±1/∆x,κ∈K
[∑
ι p(z
κ
ι )
(
zκι (k + κ) + h
i+1,j+ηzκι
k
)]
− `,
18: and store the arg max (η∗i , κ
∗
i )(ti, xj).
19:
20: * Set hi,jk = max
(
T hi,jk ,Mhi,jk ,Lhi,jk
)
and store the relative policy.
21: end
22: * Compute hi,jk for j = 0, 1, . . . , 1/∆x− 1 and j = m− 1/∆x, . . . ,m
23: by interpolation.
24: end
7.6 Non-equivalence of liquidation strategies
Firstly, we need to redefine the strategies in terms of the bid and ask quotes and
we note that we have four different cases, depending on the sign of the inventories.
Eventually, we want the conditions to be independent on the specific sizes of Xe
and X£.
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1. If Xe > 0 and X£ > 0, then the three liquidation alternatives are
(a) X$ +Xe
(
Se$ −∆e$/2)+X£(S£$ −∆£$/2),
(b) X$ +
(
Xe
(
Se£ −∆e£/2)+X£)(S£$ −∆£$/2),
(c) X$ +
(
Xe +
X£
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)(
Se$ −∆e$/2).
(7.42)
The three strategies are equivalent if we have
(i)
(
Se$ −∆e$/2) = (Se£ −∆e£/2)(S£$ −∆£$/2)
(ii)
Se$ −∆e$/2
Se£ + ∆e£/2
=
(
S£$ −∆£$/2)
⇒ Se$ −∆e$/2 = (Se£ + ∆e£/2)(S£$ −∆£$/2).
(7.43)
The above conditions hold true simultaneously if and only if ∆e£/2 = 0,
which contradicts the hypothesis of the existence of bid and ask quotes for
all three currency pairs.
2. If Xe < 0 and X£ < 0, then the three liquidation alternatives are
(a) X$ +Xe
(
Se$ + ∆e$/2
)
+XU
(
S£$ + ∆£$/2
)
,
(b) X$ +
(
Xe
(
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)
+X£
)(
S£$ + ∆£$/2
)
,
(c) X$ +
(
Xe +
X£
Se£ −∆e£/2
)(
Se$ + ∆e$/2
)
.
(7.44)
The three strategies are equivalent if simultaneously we have
(i)
(
Se$ + ∆e$/2
)
=
(
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)(
S£$ + ∆£$/2
)
(ii)
Se$ + ∆e$/2
Se£ −∆e£/2 =
(
S£$ + ∆£$/2
)
⇒ Se$ + ∆e$/2 = (Se£ −∆e£/2)(S£$ + ∆£$/2).
(7.45)
The above conditions hold true if and only if ∆e£/2 = 0, which contradicts
the hypothesis of the existence of bid and ask quotes for all three currency
pairs.
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3. If Xe > 0 and X£ < 0, then the three liquidation alternatives are
(a) X$ +Xe
(
Se$ −∆e$/2)+X£(S£$ + ∆£$/2),
(b)
(b1) X$ +
( >0︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xe
(
Se£ −∆e£/2)+X£ )(S£$ −∆£$/2),
(b2) X$ +
( <0︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xe
(
Se£ −∆e£/2)+X£ )(S£$ + ∆£$/2),
(c)
(c1) X$ +
(
Xe +
X£
Se£ −∆e£/2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
Se$ −∆e$/2),
(c2) X$ +
(
Xe +
X£
Se£ −∆e£/2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
Se$ + ∆e$/2
)
.
(7.46)
First, we note that condition (b1) can only happen together with condition
(c1) and, analogously, (b2) with condition (c2). We start by considering
the triplet (a), (b1) and (c1) and we get
(i) Se$ −∆e$/2 = (Se£ −∆e£/2)(S£$ + ∆£$/2)
(ii) Xe
(
Se£ −∆e£/2)(S£$ −∆£$/2)+X£(S£$ −∆£$/2)
= Xe
(
Se$ −∆e$/2)+X£ Se$ −∆e$/2
Se£ −∆e£/2
(7.47)
In condition (ii) we can compare coefficients since we want the conditions
to be independent of the specific levels of the inventories Xe and X£.
Condition (ii) thus reduces to
(
Se£ −∆e£/2)(S£$ −∆£$/2) = (Se$ −∆e$/2). (7.48)
Conditions (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously if ∆£$/2 = 0. For the triplet
(a), (b2) and (c2) analogous considerations hold and the three alternatives
are equivalent if ∆e$/2 = 0.
Bibliography 182
4. If Xe < 0 and X£ > 0, then the three liquidation alternatives are
(a) X$ +Xe
(
Se$ + ∆e$/2
)
+X£
(
S£$ −∆£$/2),
(b)
(b1) X$ +
( >0︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xe
(
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)
+X£
)(
S£$ −∆£$/2),
(b2) X$ +
( <0︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xe
(
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)
+X£
)(
S£$ + ∆£$/2
)
,
(c)
(c1) X$ +
(
Xe +
X£
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
Se$ −∆e$/2),
(c2) X$ +
(
Xe +
X£
Se£ + ∆e£/2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
Se$ + ∆e$/2
)
.
(7.49)
We can proceed as in point 3 to find analogous results on ∆£$/2 and ∆e$/2.
Wrapping up, we can state that if ∆e$/2, ∆£$/2 and ∆e£/2 are strictly positive,
than the three alternatives need not to be identical.
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